
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TURKEY FACES WEST

THIS VOLUME IS BASED ON LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, WILLIAMSTOWN, MASS.

By Ewing Galloway, New York

MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA

PRESIDENT OF TURKEY

An intimate photograph of the head of the Nationalist Government.

TURKEY FACES WEST

A TURKISH VIEW OF RECENT CHANGES AND THEIR ORIGIN

Halidah Adib, kharum

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WE COME FROM THE EAST,
WE GO TOWARD THE WEST
ZIA KEUK-ALP

NEW HAVEN · YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON · HUMPHREY MILFORD · OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Printed in the United States of America

First published, August, 1930
Second printing, October, 1930

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PREFACE

It is a fundamental tenet of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that any man, however great his guilt and however long his criminal record, shall be given an opportunity to speak in his own defense before a judge or jury that has not already made up its mind. This proud boast has not always been observed by Americans when they have formulated their opinions about the Turks. Time and again the American press, the American pulpit, and American historians have indicted the Turkish nation, have pronounced a verdict of guilty *absente reo*, and have demanded summary execution by the armed forces of the civilized world. The principal witnesses for the prosecution have been missionaries and relief workers, politicians under the spell of the Gladstonian tradition, Armenian and Greek refugees and immigrants, and others whose impartiality and knowledge of the whole truth have left much to be desired. The witnesses for the defense have been practically nonexistent—the Turks in the United States being few and pitiably inarticulate. That the verdicts of public opinion thus arrived at have been unjust and sometimes grotesque is, of course, obvious. No student of Near Eastern affairs will deny

that the record of the Ottoman Turks during the past century is unpleasantly stained with tyranny, stupidity, and innocent blood. But it also cannot be denied that the picture of the Ottoman Empire presented to the American reader has been almost invariably incomplete and hence misleading. Prejudice, unenlightenment, and malevolence have been conspicuous characteristics of much that has passed as authoritative writing on the Near East during the past century in the United States. Now that the Ottoman Empire—an impressive scrap-heap of superannuated institutions, some inherently absurd and some essentially vicious—has gone the way of many other pre-war anachronisms, it is perhaps time to reëxamine some of our hoary opinions concerning the Turks and give them a day in court.

Madame Halidé Edib attempts in this book to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in frank and unashamed defense of her countrymen. In view of the complicated character of the Eastern Question she could hardly be expected to satisfy all varieties of opinion. But her intellectual and moral integrity as a witness is above dispute. She is a prophet not without honor in her own country, where she has had a distinguished career as a teacher, journalist, author, statesman, social worker, and soldier. The first Moslem Turkish graduate of the Constantinople Woman's College, she has been for more than three decades a just cause for pride on the part of

that outpost of American education. As one of the leaders in the movement for the emancipation of Turkish womanhood, she deserves high rank among the distinguished women of the world. Although with characteristic modesty she has put herself in the background in the pages of this book, Madame Halidé Edib played a prominent rôle in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908–09 and a still more prominent rôle in the Nationalist Revolution under Mustafa Kemal Pasha from 1919 to 1924. In the politics of her own country she has always been a liberal; in her outlook upon world affairs she is an internationalist. Hers is a voice to which Americans can listen with sympathy and confidence.

Although Madame Halidé Edib writes frankly from a Turkish point of view and in defense of the Turkish people, her book is no *apologia.* The old Ottoman Empire had no lure for her; she describes it as a nuisance to its neighbors and an abomination to its own nationals. She is rightly concerned over the "staff-officer" mentality of the present dictatorship. Although she was a Turkish Nationalist—embracing nationalism as the only emotional and moral force capable of saving the Turkish people from complete domination by Allied and Greek imperialism—she is of the opinion that "political nationalism is as ugly as any other creed which tends to make men exterminate each other." Her fundamental interests are not in politics, but in the cul-

tural heritage of the Turkish nation. Her sympathies are not with the army or the bureaucracy or even with the middle class but rather with the Anatolian peasantry, whose qualities of forbearance, courage, determination, and industry arouse her profound admiration. Where she is sharply critical of the West in its relations with the Turks, one feels that she speaks the truth, however unpleasant. The policy of the Great Powers toward Turkey has consistently been one of "betting on the wrong horse," and as the author wisely observes "what it means to gamble with human beings is known only to those who have been the pawns in the game." Madame Halidé Edib cites as indicative of the state of western opinion concerning Turkey the widespread and sensational emphasis placed upon the so-called "Hat Law" (prohibiting the wearing of the fez)—a pathetic commentary on our superficiality and interest in the bizarre where Near Eastern affairs are concerned. In short, the American reader will find in this book much that will challenge his prejudices, much that will shed new light in dark corners, and not a little which will make him question the omniscience which so many of us have arrogated unto ourselves. He will not, and should not, however, find refutation of those fundamental criticisms of the old Ottoman Empire and the new Turkey which have been offered by liberals and democrats without regard to their nationality.

Madame Halidé Edib is not new to American readers. She has already published a volume of personal memoirs which present a unique and charming picture of life in Turkey before the War. She is also the author of *The Turkish Ordeal*, a history of the Nationalist Revolution based upon her own observations during the bitter years of struggle under Mustafa Kemal Pasha for the emancipation of Anatolia. Her present volume is supplementary to both of its predecessors. Its account of the Nationalist movement, for example, is more detached, objective, and reflective. It shows how deep-rooted in the past are some of the revolutionary reforms of 1908–1909 and 1919–25. It makes persistent and salutary distinction between things essentially Ottoman and things essentially Turkish. It views modern Turkey in world perspective—attributing the present dictatorship, in part at least, to a general post-war reaction against democracy as a means of getting things done. Its historical sketch of the Ottoman Turks is unique in many respects, even though it is of questionable validity to speak of innate national characteristics and even though the use of the term "Turanian" has unpleasant associations with Edward August Freeman's *The Ottoman Power in Europe*, a thoroughly unreliable book, which in its day was a devastating influence in support of Gladstone's Turcophobia. Whatever differences of opinion one may hold as to some of

Madame Halidé Edib's conclusions, however, one must be profoundly impressed with her sincerity of purpose and with the catholicity of her interests.

As a liberal Turkish appraisal of new forces at work among the Turks this book will possess high value for students of contemporary Near Eastern affairs. It is to be hoped that it will receive a sympathetic reading on the part of those Americans who wish an honest statement of a point of view all too seldom heard in the Anglo-Saxon world.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE.

Columbia University, New York City,
January, 1930.

TURKEY FACES WEST

INTRODUCTION

"EVERYTHING goes back to its origin," says an Arab proverb. Although things and beings are constantly acquiring characteristics by new contacts and influences, their origins also continue to affect them. In the recent changes in Turkey, a great many intellectuals believe that there is a tendency to return to our origins. What is more important is that this belief is consciously propagated by a considerable number of the intellectuals, partly for the sake of making those changes acceptable to the masses. Some of the new phases will be easier to understand if one knows who and what the Turk is—or what the Turk believes himself to be, which is after all the same thing. Therefore, a brief rough survey of the origins and characteristics of the Turk—as a modern Turk understands them—may not be amiss.

Racially the Turks belong to the Turanian family. One trait characterizes the peoples of Turanian origin—a grim realism and objectivity. The Ottoman Turks in this respect seem to be perhaps the best example. A great deal in the historical evolution of the Ottoman Turks would seem less inexplicable if one kept this characteristic in mind.

Keyserling would call them extroverts; and like some extroverts, such as the Anglo-Saxons, the ruling passion of the Turks was empire-building. To understand the extent of this pet passion one has only to look over the map of Asia and read the names of its mountains, valleys, cities, and rivers. From the first century of the Christian era up to our own day Asia has been more profoundly altered than Europe in this respect, and the greatest alteration dates from the fifth to the eleventh century, coinciding with the Turkish and Mongolian invasions. The Turks dominated Asia and eastern Europe almost completely, up to the fifteenth century, that is, until science and method had conquered mere grit, organizing capacity, and force.

The outstanding empire formed by the Turanians before the Ottoman Empire was that of Jinghiz, founded in the twelfth century. Jinghiz set up a vast organization with almost unparalleled discipline and ruthlessness, and proceeded to enlarge it by further conquests. What is of interest to us is that Jinghiz is believed to have been the first great Pan-Turanist, the first leader who wanted to gather all the Turanian peoples under one banner in a common organization and racial culture.

Therefore it was natural that a number of Turkish states already based on Persian culture, with Islam as the guiding principle of state, opposed him. For Islam bases the state on religious law and recognizes no other unity among men but that of Islam; hence it is fundamentally antagonistic to all

racial and cultural nationalism. Naturally Jinghiz destroyed those states. Not only the Turkish Moslem states were destroyed, but the Arabic Caliphate of the Abbasids (1215) was also laid in ruins by his grandson Hulagu during his conquest of Bagdad. Jinghiz appeared to be as fanatical as the Christian crusaders against the Islamic states. Yet even a superficial study of his own state shows that at home he was entirely tolerant in religious matters. The Mongols and Turks in his camp, great or small, adhered to all possible religions—Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Shamanism, and others. Preachers and priests of those religions led their own flocks and propagated their own faiths freely. Jinghiz' second *yassa* (law) stands out as one of the most liberal and tolerant in religion. And in the special Mongolian and Turkish brand of cruelty, religious fanaticism is lacking as an element. Jinghiz' unquenchable hatred of Islam is directed against religion in the state rather than against religion itself.

I do not know whether the far-fetched historical evidence of Léon Cahun, and that of the recent Turkish Pan-Turanists (1912–18) is enough to convince us that Jinghiz was a conscious Pan-Turanist or any sort of "ist" whatever. But it is evident that, consciously or unconsciously, he was determined to keep the state and religion apart. Not only he himself but the prominent Mongols and Turks in his camp watched with complete indifference the rivalry of the missionaries belonging to all religions and their quarrels over the souls which they

wanted to obtain for their particular creed, and never took sides. In any case there is strong enough evidence at present to make us believe that the primary idea of the Mongol and the Turk in government is a non-theocratic one.

Like all the other conquering races of those days, the Turks built military states. The army with its chief, who is the *Khakan* (the ruler of the rulers), dominated the state and the individual. The Khakan made the laws with his council of elders (the *Kurultay*). Yet in spite of great military autocracy, the individual had a great deal of freedom and a dignity of his own. The nomadic origins of the Turks had something to do with this seemingly contradictory condition of things. For life among the nomads necessitates two seemingly contradictory aspects in the life of the community. First come authority and discipline. The chief who assumes the right to rule and to lead must be the fittest and ablest man. He may be autocratic and intolerably cruel, but he may not be weak or incompetent. Second, in the difficult and ever changing state of nomads every individual is of some value, and every individual develops a sense of responsibility toward the tribe, or the state which is the larger tribe. This combination of discipline and responsibility in the Turk makes him a democrat and an autocrat at the same time. The fawning, servile spirit which is usually the outcome of long autocratic and despotic *régimes* as well as of class rule—military or otherwise—is a foreign mentality which crept into the

official and city life with the Persian and Byzantine influences. The personal dignity of the Turkish peasant and the ordinary man in the street is proverbial and does not need any proving.

The study of the early Turks in the various aspects of their life is comparatively recent; it is called "Turkology." Although it is very incomplete, still it throws some light on their family life and the position of women among them. The data differ according to the various tribes among which the studies were made. Zia Keuk-Alp, a recent Turkish sociologist, always claimed that men and women shared all rights, political or otherwise, in Turkish society. His evidence was fairly strong and authentic. The Turks and Mongols (of the pagan period) claimed descent from a virgin who bore a son without a father and without sin. She is called Allangoya. Further, the ancestor worship of the Turk was not limited to the souls of grandsires; the souls of women ancestors were also included. Politically, authority was not limited to men. No law published beginning "By the order of the Khakan" was valid. It had to begin "By the order of the Khakan and the *Hatoun*" (hatoun means woman, but the early Turks used it also in the sense of queen). Even in the army, which was the supreme class, women could hold the highest grades such as that of commander. Zia Keuk-Alp justly declared that the inferior position of women in certain Turkish communities today was due to the Byzantine and Persian as well as Islamic influences. But Islam in it-

self, however, was not enough to alter the position of Turkish women. In the fourteenth century the famous Arabic traveler, Ibn-batuta, spoke in shocked terms of the freedom of Turkish women in the Crimea. It all appeared to him very unorthodox. Further, in his visit to the early Ottoman capital, Brusa, he was received by the wife of the Sultan in the absence of her royal consort, and she discussed state affairs with him. It really required centuries of Persian and Byzantine influence to change the condition of women—and those who were not submitted to these influences in their cultures did not change much.

To illustrate the last point one need not go far back. There are Turkish tribes, nomads called *Yuruks*, living at the present time in Turkey, especially on the Adalia and Smyrna mountains, who reveal how greatly they differ from the settled peasantry in the position of their women. Both are Moslems, but the settled Anatolian peasantry have been altered by other influences while the nomads are as they used to be centuries ago. Theirs is a society which would delight the soul of the western feminist in some respects. The women are not veiled, polygamy and divorce are practically unknown, marriage is the outcome of long intercourse and free choice. Women are on an equal footing with men in every respect, being responsible in social and tribal affairs as well as in personal morals.

Because of the drastic reforms which have affected religion in Turkey, the religious nature of the

Turk is being widely discussed all over the world—especially in the Asiatic and Moslem world. I do not know whether the religious nature of any people is subject to satisfactory definition. But in the case of the Turk the attempt has led to a series of contradictory conjectures. Western writers on Ottoman history differ widely. None among the historians attempts to define the religious nature of the Turk below the surface. One set of writers speaks of the Turk's religion as mere fanaticism—defining him as a being who kills everybody that refuses to accept his own religion. A charming American woman said to me after a lecture with a humorous twinkle in her eye: "My idea of the Turk was that of a man with a dagger who seizes you wherever he meets you, asks you to accept his religion, and if you refuse his request cuts your head off." This proved that the type of historian I have mentioned had done his work most thoroughly. As this fanaticism is not confirmed by historical evidence, another type of western historian speaks of the tolerance of the Turk in his religion. The second type usually tells us that this tolerance is due to indifference rather than to virtue. But very few have given any serious study to the religious nature of the Turk apart from its political bearing.

Common forms of religion among the early Turks were nature and ancestor worship. The prevalent form was "Shamanism," a kind of ancestor worship, but the large majority have accepted Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam; while a small section, the

Kareimenes of Crimea and Lithuania, have embraced Judaism.

Léon Cahun, who aroused contemporary interest in the origins of ancient Turkish culture in his book called *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie*, has his own particular idea about the religious nature of the Turk. According to him the Turk lacks the ardent enthusiasm of the Persian and the fiery nature of the Arab. Temperamentally the Turk is most at home with Buddhism and out of place in Islam. M. Cahun cites religious poems written in the old Turkish dialects by Turks, which are Buddhist in spirit although Islamic in form. He admits that the Turks have been sincerely attached to Islam and have defended it with their lives. But his personal hatred of Islam leads him all the time to strenuous attempts to prove that Islam has been fatal to the Turk. Still, there are a certain amount of beauty and a great deal of truth in the following passage which he writes after an extensive study of the Turkish religions that have given way to Islam:

> Although it is impossible to establish the dogma, the classification and the chronology of these religions, one arrives at certain general principles which are common to them all and so deduces their physiognomy from the aesthetic point of view. Their primary trait and characteristic is a very great gentleness, a familiar tenderness for man and the world that surrounds him. It is a religion of the open, one without theology, entirely simple and rural.*

Anyone who has had any serious contact with the

* *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

simple and rural Turk will admit that there is a serene and contemplative element in him; there is a lack of theology and above all a familiar tenderness for man and the world that surrounds him. In this the Turk is utterly different from the Persian, who weaves together his politics and ideals of conduct and is never content until he finds an outlet for his religious feeling in martyrdom and suffering. There is also a vast difference in this regard between the Turk and the Arab, who carries his religion from the realm of rationalistic thought into the domain of the metaphysical. The Persian is all spirit and the Arab is all mind in religion. What is the Turk then? Count Hermann Keyserling, in his *Europe*,* speaking of the Hungarians (a people racially allied to the Turks), mentions the fact that the word "soul" does not exist in Hungarian and that the word "heart" is used instead. This is also true in the case of the Turk. The word "soul" is taken from the Arabic. Further, the common Turk, especially the peasant, uses "heart" when he means "soul." In connection with such attributes of spirit as "Goodness" and "Fear of Allah" he always uses "Heart." Hence we might say that the religion of the Turk is all heart. And the normal Turk senses rather than reasons in the domain of the spirit and is content to keep it as a separate function. But in the domain of action this simple being comes out with a rare realism and reason which are difficult to understand

* Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1928, translated by Maurice Samuel.

when one has seen the childlike simplicity of his religious life.

Of the effect on the Turk of Islam in its favorable and unfavorable aspects we will talk later.

The object in presenting these primary qualities of the Turks in their earlier stages of development is clear: all the changes in the lives of the Turks which have come to the notice of the world only recently betray two dominant influences—racial psychology and the gradual penetration of western culture and civilization.

Ethnically, in defining the Turk of today, race has ceased to have much significance. It is more or less so all over Europe and America, but more so in the Near East. The Turks are so mixed a racial group that their Turanian origins are probably a small percentage of their blood, and from the racial point of view they are more Aryan than Turanian. Yet the state of the soul, or the reaction of the Turk to change, is singularly different from that of other peoples with whom he has mixed or of the people who gave him his pre-western cultures. The Turk believes himself to be dominated by racial characteristics to a considerable degree. And in the present changes the striking and probably lasting features are those which he consciously interprets as being in accordance with his past.

THE COMING OF THE TURKS

A HANDFUL of people with some such characteristics as are mentioned in the Introduction came to the Near East in the thirteenth century. According to H. A. Gibbons they were fifty thousand in number and according to Turkish chronicles they were a tribe composed of four hundred tents. These were the remnants of Turks who, after their kingdom in Karakorum had been destroyed by Jinghiz, had been fleeing from the onslaughts of his forces. The fact that they had been always opposed to Jinghiz without even the pretext of Islam (they were pagans in those days) shows that they were a handful of people of great independence of spirit. The hatred of the Ottoman Turks for Jinghiz and his descendants was such that for nearly seven centuries the Turkish historians used abusive language and refused to be fair whenever they treated of Jinghiz and the Mongols.

In the coming of the Turks to the Near East the most striking point is the smallness of their number and the vastness of the empire they built. The key to their success perhaps lies in the way they mixed with the most vital and creative types of the Near Eastern peoples. Amid a complete decay of administration, there were enough virile and talented Greeks and Slavs who were only too glad to join

with the rising Turkish *régime* and become part of the fresh force and life that the newcomers represented. In connection with the mixing of Turanian peoples with the others, Count Keyserling makes some very interesting remarks in his *Europe*.

> Whenever Turanian blood has mingled with the blood of any other high-bred race, there have emerged individual personalities of unique superiority. . . . Whenever a human type of mighty will has been revealed, one might say almost without exception that its character bore the trace, however remote, of the Mongolian blood-stream. . . . In the case of Turanian blood it seems that the slightest admixture suffices to transmit its fundamental advantages.*

Keyserling takes his examples outside of Turkey. I could cite throughout Turkish history a large number of individual personalities of unique superiority—early sultans, statesmen, writers, architects of international renown—who were mixed in blood but nevertheless were completely Turkish in their outlook, behavior, and creative activity. One must study the situation in the Near East at the time of the arrival of the Ottoman Turks with this important factor in mind. And the situation was something like this:

Imperial cosmopolitan Rome had given way to the Byzantine Empire. The Greeks of Europe, driven by the Avars and Slavs, and the Greeks of Asia, driven by the Arabs, concentrated in the imperial city and gave it a new administration which was predominantly Greek. Flanked by the Balkans

* Pp. 209–210.

and the Anatolian Peninsula, and forced to face continual invasions from either side, Byzantium found itself unable to hold both. It therefore concentrated its defenses in Anatolia. There was a natural reason for this. From the fourth to the sixth century Anatolia had been Hellenized and Christianized, and its dominant language had become Greek. The original inhabitants of Anatolia—Hittites, Phrygians, and no one knows who else—had been swallowed up in the Greek colonies; and though this civilization did not penetrate deeply into the peasant world, still the Greek rulers of Byzantium felt Anatolia to be Greek enough for them to depend upon its resources in their struggle against Balkan invasions. Consequently, Constantinople drew upon the army, the revenue, and all the resources of the nobility for its own use and offered nothing in return. Drained and exposed to the utmost extortion, the state fell into decay, which set in at first in the center where some of the feudal nobility of Constantinople broke away from the central government of Constantinople and formed new groups which were only loosely attached to it.

Amid this decadence, from the eighth century onward, the Turkish invasions of Anatolia increased. By the eleventh century Seljuk Turks were in possession of Anatolia from Smyrna to Isnik and they remained in occupation of eastern and central Anatolia. A complete Turkification set in. Both Prof. T. W. Arnold and Prof. A. J. Toynbee confirm the view that this conversion was not marked by vio-

lence of any sort. The peasantry had not been seriously Hellenized; the anarchy and tyranny of the church landowners was a source of oppression to the country, and no order or justice remained. The Seljuks proved better rulers than the Greeks, for Islam at the moment was more tolerant than Christianity. The Seljuks themselves probably became fundamentally Islamized during the period when they were settling down to form their kingdom based on Islam. It is most likely that the Anatolian peasantry changed its religion at the same time as the Seljuk conquerors. The whole of central and western Anatolia, swept by a common conversion, had become Turkish and Moslem by the end of the eleventh century, and nothing remained but some inscriptions on stones to speak of that remote past when that region had been beneath the sway of Hellenic culture and had spoken the Greek language. It is on the existence of these inscriptions, by the way, that the modern Greeks base their claims to Anatolia.

In the thirteenth century, when the Ottoman Turks came into Anatolia and settled in the northwest and the west, the Seljuk kingdom was on the wane, but the country was still entirely Turkish. The decadent Persianized Seljuks, with their Turkish background, formed a point of strength for the newcomers in the beginning. But the building up of the new empire and state had little or no help from the presence of this body of people of its own race and religion. On the contrary, it had to face great opposition from the scattered Turkish principalities,

and had to fight down to the time of the Conqueror, Mohammed II, in 1453, to unify and to subdue those Seljuk principalities. But the Ottoman Turks derived a great deal of strength in their early constructive work from the Christians of Byzantium. All that was vital and young in the community, all those who were revolted by the decadence and corruption of the Byzantine rule, rallied around the Turks. Many Greeks—commanders and men of culture and ability—joined the Ottoman state, became Islamized, and formed some of those valuable elements which later helped to build up the empire. The Slavonic community in the Balkans, which had neither peace nor justice until the strong hand of the Turkish conqueror helped to restore these things, also rallied to the side of the Ottoman Turks. Intermarriage on a large scale started very early. About two centuries after the coming of the Ottoman Turks, Constantinople fell to the Turks and the Byzantine rule came to an end. George Young speaks of the episode in his *Constantinople*,* thus:

> The Turks, at first sight, would seem to have been an association of barbarous tribal communities, united by a feudal military system for the purposes of a fanatical crusade. Why, we may ask, should their feudalism and fanaticism have succeeded in establishing an Ottoman Empire in the city where Christian feudalism and fanaticism had just hopelessly failed to establish a Latin Empire? The explanation, put in as few words as possible, would seem to be this: firstly, the structure of the Ottoman State until the last century, although it appeared to be despotic in its

* Geo. H. Doran Co., 1926, pp. 115, 124–125.

façade, was democratic in its foundations; and secondly, the Turkish character, by temperament, training, and tradition, was more equable and equitable than the Greek or the Latin. . . . The State entry of Mohammed II appeared to the moralist of that day as the triumph of Islam over Christianity, of evil over good. To the moralist of a later day it came to mean the triumph of justice and reform over oppression and rascality, of good over evil. But to us it may present itself neither as the one nor as the other, but as the inevitable substitution of the sound Ottoman social system for the decayed Greek imperialist ideals and interests.

"All Turanians are matter-of-fact, unmetaphysical, thoroughly of this world," says Keyserling.* This may be too sweeping a statement to make about any race. But it is nevertheless true that the Turks have acted unsentimentally in moments of crisis and in moments of achievement. It is this trait that led them to adopt the Slav and the Greek of the younger type rather than the old Seljuk. It was their westward step—and in this westward step their adoption of Islam rather than of Christianity may appear to a superficial reader of history as incongruous. After all, they had adopted Islam either during or after their arrival in the Near East.

H. A. Gibbons in his work *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, speaks of Ertoghrul, the father of the first Turkish Sultan, as still a *shaman*. We might ascribe two important reasons for this. In the first place the simple and objective Turk may have been bewildered by the dogmatic complications and

* *Op. cit.*, p. 211.

intricate theology of the Orthodox church. But, above all, the effect of eastern Christianity on the outward conduct of the eastern Christians was very ugly. The church was one of the tools of oppression and persecution, and it had ceased to act either as a moral or a unifying political and administrative force. It muddled and complicated administration rather than helped it in either a human or a legal way. One example from Gibbon* of Christian conduct is sufficient to illustrate this point:

> The Latins were slaughtered in their houses and in the streets; their quarter was reduced to ashes; the clergy were burnt in their churches, and the sick in their hospitals; and some estimate may be formed of the slain from the clemency which sold above four thousand Christians in perpetual slavery to the Turks. The priests and monks were the loudest and most active in the destruction of the schismatics; and they chanted a thanksgiving to the Lord when the head of a Roman cardinal, the pope's legate, was severed from his body, fastened to the tail of a dog, and dragged, with savage mockery, through the city.

The Latin conduct was not much better either, and offers similar examples. It was natural for the Turk, who is above all at his best a state-builder, to see that the Christian church was no longer a force to be depended upon in laying down the principles of a new state. Of Islam in those days George Young says:

> The Arabs, more generally known in this connection as

* Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. lx.

the Saracens, were not savages like the Avars, nor free-booters like the Persians. They possessed a culture inferior to that of Greece, but adaptable, and capable of assimilating Greek ideas. They had a commerce that followed their conquests. Their creed was inferior to Christianity as a spiritual faith, but superior to Orthodoxy as an inspiring force. They came not as mere raiders, but as reformers, offering to the oppressed provincials a release from the imperial extortion and corruption. Even the provincial Churches, the first shock of conquest past, settled down almost with relief under tolerant and trustworthy Arab rulers.*

Professor Arnold, in his *The Preaching of Islam*, gives an exhaustive account of the effect of Islam upon the administration of conquered Christian or pagan countries by Islamic rulers. Hence it is safe to say that if the simple Turk took to Islam because of its comparative simplicity, the state-building Turk found in its judicial and administrative phases a more reasonable and workable possibility.

The most difficult problem the Turks had to face in those days was the heterogeneous quality of the place. It was composed of many races speaking different languages, belonging to two antagonistic religions—Islam and Christianity—the struggle between the Christian churches and sects being, if anything, more ruthless than the struggle between the Moslems and the Christians.

The Turks solved the Byzantine race and religion dilemma in this manner:

They divided the various peoples of the Ottoman

* *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

state into church nations, that is, they classified from the religious rather than the ethnical point of view. The Ottoman nation came first. It was composed of all the Moslems—Turks or non-Turks. They constituted the politically ruling classes, and were under the jurisprudence of the Islamic law. The Orthodox nation came next. As its head the Greek Patriarch acquired a power such as he had never possessed before. Supported by the Orthodox clergy and the nobility of Phanar, crowned and sceptered, with a Janissary guard of his own and his own prison and court, he ruled all the Orthodox Christians, Greeks or otherwise. In matters of culture and religion his people had complete freedom, more so than any modern minority today. Their common obligation to the Ottoman state took the form of taxation (*Haraj*). The other nations were organized and classified according to their religious faith and church, and put under the same complicated system. Based as it was upon churches as states within a state, it was the only possible solution to the Byzantine tangle.

The system worked well, and its elements lived together in tolerable harmony and contentment until the end of the seventeenth century. But the harmony and continuity depended on the Turkish way of handling the situation and the Turkish stability and force in its turn depended on two principal classes and institutions—the military and the judicial.

The military classes. The army was the ruling

caste in the nation, or the motive power of its machinery. In the organization of the military classes the Turks did not depart from their original methods. To combine love of order and discipline with democratic principles demanded the association of every race of the empire in this important class. They accomplished this by conscripting a certain number of children from all the subject races and, though the Christian historians have spoken of the system as the "Blood Tribute," George Young, who judges its merits by its efficiency and workability, says:

> Orkhan arrived, possibly by accident, at an arrangement for the association of subject races in political power; and this without weakening the executive. He established a ruling class, composed of two castes—one military, the other civil—recruited by conscription from the subject races. In modern language this is described, and much censured, as the "tribute of blood." The "tribute" children thus obtained were educated either as soldiers, the "Janissaries" or new soldiery, or as civil servants. Both divisions obtained not only education at the public cost and emancipation from all the evils of poverty, but also the opportunity of elevation by merit to power. . . . The tribute child from Albania or Greece or Trebizond got as good an education for public responsibility as he would have had on the charitable foundations of Eton or Winchester. . . . The excellence of the early Ottoman administration is evidence also that, on the civil side, the system was . . . a success.*

The system, though ethically unjustifiable, was a success in operation, and this was not due to the

* *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

fact that some of the children were Christians but rather to the merits of the education they received and to its sound principles of elevation through merit and talent alone. It was, however, gradually abandoned, and by the seventeenth century at least was superseded by a system of elevation through favoritism. The children of the *bourgeoisie* were rising to influence through bribery and wirepulling, and with this change the discipline and efficiency of the institution came to an end. Still, efficient or inefficient, the army continued to be the ruling caste of the empire.

The judicial system (*Sheriat*). The laws that governed the Ottoman state, that is to say the Moslem nation, were *Sheriat* (Islamic laws). Islam as a religion has no priesthood; between man's conscience and God no man is allowed to stand. But Islam is not merely a religion; it is an all-round system, whose object is to create a society, a type of man. It regulates his politics, his administration, all his human as well as legal and economic transactions with his fellow men, Moslem or otherwise. By accepting Islam the Turks bound themselves to set up a certain type of state, with the rigid laws and rules such a state contained. The consequence of this was that in the body of men or organization, mainly judicial, which administered these laws, was to be found the other important ruling and all-powerful class in the Ottoman nation. The power of Islam in Moslem society does not come from a priesthood which it does not possess, but from the

judicial body called the Men of the Learned Path, the *Ulema*. Hence the Ulema and the military constituted the two all-important classes which ruled the Ottoman Turks.

It is impossible for western minds, with their fundamentally different approach to the laws which govern a state, to comprehend the upheaval in the Moslem East, and the difficulties which lay in the path of Turkish reform, without first clearly grasping the principles of the Islamic law which is Islam itself.

The western conception of law is Aryan. Its primary characteristic is that it is man-made. Further, the Roman conception of law dominates it, that is, it is made for the people of a particular country, by that particular people. Christianity, taken from the mouth of Christ, before it became a system of church machinery and took on a temporal and judicial aspect, is a case in point. For, apart from the question of marriage, Christ made no attempt to lay down a temporal law. "Render, therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Christ's religion in this sense is un-Semitic, for the dominating trait of the Semites is the mixture of the spiritual and the temporal, the attempt to regulate man's temporal actions through religion.

The Arabs had a Semitic conception of law. The law is God-made. Why? The law for the Arab was the solution of the problem of certitude in the matter of good and evil. They called it *husn* and *kubuh*,

beauty and ugliness. What is morally beautiful is to be done, what is morally ugly is not to be done—that was the basis of Islamic law. But who is to decide what is morally beautiful and what is morally ugly? Not man, for men differ in their notions of the morally beautiful and the morally ugly, interpreting these things according to their lusts and interests. If it were left in the hands of human beings to decide on the certitude of good and evil, they would live in eternal strife. It follows that the law must be divine—God-made. The Islamic law, then, being God-made, holds good for every Moslem. It cannot change, and it is not confined to any particular country or people, but is valid for every single one of the Moslem people, who must take its whole system as the code to guide their conduct in life.

As God does not speak directly to man, he sends his messengers. There have been Adam, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus; finally Mohammed came to give the ultimate message concerning good and evil. All the sources of Mohammedan law are therefore to be found in the Koran (the Moslem scriptures), contained in the deeds and sayings of the prophet, that is, such as have come down from reliable sources. The prophet died in the seventh century; the Islamic law was not codified until the ninth century. For two centuries Islamic law was a matter of interpretation. A time came when stability and unity in the Islamic law became necessary. And in the ninth century four great founders of the Islamic

creed codified the Islamic law; that is, they laid down the Sheriat as an unchangeable and eternal monument of human guidance in life and in the hereafter.

The codification and the great men who accomplished it are worthy of notice. Those who have merely read the Koran or the prophetic traditions are in the habit of judging its merits by quoting some bloodthirsty passage or some contradictory tradition from the time of Mohammed. This is entirely unfair and incorrect. For the men who codified it possessed extraordinary minds, logical, humane, and judicial. Out of the seven thousand verses of the Koran and out of the thousands and thousands of prophetic sayings they chose fifteen hundred as having any legal importance.

Count Léon Ostrorog, lecturer in Mohammedan Public Law and Turkish Land Law in the University of London, an internationally known Arabic scholar, speaks of the Islamic law in very high terms in his book called *The Angora Reform*. According to him, the code is a monumental moral and judicial structure. In it the four great Jurists of Islam laid down the principles of the rights of man, including individual liberty of person and property. They elaborated a law of war which in its humanity and chivalry surpassed all western codes for nearly a thousand years. They also laid down a doctrine of toleration of non-Moslem creeds such as did not exist in Christian countries for several centuries. The power of the Caliph was founded on a contract

which allotted to him the function of carrying out the judgments of the doctors of law and judges of Islam. His was the executive arm of the law, but it was for the judges of Islam to pronounce. The doctors and judges of Islam were to see also that the Caliph properly fulfilled his executive duties; if he failed in capacity or performance, the contract by which he had been accorded power became *ipso facto* invalid. It may be imagined what formidable temporal power this gave to that well-organized body of men, the doctors of law and judges. But it is only just to admit, even for those who believe in man-made laws, that the Islamic law was workable and is still a very modern code except in its penal side and a few details about the family law.

The Turks who adopted the Islamic law underwent a great change. They ceased to be non-theocratic; the law, instead of being man-made, as in their early days, became God-made. And as they are very earnest in all their undertakings, they created a formidable Turkish Moslem judicial class, the Ulema, and invested it with immense authority. Without its consent no change or innovation could take place either in the case of individuals or of the state.

The Ulema became something in the nature of a clerical and learned regiment whose office it was to carry out the most essential duties in Islamic society. The *Sheikh-ul-Islam* was the head of the Ulema, which consisted of *muftis* (jurisconsults) and the *kadis* (judges of the empire). In short the Sheikh-

ul-Islam's position corresponded to that of the chief minister of justice in a modern state. He sat at the council of state ministers, and if he deemed any extraordinary measure to be contrary to the spirit of the Sheriat, he forbade it. No such measure was passed without his consent, and he never argued or deigned to discuss. He simply said, "*Olur*" (It may be done) or "*Olamaz*" (It may not be done). Some of these "May not be dones" are masterpieces of humanity. The greatest of them occurred at the time of Selim the Grim. He was a strong Pan-Islamist who dreamed of creating a unified state and even tried to make the Turks adopt Arabic as their language. He also wished to Islamize the Christians of the empire, and, in the event of their refusing, to exterminate them, just as those Moslems in Spain who refused to become Christians were exterminated by Christian dynasties and the Christian church. When he asked the consent of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, Ali Jemali Effendi, the answer was, "It may not be done"—and it was not done. I believe that Ali Jemali Effendi deserves to have statues to him erected all over the Christian world, for I do not know of any Christian church authority in those centuries who showed the same liberalism and humanity to Moslems. The fact that such a powerful Sultan, who beheaded Grand Viziers very easily, recognized and bowed down to the authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islam proves the reverence and the earnestness of the Turks in their adherence to Islam. That the Islamic law was a liberal and humane

training for the Turk, there is no doubt, yet it must also be admitted that not the law itself, but the original conception of its infallibility and finality became detrimental to national progress. Man-made laws are flexible and offer a continuous possibility of growth, whereas Islamic law, while it provides a background of stability and unity, cramps the critical faculties of the man in the street.

The Christian world, of course, at the time when its church was a temporal institution, suffered from a similar handicap. But the temporal power of this church was only assumed, not essential, and the Reformation and later the ideals of the French Revolution freed western man from this partial impediment to progress and to the development of his critical faculties. The all-powerful interference of Islamic canonic law was not an assumed property; on the contrary it was the most essential part of its spirit.

I do not mean to say that reform and change were impossible in Islam. There have been attempts to interpret its scriptures and traditions in accordance with modern needs and ideas. Since the four great doctors and founders of the orthodox Islamic creeds were only men, and created the Islamic law in the light of their human reason and critical powers, why should not other men also interpret? So there arose in Islam the school of thought, known as *Mujtehidin*, which stands for leaving man's mind free to interpret. The other side is known as Traditionalists; they hold, that is, that the creeds laid down as

orthodox, and based on the Sheriat, are final and infallible. The latter school of thought has proved the stronger; they have ruled the masses and they are responsible for the failure of reform in Islam. They are also responsible for the stagnation in the Islamic world.

We have here the external picture of the Ottoman state, with the army and the Ulema as the two ruling classes which affected its conduct. It is only a rough outline. It is enough to say that the Ottoman Empire once established did what all other empires have done, under various names. It made itself a nuisance to its neighbors by endless aggressive wars, with or without the sort of imaginary pretext which all empire-builders invent. And the Ottoman Empire, like all others, after reaching its zenith, began to shrink and decline. This decline did not only affect the Ottomans and the peoples beneath their rule; it spread farther, and created international upheavals. Internal and external problems, the outcome of decline, continued to act and to react on one another for two long centuries, leading finally to the creation of the Turkish Republic of today. The problems with which we deal here are chiefly those of the nineteenth century. However interesting *sui generis* these problems may be, the most important thing is the way in which the Turks have handled them.

IMPERIALIST OTTOMAN VS. TURK

After the time when the Ottoman Turks entered the Near East and fell into the boiling pot of Near Eastern religion and culture, there emerged two different types of Turks—the Imperialist Ottoman and the Turk.

The Imperialist Ottomans, that is the ruling class, the class with the will power and the doctrines to build a lasting empire, were incontestably the motive power of the empire to the end of the nineteenth century. They were a composite but a very clear-minded class from the very beginning. As long as clear-mindedness lasted, as long as they were consistent in their doctrines for the state and for society in the Near East, their power lasted.

Their fundamental idea was not to base the state on race. Race they felt had nothing to do with it. The state was a geographical entity, with no end of people of mixed origins and cultures; hence the one common tie could only be a political one. As an auxiliary means of classification of the groups, they adopted a religious identification. Even the name of race was to be kept out. Hence they dropped their racial name, Turk, and replaced it by the name of Ottoman. This was a political name. They tried to get away from the tradition and the culture of the race as well. To them the Turkish element which

had come with them, or had been in the country before them, was merely a part of the human material of the state. A common Turk meant no more than a common Greek. Further the Imperialist Ottomans adopted almost an insulting tone toward the "Turks," especially toward the Anatolian Turks. "*Eshek Turk*" (the donkey Turk), "*Kaba Turk*" (the rough Turk), were two of the epithets which they used for the Anatolian peasantry.

The intermarriage of the Imperialist Ottomans may have been with or without a specific reason, but the adoption of Near Eastern civilization and culture was for a purpose: It was a conscious act or series of acts intended to create a purely Near Eastern state.

The civilization of the Ottomans is that of the Eastern Roman Empire. It was and is wrong to call it the Islamic civilization, although Islam was a dominant factor in it. The Romans, who were masters in assimilation, had made a single whole of the early eastern (Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, etc.) and the Greek civilizations. A great number of the Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Near Eastern peoples adopted it. Christianity and Islam became the two dominating religions, coloring the cultures and conduct of the peoples belonging to either of them. The Moslem Arabs took all their learning, science, and philosophy from the Greeks—or rather from the Graeco-Romans, who are the Byzantines. The Ottomans adopted the same through the Arabs under the name of Islamic learning. The fact that

they went to the Arabs, who were only translators, rather than to the Byzantine Greeks, who were the founders of that civilization, gave an air of super-artificiality and imitation to their learning. If the Ottomans had gone directly to the Byzantine Greek scholars for learning, probably the Renaissance would have started in the Near East. And the scholasticism of the Islamic church and Ottoman thought would have ended earlier than the scholasticism of the western churches and western thought.

The Islamic colleges (*Medresses*) became the centers of learning, philosophy, and science. Under the theological garb, science and philosophy were monopolized by those colleges. They were utterly medieval and scholastic and they remained medieval and scholastic to the end. In those countries where learning and philosophy are still in the hands of the Islamic colleges, they are still scholastic. This was an unnatural twist, or rather a feat, for the Turkish mind—for the Turkish mind is fundamentally practical and reasons on what it knows. It is objective and experimental. Hence, if not hampered by the learning of the Medresse, the experimental and inductive method of the later western schools of philosophy would have suited it perfectly.

In the domain of culture, especially in regard to the Turkish language and literature, the Ottomans became still more artificial. The written Turkish language of the Ottomans, which took the name Ottoman also, was a conscious, synthetic arrange-

ment, instead of an unconscious growth. It was not merely composed of Persian, Arabic, and Turkish words, the two former dominating; it also adopted the grammar and syntax of those two alien languages, side by side with that of the Turkish. There were three names for every object, three adjectives to define them, and three verbs for every action. The richness of a composite language, if it is an outcome of growth, is due to its vast scope of *nuance* and subtlety, to the way each foreign word, taken into it, brings not merely a noun, a verb, or an adjective which means the same thing, but a richness and variety of mood. English, the greatest composite language, because it was an outcome of growth, possesses this infinity of mood. The strange elements have blended more naturally, and have become Anglicized, while they have added their own particular character and shades of meaning. In the Ottoman language, there is a masterly technique but none of this subtle blending.

If the form was conscious and artificial, the choice of subject and the style were still more so. The pompous and artificial style with which the Persians expressed their achievements, the conventional phrases with which they described nature, and their all-dominant love of allegory were faithfully copied. The individual, everyday life, simple nature, and especially women, all of them favorite subjects of the common Turk, disappeared from Ottoman literature—the former as unworthy of literature, the last as indecent. The Persians could

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The new capital of Nationalist Turkey, a modern city growing around an old fortified rough mountain town.



By National Geographic Society

CONSTANTINOPLE FROM THE AIR

A recent view of the former Turkish capital.
Center: Mosque of Sultan Ahmed (the Blue Mosque).
Back: Hagia Sophia.

make out of artificiality masterpieces which have a tone of personality. The Ottomans had perfect technique but little or no originality, and they were read by very few.*

But in architecture, on the other hand, although the Imperialist Ottoman set out to copy and imitate the Arab and the Byzantine, he created something so entirely original in its conception of line and simplicity, that in the art of the Near East it will always stand out as a lasting witness to Ottoman genius. In music also, although they copied very much from the Arab and the Byzantine, the Ottomans brought in something of their own. The eternal dirge, which turns into a monotonous whine at times in Byzantine music, is not there. The religious chants took on a simple grandeur of their own, and the dance music acquired a spontaneous gaiety which neither the Arab nor the Byzantine school possessed.

If the Ottomans missed something ultimately good by not going directly to the Byzantine Greek scholars in the domain of thought and philosophy, they also lost some of their valuable assets of character by the direct influence of Byzantine society. The greatest alteration through the influence of the

* However, in the classic periods when Persian and Arabic choked out Turkish, in form and in spirit, there appeared lonely individuals among the Ottomans themselves, who thought and wrote in simple Turkish. Sheikh-ul-Islam Yahia Effendi, the contemporary of Nefi, in a time when the greatest artificiality reigned, wrote in simple Turkish. He is the greatest but by no means the unique example of the existence of a more congenial and less artificial spirit.

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Byzantines—for the worse—took place in the attitude of mind toward the family and woman, an attitude which had constituted the sanest and the strongest point in the early Ottoman and Turkish society. George Young says:

> It was an evil day for the Turkish race when the Crescent replaced the Cross over the dome of St. Sophia. When their feudal chieftains entered the palaces and private mansions of the Byzantine Greeks, the simplicity and severity of their society became exposed to an infection it could not resist. . . . After but two centuries the Ottoman society was no longer Turkish. . . .
>
> The process began at once. The Turkish ladies adopted . . . the diaphanous Yashmak or veil. . . . The Hareem was reorganized on the exact model of the Gynæcea of the Empress Helen. . . . The Seraglio and the Janissaries . . . had grown very like a Byzantine Court and its Imperial Guard.*

George Young's statement is utterly true for the Imperialist Ottomans. The group of ruling men who adopted a civilization alien to their nature, who amalgamated languages and cultures with supreme technique and no originality, altered its social life to an unrecognizable degree. But the process was not only slow but to a great degree ineffective as far as the masses were concerned. The Turkish masses remained strangers to the Ottomans in culture and in outlook on life. Although in the old days there always was a greater chasm between the ruling classes and the people than today, still it was never to the degree of creating two such separate types in

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 192, 193.

the same people as the Imperialist Ottomans and the Turks.

But there was one common point in the direction of development of both the Imperialist Ottoman and the Turk in the Near East. Zia Keuk-Alp expresses it in a verse. "We come from the East, we go toward the West." The face of the Ottoman was turned toward the West from the earliest times. Even in his conquests, excepting those of Selim, this westward urge dominated. When the Ottoman ceased to be able to advance, when he was forced to recoil back from the West, still this westward urge remained as an unchanging desire. It is from the moment of his failure and decadence that we see him earnestly striving to accept western civilization at a very high cost. Somewhere in the original Turk, the initial traits seem to have more in common with the West than with the East. Herein lies the Turk's superiority as well as inferiority to the other eastern peoples; with that curious, grim realism of the West, with its ruthless matter-of-factness, he handles his problems and passes on to new stages in his development, while the vast eastern world, the real East still talks, discusses, and muses. The outcome may be that when the real East accomplishes its new and future destiny, it may have an eastern face of its own, while the Turk might look less original but more fundamentally western.

The Imperialist Ottoman as a class has disappeared; and as an individual he is no longer a force. The second type, the Turk, has survived. As he is

the creator and the keeper in future of the Turkish Republic, one has to understand the kind of man he became in the Near Eastern boiling pot.

The Turk also intermarried almost as much as the ruling classes, but he remained more fundamentally Turkish than the Ottoman, if not in looks, at least in temperament. The civilization adopted by the Ottomans, the state they have built, the Turk accepted. The amalgamated cultures, consciously and deliberately welded and turned into the Ottoman culture and language, had no effect on him. It is true that he also was altered by the contact of these Near Eastern cultures, but it was a matter of growth rather than of conscious adaptation. Islam was perhaps the outstanding influence in his life, at least he thought so. But its effects on him were different from its effects on the Ottomans. It is the external effect of Islam on the Imperialist Ottoman which is most evident. In the first place it was a part of the machinery of state and of law. Beautiful mosques, rituals, religious ceremonies with vocal music, connected with public and personal life, are found in abundance. Apart from these externals it is difficult to say how much spiritual thought and emotion Islam gave to the Imperialist Ottomans, and how much the Ottoman was altered in adopting Islam. That externally it made him a gentleman is true. Good behavior is an essential part of Islam. But the Ottoman stuck faithfully to a most orthodox creed and remained orthodox.

The Turk took religion as something more than ceremonials and good behavior or machinery of state. The effects of religion are more internal than external with him.

The Turk called Allah (the Arabic word for God), *Tanri*, his supreme and favorite god of the pagan days. Tanri was the god of beauty and love, and he did not mete out punishments. A secondary god, *Erlik Khan*, the god of punishment, was not imported into Islam. The aesthetic side of his religious nature, the worship of beauty and love and the natural world, did not alter much. The Islamic preachers who threatened the masses with hell fire and the tortures inflicted by *Ifrits* (the hell keepers) there, were less popular than those who spoke of Tanri as a being of love and beauty.

The titled, learned men and teachers produced by the Medresses of Constantinople, the official Ulema and scholastics called *Ulema-i-Rusum*, did not affect him much. There was another body of men, the learned men of the people, called *Halk-Ulemassi*, who wrote and taught in simple Turkish and whose theology was rarely orthodox. The scholastic orthodox Islam with its complicated Arabic phrases appealed to the Turk as little as the doctrines of the Byzantine Orthodox Church. The Turk escaped from orthodoxy very early. A vast number of religious sects grew up all over Anatolia and in parts of Macedonia under the name of *Tarikats* (paths) and monastic orders. A great deal of Persian Sufism

and Pantheism penetrated into them. In some curious way Pantheism is the favorite tendency in the religion of the Turk, probably because of his love of nature. One frequently sees trees, mountains, and occasionally rivers with some sacred meaning attached to them. In the legends, epics, and stories of the Turks, mountains, rocks, rivers, clouds, as well as animals, speak and take part in the simple plot of the story.

In almost all these Tarikats the interpretation of God is beauty and love. The ultimate and absolute beauty is good. One of the greatest love stories of the East, *Leila and Mejnun*, has a passage that illustrates it. Mejnun, the lover, after untold suffering to win his beloved, Leila, loses his mind and goes into the wilderness. There he lives in friendly familiarity with the beasts of the wilderness. The storks build their nests in his hair and lions follow him like lambs. His beloved comes to him and asks him to return to the city with her. There is no longer any obstacle to their union. Mejnun looks at her indifferently and says, "*Yuru, Leila, ben Mevlami buldum*" ("Pass on, Leila, I have found my master"). He has gone beyond the material symbol of love.

These numerous unorthodox sects have fostered poetry, music, and dancing. *Mevlevi Tarikats* have been for centuries centers of these arts, as well as of beauty in dressing and living. They have not only made these fine values available to the people, and

in the people's language and music, but they have also produced the greatest musicians and poets of the Ottoman school. The father of modern Turkish music is Dede, a Father of a Mevlevi Tarikat. The greatest poet of the Ottoman school is Galib Dede, who wrote the *Husn-u-Ashk* (Beauty and Love). Another Turkish poet of all ages and classes, even of the Ottomans, is Suleiman Dede, another Father of the same Mevlevi Tarikat. He wrote in everyday Turkish Mohammed's birthsong (*Mevloud*). The chanting of that poem has become a religious ceremony and its spirit is not at all that of the orthodox Moslems.

In the domain of thought, political, religious or otherwise, *Bektashi* orders have played an important part among the people. The idea of universal brotherhood, although expressed by other orders as well, is their dominant note. They have always been considered not only outside the pale of orthodoxy, but also as revolutionary. Therefore they were persecuted by all *régimes* and by orthodox Moslems. The important part that these Tarikats played, in the spiritual, aesthetic, and even the intellectual life of the people, may be compared to the great rôle of the non-orthodox Russian sects in the life of the Russian masses. In Russia this influence has gone much farther than the masses. The intellectuals were influenced to some degree. Tolstoi is an outcome of one of those non-orthodox Christian sects. Fülöp-Miller in his book, *The Mind and Face of*

Bolshevism, gives some very interesting and detailed information on the subject. According to him, one-third of Russia was under their influence. Because of the vast difference of the language spoken and written by the Turkish people from that of the Imperialist Ottomans, this spiritual influence did not penetrate to any great degree into the mental life of the ruling classes.

Probably due to the softening influence of these Tarikats in Anatolia, the Turk in Anatolia is one of the most peaceful and non-aggressive types one may come in contact with. His ability to "let live" is nothing short of genius. The same is said of the Russian peasant also.

This peaceful attitude of mind of the Turk in Anatolia, which is a confirmed fact, might seem contradictory to the ordinary western reader who thinks of the Turk only as a fighter. But the quality of the Turk's fighting, if analyzed, confirms the pacific attitude of his mind. The best Turkish commanders have told me that the Turk was unsurpassable in defensive warfare, but was not so good in offensive warfare. The brilliant offensive campaigns of the Turks up to the seventeenth century owed a great deal to the Macedonian elements, which are very aggressive in temperament. But when it comes to holding his own, no one seems to equal him. This is probably due to the spiritual influences with which he has come in contact after his entrance to the Near East. All the wars within the last century were forced on the Turks either from outside or by the

Imperialist Ottomans who constituted the ruling class. Even the famous war song of the Anatolian Turk, "*Ey Gaziler*," is a pathetic melody. It recounts the hardships of war as much as any present-day international league for peace.

Another outstanding trait of the Turk, whether due to the same spiritual influences or not, is the curious lack of hatred and of desire for vengeance. When aroused, which is a difficult and rare thing, the Turk becomes most formidable, but the moment he calms down he no longer cherishes the ills or wrongs he might have suffered from his adversaries. A Turkish Nationalist said to me once, "The fact that all the other races who surround us or live among us preserve their hatred and nurse it like a beloved child, while we forget our wrongs in no time, is a disadvantage to us. One of the duties of Turkish Nationalism is to cultivate hatreds for those who have wronged us." I believe in the contrary. It is the duty of the real Turkish Nationalist to preserve the precious quality of being free from hatred. I also believe that this lack of hatred has given the Turk a supreme advantage over his neighbors, of course, in the long run. It is the advantage of those who are free from hatred to see things more clearly than those who always have their thoughts and decisions colored by such a strong passion as hatred. One must confess that the Imperialist Ottoman also was free from strong hatreds. But in him it was a virtue which all men who build and maintain empires have. In the case of the simple Turk it

is something far deeper in his nature, and the schooling he has had under Near Eastern spiritual influences has strengthened this trait.

In connection with all the Tarikats a vast amount of literature has accumulated among the people, written or unwritten. Some of the Fathers of the Bektashi Tarikats have been prominent poets, like those of the Mevlevi Tarikats. But the tone of the Bektashi literature has a definite quality—Turkish humor in religion. The Turk is the only person who can joke with his Creator in tender but reverential familiarity. There is no note of bitterness or complaint; it is a way with the Turk—he is simply telling his mind frankly to his Creator. Surely Allah, "the best Knower," is one above all with whom it is possible to be frankest. The most precious inheritance from our Turkish ancestors—no one knows how many other ancestors we have—is this ability to joke with "the best Knower," in moments of great distress. After all, now that the materialism which has dominated science until the beginning of the twentieth century is gone, because of the new theories developed from 1905 on, the most modern attitude of mind would be to take even the scheme of the universe as a Divine puzzle with a Divine joke behind it.

The self-expression of the Turk—artistic, literary, or philosophical—has always a subtle humor. The curious part of it is that this particular form of humor, always destined to be modern, belongs to the Turk in the Near East, and only to the Ana-

tolian. Macedonia is devoid of it. The Ottomans never went beyond satire in their Persianized period, and wit and irony in their westernized period. The Greek, the most brilliantly witty individual of the Near East, is also devoid of it. The central Asian does not have it. Whatever the reasons are which have produced this humor, it constitutes the philosophy of the Turk's life, the philosophy which gives him invincibility in the face of any amount of mental and spiritual suffering, a capacity to survive no matter what the odds are against him.

The Turkish language as used by the Turks was also different from the amalgamated language of the Ottoman with its high artistry. It is the Turkish of the Near East in its simplest form, which is the most beautiful Turkish. The harsh and sonorous domination of the string consonants has been softened down, a great number of moods, new ways of expression, and a new harmony have entered into it. A large number of foreign words have also been adopted in the Near East. But it was a matter of growth rather than of deliberate choice. In this the Turk differs entirely from the Ottoman. Foreign words added to the Turk's language became Turkicized. No foreign grammar or syntax had any effect on its construction. And whenever the Turk took foreign words, the Turkish words signifying exactly the same thing were dropped. If the Turkish words remained they assumed an abstract meaning. The words black and white, taken from Persian, used by the Turk signify merely color. The Turkish words

black and white are used in an abstract sense. The Ottomans did the contrary; the Turkish words were used to convey objective meanings. The abstract words, the words which meant a state of soul, were invariably from Arabic or Persian. This perhaps is the most significant difference between the Ottoman and the Turk in the way they have been altered by Near Eastern influences. In the Turk, the Turkish ego remains dominant, and all the outward influences which color and affect it are due to unconscious processes of selection and growth. The ego of the Ottoman is more composite. The process which made him an Ottoman was a deliberate and conscious one.

The simple Turkish tongue acquired a harmony and clearness which the Ottomans failed to give to their amalgamated language. And in this simple Turkish a vast number of written and unwritten stories, legends, epics, songs, hymns, and proverbs were created. The stories, especially the fairy, the animal, and the legendary tales, can be traced to old Turkish myths and are to be found among other Turkish-speaking Turks. The epics were created in the Islamic period. It is the warlikeness of the Moslem and not of the Turk which is usually the subject. The tales of heroic Turkish brigands (all of whom have a social purpose, to rob the rich and to look after the poor), love songs, dance songs, and a large number of humorous stories and skits on Turkish life were created in the Near Eastern period. *Nassir-ed-din Hoja* is the only internationally

known one. But there is an immense virgin field which needs a whole generation of study in order to collect, classify, and publish the formidable mass of the Turk's simple but creative culture.

The arts in Turkey, such as carpet making, wood carving, tile making, bookbinding, illuminations, furniture design, and domestic architecture belong to the Turk rather than to the Ottoman. The Turks have produced masterpieces in all these lines. Carpets and embroidery, a woman's art, show a sense of color and design, both quaint and original. It is Turkish, but Turkish of the Near East. The central Asian sense of color and design has disappeared. Yet in the consciousness of the race they have also preserved things which are not entirely of the Near East—tulips of a thousand tints, hyacinths remembered from the days of Altai, prairie colorings in the spring in its delicious gaiety and freshness. In any tiled mosque in Brusa, in any simple Turkish room with old Turkish carpets, one is cheered at once by these lively qualities which are entirely of nature. In all Turkish art it is this tendency toward simplicity, this wonderful copying of nature's colors, which dominates. There is line, harmony, and space in all Turkish buildings; geometrical designs and artistic ornament of a complicated nature were not native to the Turks.

The music of the Turk was also very different from that of the Ottoman. There are two dominant notes—gaiety in the dance music, and a strange nostalgic tone in all the rest. The Persian nightin-

gale and the rose with their garden settings do not exist in the Turkish songs. Frogs, cranes, storks, and all the creatures that sing or that live by lakes or rivers, are found in abundance. The background of these songs are prairies, mountains, and above all lakes.

In his family life and in his attitude toward women the common Turk was less influenced than the Ottoman by Byzantine or even Islamic ways. Polygamy was included as a custom, but in a very restricted sense. The seclusion of women, although a fact in the palace and among the higher classes, was practically unknown up to the eighteenth century. We find royal decrees of the first half of the eighteenth century ordering women (the common ones) to veil. The harem, which to the European means a place where the women are herded together for the pleasure of one man, to the Turk simply means home and an apartment for women. From it the Turkish women ruled the domestic side of life when they ceased to take part in the nation's life.

If the Turk was less influenced by that degeneration which was largely due to Byzantine influences, he was also influenced by the Byzantine in beneficial ways. His contact with Byzantine thought was not through Arab sources, or by contact with the ruling Byzantine. It was a more direct and personal contact with the simple Byzantine Greek. And that contact gave him a new and precious quality—the critical quality. Too much respect for authority in every way, too much restraint and a sense of order ham-

pers a people in their mental growth and in their political development, although it gives them stability. In those cities where the Turk has had direct contact with the Byzantine, such as Constantinople, Trebizond, Smyrna, and the Macedonian towns, there is a decided and active public opinion—the outcome of a critical spirit. That public opinion is necessary to curb the ruling classes and governments who are liable to have too much power. Hero worship may be a good thing but it opens the way to the self-creation of too many petty tyrants in a community. The Greek did not err on this side. He erred on the other side. If the Greek, because of this lack of constant hero worship, failed to have constant political stability, it gave him a greater sense of freedom and power and made him highly creative. Constantinople, which both acclaims and tears down its heroes very fast, has been a check to a continuous despotism. This critical faculty of the Turk, especially in the political sense, makes him more able to create a western state on western lines than the other peoples of the Islamic world in the Near and Middle East. And it is due to the fact that while the contact of the Ottoman with the Byzantine Greek world was more with its degenerate institutions of tyranny, such as royal guards and royal harems and the general machinery of corruption and subtle cruelty, the Turk met the simple Greek of the Byzantine days—a different being from the Greek of today.

For centuries the Turk was lost behind the color-

ful and forceful Ottoman façade. In the early periods of change, all through the nineteenth century, the Turk was more passive than active. The initiative came from the Ottoman. In the later period, within the last twenty years especially, the Turk has become a more active and living factor.

THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMANS

The Ottomans reached the zenith of their power in the sixteenth century. From the sixteenth until the end of the eighteenth century they lived on, or more truly struggled to live, within the powerful organizations of the state which had been created with so much ability and force in the earlier centuries. But the mighty structure of the Ottoman Empire was becoming an empty shell; the spirit and life behind the organizing power had been weakened or rather staled. The decrepitude and decline of the Ottoman Empire was becoming evident because the outside world, the Young West, was being changed. From the sixteenth century on the West was being revolutionized constantly. New trends of thought in the field of science were affecting its whole mode of life; its armies, societies, administrations, and men were all very different from what they had been. The effect of this new life of thought and change upon the stability of the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating and disastrous. And the disaster was due to the fact that the Ottomans became aware of it later than the subject races.

Some of the subject races, especially the semi-self-governing ones within the state (the Roumelian principalities and the Christians), were very keenly affected by the changes in the West. Naturally

enough the Balkans, where Christians were in a majority, were most sensitive to the revolution of thought taking place in Europe. For one thing, the change in methods of transport had brought them into closer touch with the centers of western thought.

The most significant trend of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was toward the new conception of nationalism. This western nationalism which had come into life with the Reformation had received a fresh impulse through the French Revolution. It brought in its train ideals of equality, political unity, and independence—and it signaled the doom of empires. This mighty influence naturally found ready ground among all the Christians, first among those nearest to the source of this new ideal and doubly subject to foreign rule, politically to the Ottomans and in religion to the Greek Orthodox Church, whose tyranny was less acceptable to the non-Greek Christians than that of the Ottomans.

The Ottoman rulers were unable to realize the psychological causes of this unrest. In the first place the ruling class was occupied with wars and the general business of government. Besides, like all imperialists, they had their superiority complex, a kind of blindness to, and even contempt for, the causes of any change which might be taking place among the subject races. For the fundamental reason that the Ottomans were a race of rulers, there was a vast difference in culture and outlook upon life between the Ottomans and the western nations.

The signs of disintegration in the Ottoman Empire at once drew the attention of its powerful neighbors. Earlier in history these Powers had tried hard by means of religious war, the Crusades, to drive away these Ottomans who acknowledged a rival religion. Their efforts had failed. Later, the Ottomans had waged continual war upon them and had succeeded in preserving their supremacy for several centuries. The Ottoman Empire held the key to all the most important trade routes, and was in itself an appetizing joint from which every Great Power hoped to carve the best slice for itself. This attitude of mind on the part of the great western Powers brought about rivalries and alliances, groupings and regroupings—a whole series of actions, which constitute one of the most exciting chapters in the history of modern times and are collectively known as the "Eastern Question."

The Powers concerned in the Eastern Question played a game with the differences in culture and religion between the Ottoman Moslems and the Christians. Their policy, united or separate, was to use the Christian groups as trumps in their political gambles in the East. Lord Salisbury's famous sentence condemning the pro-Turkish policy of the English Government, "We have backed the wrong horse," is a glaring example of the gambling spirit of the western Powers in those days. What it means to gamble with human beings is known only to those who have been the pawns in the game.

The nearest country, and one which in a way had

suffered most from Ottoman supremacy, was Austria. From the moment when the Ottoman decline began—which for the sake of convenience we may date 1699, the year of the Treaty of Karlowitz—Austria had begun to assume an aggressive attitude. But when, toward the latter part of the nineteenth century, another Power, Russia, began to poach on what she regarded as her own preserves, Austria adopted a double policy. She attacked Turkey whenever there was a possibility of getting something for herself, but whenever Russia seemed in a position to get something out of Turkey, she helped the latter. Until 1908 the main theater in which the drama of the Eastern Question was played was the Balkans; after that date it became Anatolia. But the conflict between Russia and Austria over the Eastern Question was confined solely to the Balkans.

The second territorial neighbor of the Ottoman state was Russia. At the time of the Ottoman decline she was a rising nation with a great deal of superfluous youthful energy seeking for an outlet. She engaged, with or without reason, in a series of aggressive wars, but there was one legitimate cause for her desire to attack and drive out the Ottomans. She was barred from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, mainly by the position of the Ottoman Empire and the blindness of those Turkish statesmen who failed to come to an understanding with her on this vital point. One must add, to be just, that the Turkish statesmen could not have done anything else either. The western Powers were persist-

ent and insistent in keeping Russia and Turkey apart, and in keeping the Russians away from the Mediterranean. The freedom of the seas looms up as an inevitable issue in all the Russo-Turkish conflicts.

With this primary background of grievance, Russia found plenty of other pretexts for attacking Turkey. She was naturally interested in the fate of that large number of Slavs within the Ottoman state who looked up to her as their racial protector. Nevertheless, in the first decade of her interference, she did not pose as the protector of the Slavs. She stood for an older, more deeply rooted, but impossible political idea—that of the Greek Orthodox Church which was to restore the Byzantine Empire. As the Greek Church was the second and intermediate state between the Slavs and the Ottoman state, this was perhaps an easy course. It was Peter the Great who first formulated the desire to expel the Turk from Europe and reëstablish the Byzantine Empire—hence the inscription "Petrus I. Graecorum Monarcha," beneath his portrait in Amsterdam. Catherine II followed in his footsteps; she too dreamed of the restoration of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. She even decided that her nephew, Constantine Pavlovich, should occupy the throne, and had the young boy brought up by Greek nurses.

In the immediate neighborhood of, or actually within, Russian territory, there were people of Turkish race who formed a point of contention between

Russia and Turkey. Such were the Turks in the Caucasus and Crimea, and Moslem Turks in other parts of Russia who were connected by religion and origin with the Ottoman state and the Caliphate. The interest which Russia took at a later period in the Slavs was known as Balkan Pan-Slavism, and the interest of the Ottoman Empire in Russian Turks after 1912 is known as Pan-Turanism.

The French rôle in the Eastern Question has been that of a traditional friend to the Ottoman state. France could not cope with Hapsburg supremacy in Europe by herself, and she either had to ask the powerful Sultans of the day to assist her in her conflicts with Austria, or to incite the Sultan himself to wage constant wars and humiliate the Hapsburgs. Her second interest in Turkey was economic. She was the first to obtain an economic capitulation and the French flag had the monopoly of trade in Turkish ports up to 1673. But France also aspired to the rôle of protector of the Christians in the East, and the rivalries of Russia and France on this point were a constant source of trouble to the Ottomans. In the first phase of the Eastern Question, France's territorial ambitions in Turkey were indirect; she occupied Egypt through rivalry with Great Britain, for when her claim to India had been usurped by the British she still hoped to control the route through Egypt to India.

Until the nineteenth century Great Britain's interest in the Ottoman Empire was mainly economic. The interest, nevertheless, was a very real one, and

she held a dominant position in the councils of the Powers who gathered together to decide whether Turkey should be dismembered or retained as a European Power. The latter course was adopted by all of them whenever the question of the disposal of Turkish booty, if Turkey should totally collapse, threatened them with serious conflict.

Sweden, Holland, and Prussia also had each a voice in the Eastern Question; but they all played secondary parts, until Prussia, as united Germany, entered into the Eastern Question as a fifth important factor.

In short, from the end of the seventeenth century until the end of the nineteenth—if we disregard the years of the French Revolution, which for a time held the world's attention more than the Eastern Question—we see the Great Powers of the West constantly discussing methods of disposing of the "Sick Man's" goods.

In collaboration with the external agents in the Eastern Question, a speedy and violent disintegration took place in the Balkan dominion of the Ottomans.

The word Balkan means "Mountain" in Turkish, and it has replaced the original name of *Haemus*. The peninsula includes a very vaguely defined area. It has constantly changed its boundaries, and it appears at its largest today. But whatever its frontiers, the peninsula has always been inhabited by violent peoples with clashing interests. Internal strife has been perpetually intensified by the inter-

ference of outside nations, which have always made trouble in the Balkans whenever they got the chance. Unfortunately, this state of affairs has not come to an end; it is only the names of the external actors that have changed. Instead of the great Slavic power, Russia, and the Germanic power, Austria, it is the Latin races which now affect politics and events in the Balkans, namely, France and Italy.

Rome held the peninsula in peace by sheer force; but from the fifth to the fifteenth century it became a scene of perpetual outbreaks, and the Byzantine Empire, the successor of Rome, tried in vain to hold it in check. Byzantium succeeded, however, in converting a great part of the Balkans to its Orthodox Church, and made great but not entirely effectual efforts to impose its culture and language upon them also. In the meantime, invasions continued to take place. They were mostly Turanian or Slavic in origin (Huns, Avars, Bulgars). But of all the Turanian nomads only the Bulgars took root. This race became completely affiliated with the Slavs, and the nation to which the Bulgars have given their name is Slav both in culture and language.

The Ottomans were the next to pacify the Balkans as completely as the Romans had done, and beneath their rule, for nearly three centuries, the Balkan Peninsula rarely saw an alien occupation. And when disintegration of the Ottoman Empire started, because of their numerical supremacy the independent Slav states came into existence more naturally. Their ideals were less complex than those

of the Greeks, and wherever there was a big Slavic majority a Slavic state came into being. The most important are Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria; the Rumanians, a people of Roman origins and culture—or at least believing themselves to be so, which is all that really matters—gained their independence most easily of all, for they had always had semi-self-government under the Ottomans.

The first state that was formed out of the Ottoman Empire was Greece. The struggles in its formation were the bloodiest; and they were part of a greater international movement, which had its far-reaching effect in Turkey and was one of the active forces in the creation of the Turkish Republic.

Two ideals contributed to the creation of modern Greece. The first of these was that of the Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate, the restoration of the Byzantine Empire. It was unworkable for two reasons. In the first place, it was contrary to the new western nationalism in which states are not based on religion primarily. In the second place, there is no other people in the whole world who can so systematically and ably exterminate minorities as the Greeks. It is not necessarily effected by massacres, although massacres play an important part in the history of all Near Eastern peoples. Because of this phenomenon of minorities fading out of existence under the Greeks, no people in the Balkans would voluntarily accept Greek rule. The extent of this anti-Greek feeling among the Christian non-Greeks, under the Greek rule today, can be readily estab-

lished. An Englishman who went to the Balkans to study, several Americans, and several Bulgars have told me that the non-Greek Christians under Greek rule in the Balkans are sighing for Turkish rule. It means a pretty bad state of affairs.

Side by side with the ideal of the Greek Orthodox Church, that of an eastern Greek Empire, there arose among the Greeks the more modern idea of forming an independent Greek state. Though the Orthodox Church did not abandon its old idea, it helped the Greek people to realize this new and legitimate ideal. The *Philike Hetaeria* had branches in all the cities of the Levant. Although this body was called the Friendly Society, its aims were revolutionary; it distributed arms, and carried on extensive propaganda in various European centers as well as among the Greeks themselves. The great Greek linguist Coreas created a modern Greek prose literature, and their patriotic poet, Rigas, wrote stirring poems to herald the rebirth of the Greek nation.

European public opinion was ready to embrace the Greek cause with enthusiasm. Great poets, scholars, and admirers of ancient Greece, all helped the Greeks and carried on an effective propaganda for this race which they considered the descendants of Pericles. Although modern Greeks are ethnically farther removed from the ancient Greeks than the modern Turks are from their Asiatic ancestry, still modern nationalism is in a sense the outcome of

culture and language and can be explained more as a state of mind than as a racial movement. If the Greek insurgents were unable to realize their national independence by fighting, the Greek propagandists were able enough to procure the services of European armies and navies. Professor Toynbee, speaking of the art of propaganda in the Near East, says: "This questionable art, which is unfortunately characteristic of Western culture . . . has been acquired by the Greeks with uncommon virtuosity."* In 1820 the Greek rising became a reality in the Ottoman state. Constantine Ypsilanti, a general in the Russian army, crossed the Pruth and declared the Greek revolt against the Sultan, announcing his intention of restoring the Greek Empire of the East. The movement could have little success in a region where the Wallachian population was in a majority, for the Wallachians emphatically preferred Ottoman to Greek rule; and as the Czar did not countenance his general's behavior, this part of the revolt was not successful.

The risings in Morea, Patras, Athens, and Kalamitas were very different. The insurgents massacred the Moslem Turks wholesale, and in Morea virtually wiped them out. The capture of Tripolitza is spoken of in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* thus:

"The crowning triumph of the Cross was celebrated by a cold-blooded massacre of 2,000 prisoners (Moslems) of all ages and both sexes."

* *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 345.

The western press uses two terms for the inhuman act of slaughter in the Near East, in individual or collective cases. If the sufferers are Christians it is martyrdom inflicted on Christians by the barbarous Turks; if the sufferers are Turks, or even Moslems, they are merely slain by the civilized Christians in some just and holy cause. The Greek Patriarch, who was involved in the Greek insurgent movement, was condemned to death and executed. The Turks in Chios massacred a few Greeks; European public opinion which had watched the great massacre by the Greeks in silence broke out into fury at these Turkish reprisals. Finally the Greeks obtained their independence in 1830, after a long struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the European navies. Later, the Russian army also came to the aid of the Greeks.

The advent of western nationalist ideals in the Near East and the Balkans, at a time when the Ottoman Empire had become too weak and powerless to keep order, brought an atmosphere of wholesale slaughter; the peoples of the Balkans were only too ready to adopt the system, and during the whole of the nineteenth century the Balkans became a scene of frequent carnage. The Greek massacred the Bulgar, the Serb massacred the Albanian, the Bulgar massacred the others, the Turk also interfered and did his share from time to time. It was not until a century later that Anatolia also took to the system. This realization of national ideals by massacre in the Balkans only drew the attention of Europe

when these desperate Christians took to slaughtering one another.

By the close of 1913 (the end of the Balkan War), the Balkan Christians had established their national and independent states. What is more, they had actually, for the first time, formed an alliance and fought the Turk by themselves, driving out most of the Turkish element in the Balkans either by extermination or by fear. But even without the Turk, the curse of inter-massacre continued. An International Commission sent by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to study events in the Balkans after the second Balkan War published some detailed accounts of these massacres. The Commission was pro-Bulgar and pro-Albanian. The principal sufferers, the Turks, received very little space. But among the records of horror, there are Greek letters and a Serbian letter taken from private soldiers which are typical of these massacres. All might have been written by Greek privates in the Anatolian Campaign of the Greeks in 1920–22. These are the Greek letters:

> By the order of the King, we are setting fire to all the Bulgarian villages, because the Bulgarians burned the beautiful town of Serres, Nigrita, and several Greek villages.
>
> Here we are burning the villages and killing the Bulgarians, both women and children.
>
> We took only a few [prisoners], and these we killed, for such are the orders we have received. We have to burn the village—such is the order—slaughter the young people and spare only the old people and the children.

What is done to the Bulgarians is indescribable; also to the Bulgarian peasants. It was a butchery.

We plucked out their eyes [five Bulgarian prisoners] while they were still alive.*

This is the Serbian letter:

My dear friend, I have no time to write to you at length, but I can tell you that appalling things are going on here. I am terrified by them, and constantly ask myself how men can be so barbarous as to commit such cruelties. It is horrible. I dare not (even if I had time, which I have not) tell you more, but I may say that Liouma (an Albanian region along the river of the same name) no longer exists. There is nothing but corpses, dust and ashes. There are villages of 100, 150, 200 houses, where there is no longer a single man, literally *not one*. We collect them in bodies of forty to fifty, and then we pierce them with our bayonets to the last man.†

* *Report of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, D. C., The Endowment, 1914), p. 105.

† *Ibid.*, p. 149.

THE BEGINNING OF WESTERNIZATION

It was only when the superiority complex of their Imperialist nature was shaken by continual defeats that the Ottomans realized the passing of medieval civilization and the all-powerful importance of the rising West with its new methods and science. The army, the motive power of the state, was not only inefficient in defense, but it had become a nuisance at home and was hampering the state machinery, stopping any efforts at change by constant interference and bloody risings. And with the attempts to reform the army, the West took the first step into Turkish life. The beginning of westernization in Turkey was therefore an external one. Abdul-Hamid I, in 1774, managed to engage European experts and artisans to teach the army.

As a man, he was rather an imbecile, but he had a good heart, a rare thing among the monarchs of old, and he allowed Selim III, the heir to the throne, freedom from the awful custom of the cage. Selim, fortunately, had great gifts both of brain and heart, and could profit by this unusual freedom. He was most enthusiastic over the French Revolution and he sent a friend, Ishak Bey, to study western institutions in France. Selim's was the first mind which

conceived a westernized Turkey and set out to realize that idea.

But he did not propose merely to reform the army. Perhaps, if he had been a man with but a single idea, he might have been more successful in his lifetime. He wanted something more than a change of military machinery. He was not altogether what one might call an extrovert. And that was the cause not only of his personal failure but of opening vistas of reform of a more internal and lasting sort in the future. He naturally saw at the same time that unless he freed the state from the interference of an undisciplined and reactionary army, he could not proceed in any direction. He created a small model army, formed on western lines and trained by European experts. But his more interesting attempts at reform were in the line of education and state machinery. He founded several schools, the first institutions of a higher and technical education outside the domain of the religious colleges. The school of engineering was one of them; he used to teach there *incognito*. He made a strenuous effort to purify the *régime* of corruption, and worked to reëstablish justice and order. The other remarkable trend in his attempts at reform was his desire for decentralization, and his efforts to preserve the rights of the people. In all the periods of reform which started most seriously from 1807 on, Centralists and Decentralists were always strongly opposed to one another and the Centralists always proved the stronger. The dilemma of the Decentral-

ists was that it is not an easy or a swift method, although it is one of the supreme methods of democratizing a people politically. Democracy, in a social sense, always existed in the Ottoman Empire, but democracy in a political sense could be acquired only by slow growth with the help of education and a certain amount of decentralization. The Decentralists had to take time for their reforms. The success of the Centralists was due to the fact that they could do things in a shorter time and with a minimum of difficulty. The argument in favor of the Centralists was that owing to her perilous position, both internally and externally, and to the general lack of education, it was essential for the empire to find a swift and expedient remedy.

Selim was also the first man in the history of Ottoman reform to express the belief that unless women were placed on an equality with men and enlightened as to national ideals, the empire could not be saved. This desire for the betterment of women's position in his own country was based on a view of their status in the European countries. Had he studied the conditions of Turkish women in the simpler classes of society, as well as in the Turkish past, he could have seen that it was the easiest thing in the world to carry out if handled properly. As it was, all his ideas appeared as innovations or imitations. However, he tried to persuade his sister, Hadije Sultan, to gather women around her and influence them on this point.

At first his reforms gained in popularity and, for

a time, he succeeded. But a fresh war obliged the young troops and their leaders, his supporters, to march to the Danube, and he was left alone. A rising of the Janissaries put an end at once to his life and his reforms, but his nephew, whom he had brought up in the same school of thought, was saved by the gallant efforts of a brave woman in the palace, Jevri Kalfa, who threw dust in the eyes of the assassins.

> One can never make a revolution. One can only give legal recognition and a practical application to a revolution which has already been accomplished in the actual conditions of society itself.*

One may add, further, that no man alone can accomplish a revolution. He must be at the head of a minority, and the success of the change depends not only on the numbers of that minority but on the depth and sincerity of their convictions. The young army leaders created by Selim evidently were staunch in their devotion to the reforms of Selim. Selim's troops, under the leadership of Bairacdar Mustafa Pasha, marched from Adrianople upon Constantinople. They were not in time to save Selim's life but they saved his reforms. They punished the reactionaries, deposed their imbecile Sultan, and put the young nephew on the throne. And in 1807 Mahmoud II, the Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire, ascended the throne to carry out Selim's reforms.

* Ferdinand Lassalle, quoted by Ifor Leslie Evans, *Economic Aspects of the Eastern Question* (London: School of Slavonic Studies, 1925), p. 19.

He was not at all a man of humane temperament; he was that type of man of action who realizes his ideas at any cost. At first he had to face over and over again bloody risings and bow down to the impositions of a spoiled and undisciplined army. If one takes into consideration the wars in which the Ottoman Empire was engaged at the time, and the continual risings in its various provinces, one can hardly see how it could have been possible to carry out any reforms at all. But Mahmoud was the kind of man who could cope with this sort of situation. He managed to bring the Ulema, the next powerful class in the empire, to his own side and gathered a sufficient force to stamp out all military risings. To accomplish this he simply massacred the entire army. It was the crudest and most expedient way for the moment. And like all men of action he did what would bring about an immediate result. He created once more a new Ottoman army which was the beginning of the modern Turkish army. Before he could complete his new military organization war broke out with Russia in 1829. Although this, in a way, was a terrible calamity, it also proved a blessing in disguise. The scanty new troops showed such fighting power that Russia had to fight two hardly won battles and send two large armies before she could dictate terms of peace.

This for the first time convinced the Turk in the street that there was something to be said for European methods. Once his army was complete, Mahmoud carried out the rest of his educational, ad-

ministrative, and legal reforms more easily. He centralized the government, secured economy in administration by a series of enactments, removed a great many abuses of official power, insured impartiality in justice, and paved the way for the reforms of *Tanzimat*, which were perhaps the greatest of all, not excepting those which are taking place today.

But the changes wrought by Mahmoud, though profound, were mostly external—in the machinery of government and in the practical things of life. The change, for instance, in Turkish dress began with him. The Turks adopted the fez, a Greek headdress, and wore western styles of clothing.

The second era of reform, Tanzimat (1839–76), brought deeper and more lasting changes. And the methods employed to bring them about were more western in spirit than any before or after. The era opened with the royal decree of Gulhane, inaugurated by Abdul-Medjid I, 1839. It included for the first time clauses which were intended to bring non-Moslems and Moslems together. The reforms, administrative and political, which the royal decree promised, were legalized. The abuses of personal position in the official class, which Mahmoud's drastic measures had formerly swept away, were made punishable by law. But the most important clause of all had regard to the absolute equality of Christians and Moslems.

The peculiar arrangement of "church nations" among non-Moslems and Moslems had given the Christians very substantial advantages, but it had

kept the different peoples belonging to different churches apart. The Christians did not serve in the army and had absolute communal freedom; this, in a country where wars were incessant and the Turkish section of the community was constantly absent on the battlefield, gave them great opportunities, particularly of an economic, commercial, and educational kind. They were, however, subject to restrictions. They had to wear a special kind of dress; they were not allowed to carry arms. The most serious one was that the word of a Christian witness was not valid in court against that of a Moslem. Such drawbacks had irritated them, though not acutely until the nineteenth century. But when the risings of various Christian peoples ended in their establishment as independent states, when the activities of these states turned to scenes of international carnage, when, finally, foreign Powers began to intervene and wage wars whose object was the humiliation and spoliation of the Ottoman state, then the Turks abandoned their former tolerant attitude. For the first time the Turk was feeling bitter, he was feeling that the prosperous Christian had multiplied, lived in peace and accumulated wealth, while he himself had been absent on the field of battle—and in the end he deemed the Christians simply ungrateful, for he was totally unconscious of the change of ideas and new desires which the West had brought about in the Christian's life. The massacre of Morea, in particular, had shocked the Turks, and aroused such a general resentment, that

the position of the Christians had become uncomfortable, and the royal decree came in good time.

I have already stated that the Turks are not good haters, it means that they more naturally look forward than backward. This racial trait made them accept the changes of Tanzimat more easily than the Christians, even these clauses which were only in favor of the Christians.

Tanzimat created educational institutions in which Moslems and Christians were brought together for the first time. Before this the schools of each people had been communal affairs. Moslem higher education had been given in the Medresses, and the primary schools had consisted of private institutions, supported by individual donations and attached to pious foundations. In 1838 the Council of Education was created, which opened several state schools, and in 1860 some new regulations established secondary schools, in which the youth of every faith received an education at the state's expense. In 1868 the Lycée of Galata Serai was founded, a first-rate institution, where education was partly in French. Its creation was an epoch-making advance in the penetration of western, more particularly French, culture, and modern Ottoman high officials, both Christian and Moslem, are one of its products. The youth of Bulgaria, especially, attended it in great numbers, and Galata Serai, together with Robert College, has sent out a large number of Bulgarian youths who have been personalities in the making of that youthful state. The

state schools opened for instruction in medicine, arts, and science broke down barriers, and the new reforms were carried as far as was possible in such a short period. The young Turkish generation in particular was sincerely in favor of the "Union of Elements," and did much to melt the harsh barriers that had arisen between the races and religions. Critics of the period insist that a new Turkey, on a democratic basis, might have been evolved at this time, if only external powers had been content to leave the reforming state and its peoples to themselves. But it was not merely the external powers that stood in the way; certain small Christian states, imbued with a fanatical and narrow nationalism, exerted a continual influence upon the Christians of their own race and religion who were still Ottoman subjects, which went far toward hampering effectual union. Moreover, the primary education supplied to the Christians by their churches was of a nature to inflame them with hatred against all Turks, and to prompt them to undermine and destroy the ideal of union within a single state.

Russia watched the apparent success of these reforms with very great anxiety. The cardinal point of her policy was to maintain a weak and divided Ottoman state which could justify interference and attack on her part. The Congress of Vienna, 1815, by adopting the policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire, had kept Russia within bounds. The Holy Alliance had further decided Czar Nicholas II in favor of preservation, but the old Russian policy,

which aimed at driving out the Turk, was not by any means dead. In 1844, during his visit to London, the Czar proposed the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but his plan was received with suspicion, and refused.

The sudden revival and rejuvenation of the Ottoman state goaded Russia into taking definite steps. The quarrel between Latin and Orthodox monks over the Holy Places furnished a pretext for an attack. Fortunately for the Ottomans, the rivalry between the western Powers and Russia was momentarily favorable to Turkey, and the conflict ended in the Crimean War, in which France and England fought against Russia as allies of the Ottoman Empire (1853).

The Treaty of Paris is a landmark in the history of the Near East. Its chief and most constructive clause relates to the free navigation of the Danube, which was placed under the supervision of an International Commission. I do not know of any clause in any treaty concluded in the Near East which has proved more useful and beneficial; to the Balkan peoples, particularly, it was of enormous economic assistance, more so, perhaps, than any act of recent times.

The clauses of the Paris Treaty were in appearance very flattering to the Ottoman Empire. She was admitted to the Concert of Powers; and the high contracting parties undertook to respect her integrity and independence. This sounds as though they meant to give a breathing space to the Turks,

to enable them to carry out their internal reforms. But they inserted a clause which became a principal cause of untold tragedy in the subsequent stages of eastern history. This reaffirmed the Tanzimat reforms, and so was in direct contradiction to those other clauses which promised non-interference and respect for Ottoman integrity. The Ottoman statesmen were either too weak or too stupid to prevent its insertion, but a western statesman, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, saw the Machiavellian intention of the clause, and loudly insisted that it would prove a basis for further interference in Ottoman affairs by the Powers, and a source of trouble between the peoples and the Ottoman state. He was not heeded.

In fact it bore fruit immediately. We know that the position of the Christians was unique; they were still a separate "church nation" with separatist ideals, for the realization of which they depended on external help. The Tanzimat reforms had given them the right to share Turkish privileges, without taking away those which they already possessed and did not share with the Turks. But they intended to share the privileges of the Ottoman Turk without his responsibilities. Consequently, any measure likely to create a really workable citizenship and bring races together was objectionable to the Christian politician who took his cue from outside. In fact, after the Paris Conference the chief opponents of reform were the Christian politicians and Christian priests. This was just what Russia wanted. To

close the split left by the disagreement of various races and churches would have meant that foreign influence could no longer penetrate into the country. What Russia really wanted was a good, wide breach, into which she might thrust herself, and so destroy the Ottoman Empire from within.

An absurdly equivocal attitude was taken by the Christians toward reforms. They objected as effectively as they could to reforms, but they also came out with loud complaints because this or that particular clause of reform was not carried out. So those reforms which the state itself had begun, and which the Turks had not only supported, but spilt their own blood to carry out, were turned into a weapon in the hands of western politicians and Christians within the empire, who used the reform question as a pretext for constantly inviting interference and war.

NATIONALISM VS. DEMOCRACY

The influence of western thought in the Ottoman Empire created two sets of political ideals. The Ottomans took to democracy and the Christians to nationalism.

The ideal western nationalist state is composed of people all speaking the same language and more or less of the same race. Such an ideal was comparatively easily realized in western Europe, where languages and races are segregated in large territorial areas; but it became less simple when applied to a country where languages, races, and religions are so geographically intermixed that in some parts it looks like a human mosaic.

Not only the large Christian minorities, but the small minorities, had been imbued with this spirit of nationalism. Hence, though it was easy to westernize them, it was almost impossible to democratize them, that is to turn them into Ottoman citizens. Though the reforms of Tanzimat (1839) accorded to all the Christians equal rights with Moslems in political life without even taking away their old privileges, though Tanzimat opened schools to unite the Christians and the Moslems and to prepare them for public service, still the impact of western nationalism among the Christians proved stronger. Wherever they were in a majority, a new Christian state

sprang into being on Turkish lands, whose first action, in most cases, was to massacre any minority in its midst, in order to prevent such a minority from setting up any further claims to autonomous government. The era of massacre in the disintegrating Ottoman state started in this way. Any possible solution to a peaceful understanding and arrangement among the small minority in a newly created or an old state was endangered by the constant interference and selfish designs of external Powers who played with minorities in the Near East all the time. The tragedy of the Moslem extermination by the Greeks in Morea and old Greece was the first. The tragedy of Turko-Armenian inter-massacres in eastern Anatolia was the next great calamity. And let us hope that the attempted extermination of the Turks in Anatolia by the Greek army in Anatolia was the last.

The Turk perhaps was never a nationalist in politics. Empire builders rarely are. Their ultimate and highest ideal in politics is inevitably some form of democracy. When the Turk became a Moslem, the democratic side of his nature was strengthened, for democracy is the dominating aspect of Islam. That part of Western Idealism which preached equality among men took hold of the Ottoman mind at once. The Ottomans could not grasp the nationalist side of it, the separation of small groups into independent states. For their lack of understanding in this field they suffered more than any other race by the advent of western ideals in the Near East.

Down to Tanzimat the Ottoman Turks had believed that only Moslems could be politically equal. With Tanzimat they believed that all men could and ought to be politically equal, and once the principle applied in a mixed society of men they could not conceive of the reason for political disintegration. This was their external lack of understanding.

In the advent of western ideals there was a greater and more important question. Islamic society was something different from western society. Could it be possible to effect an all-round westernization without altering the very nature of Islamic society? The Moslem state might reform its army upon modern lines, it might adopt the mechanical side of civilization with regard to transport, it might open special schools for training in certain professions and arts; it might even proclaim the equality of Moslems and non-Moslems—Islam had already proclaimed the rights of man in other lines a thousand years ago. But was it possible to alter the nature of Islamic society without altering Islam in itself? And what was the dominating difference between Islamic society and that of the West which did not allow westernization internally? It was the Islamic law. No change could be made in that aspect. Divine law administered by the Ulema of the realm in Islamic society did not permit change. Hence superficially, the creative and critical faculties of the Turk seemed far behind those of western peoples. But was Moslem Turkish society as immobile and stagnant as the other Islamic societies?

Was there not an objective psychology at work all the time beneath the surface, trying to change or throw off all obstacles to its growth? We can find the right key to the changes in Turkey in recent times, in a study of the Turkish soul, struggling between religious orthodoxy and a freer, more vital racial instinct, in a long effort to express itself. As soon as we penetrate beneath the surface immobility, and observe how he freed himself from the rigid Arab rationalism of the Islamic Middle Ages, and how he threw off the tyranny of the Persian spirit which had tied him down to the repetition of ancient and uncongenial forms of thought, we see clearly the difference between the Moslem Turk and the other Moslems in the world.

The most static aspect of life in Islam is law, and religious law had given its character and shape to Turkish Islamic society. But from the very moment when the Turks had accepted Islam, and originated the class—Ulema—which was to preserve them from stepping outside the Divine Law, they began unconsciously to take those steps for change. In the eyes of the world, modern Turkey has only recently become a secular state, and to the casual observer it looks as though the change had been carried out by a single act overnight, and forced upon the Turks by the power of a terrorist government. But Turkey was not changed by one single step from a theocratic state into a secular one. The change is a logical culmination and result of a series of lesser changes in development. Nor is it yet complete. The final and

latest secularization is only understandable in the Ottoman Empire which has been going on for centuries.

The Arab mind has a metaphysical conception of the universe. It looks upon legislative power as belonging to God, and executive power to the Caliph; and it regards the doctors of law as intermediaries between God and the Caliph, who are to control the executive and see that he carries out the laws of God. If he fails, they are to cancel his contract and elect another Caliph by the consent of the Islamic people. Semites, as well as Arabs, had formulated this conception of Divine Law before Mohammed did so. It was the Scriptures which ruled the Semitic peoples, and it is the Scriptures which rule them still.

It was different with the Turk. In his pre-Islamic state he had been accustomed to be ruled by man-made laws, and he is by nature more inclined than the other Islamic peoples to separate religion from the ordinary business of life. It is true that his laws were made for him by his chiefs, but all the same they were man-made. This streak in his psychology made itself felt immediately during the earliest centuries after his adoption of Islam.

When the Ottoman Turks founded the vast and complicated Ottoman state, Sultans and governments began to make laws outside the Divine Law. It is true that these began as royal enactments and dealt with military and feudal organizations, which were virgin soil and unforeseen by the Sheriat (Is-

lamic law). Nevertheless, the precedent was contrary to the teachings of the orthodox doctors, and no Arab, no other Moslem state, would have dared to do such a thing. This was the first stage. Suleiman, called the Magnificent in the West, is known in Turkish history as the Lawgiver (*Canuni*), the maker of laws. The very name is a direct contradiction of orthodox principles. Suleiman created the embryo of a criminal code which gradually replaced some of the texts of the Sheriat in penal matters. Such primitive measures as the cutting off of a thief's hand, the stoning of adulterers, and the flogging of wine drinkers, were replaced by imprisonment or fines. They are still applied in the kingdom of Ibn-Saud who prides himself on having restored the *Hedjaz* to Islam.

In Suleiman's time the word *Canun* (man-made law) entered Turkish jurisprudence side by side with Sheriat (God-made law). The Canun was at first in an inferior position, but it gradually gained ground and expanded until it overshadowed the Sheriat. The very name Canun is a direct contradiction of orthodox principles and in those days out of all the Islamic states it existed only in the Ottoman Empire.

The proclamation of Tanzimat, 1839, which declared the political equality of all the church nations, also introduced an entirely new series of man-made laws. A criminal code, taken from the French code of 1810, a commercial code, and a judicial organization copied from France, with a Tribunal

of the first Instance, Courts of Appeal, and a Court of Cassation, all came into existence. After Tanzimat, therefore, two kinds of courts existed side by side in the Ottoman Empire: (1) The Sheriat courts, with only Moslem judges, which were only concerned with family matters, marriage, divorce, and inheritance of the Moslems in the Empire; (2) the *Nizamie* courts, where Christian, Moslem, and Jewish judges sat side by side and judged all the Ottoman subjects according to the laws of the realm. The penal section was derived entirely from the French legal system; the civil section was the codified Sheriat, or *Mejelle;* and the procedure throughout was French. Hence, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had passed from God-made to man-made laws in a very large section of her jurisprudence.

To all these changes the Ulema, the doctors and judges of Islamic law, made no opposition. With the Turkish outlook on life which is readier to separate this and the next world from each other they accepted changes in the laws which would have made the Ulema of other countries denounce the Turks as heretics. No other believers in the Islamic law but Turks in those days could have permitted a separate criminal code and a separate commercial code without deeming the foundations of Islam shaken. Yet the opposition to these changes had not come from the Ulema but from the rank and file of the army which was reactionary up to the time of Mahmoud. The Moslem Turks of the Ulema class

considered only one feature of the Islamic law as unchangeable, that part which concerned the family, and this they intended to keep within the boundary of God-made law.

The Tanzimat had nothing to fear from the army, which was westernized and well disciplined at the time. The Ulema had accepted all the judicial changes. Hence with those important classes, the army and the Ulema on their side, the Tanzimatists (the reformers after 1839) were enabled to bring about a deeper and more lasting change, a change that went for the first time below external things and the machinery of state.

In order to define the class of men among the Ottomans who went below the surface and began to change the mind as well as the machinery of state, one must think back for an instant. In the chapter, "Imperialist Ottoman vs. Turk," we saw how there were two distinct types of Turks—the simple Turks and the Imperialist Ottomans, who had consciously dropped out everything that belonged to the tradition of the race, including its very name. We also saw that the difference between the two types was much more than what reasonably existed between the ruling classes and the masses in the other countries. In the Turk the Turkish ego remained dominant and all outward influences which colored and affected it were due to unconscious processes of selection and growth. In the Ottoman the ego was more composite, and the process which had made him what he was, deliberate. He thought

other thoughts, spoke and wrote a language which had not only changed in its structure, but also in its spirit. The estrangement was complete. The gap between their egos seemed too deep ever to allow the two to understand each other. The Ottoman never stooped to understand what was going on in the mind and the soul of the Turkish masses from which he derived all his force. The Turk found the Ottoman incomprehensible and uncongenial and did not care about his ideas at all. Now for the first time a class of men among the Ottomans ventured to step into that gap. We call them the Tanzimatists; it would be more adequate to call them the western intellectuals.

The Tanzimatist school is justly called "The Turkish Renaissance" for with the writers of the school the empire stepped out of the Middle Ages. Poets, playwrights, prose writers, novelists, essayists, and statesmen, their effort and its far-reaching result were gigantic. The Ottoman language, which could only express medieval thought, acquired a modern prose. Shinassi and Namik Kemal actually created a medium in the Ottoman language which could for the first time express the new thoughts and ideals of the West. And this new prose with its new message was understandable to a large number of simple Turks. They always kept their school as a medium for intellectual development rather than for the aesthetic side of life. But garbed in a grand romantic dress, it set out to impose a new outlook on life. Thanks to the fire in the minds of the men

who created the school, it aroused sudden enthusiasm. And the greatest message of the school was liberty, individual liberty in the state. Liberty became almost a religious cult. It was a new thing to live and to die for. No one outside of Turkey realizes the trail of martyrs and sufferers for the ideal of liberty. Namik Kemal, who turned the idea of liberty into a cult, was the man most beloved of all by the Turkish public. There has never been any other figure in the history of Turkish thought and politics who has been and is still as much worshiped by the Turkish public.

This vague and large way of worshiping liberty naturally had a practical result. In the domain of the idea of the state it took a definite shape. A dissatisfaction with the man-made laws of the state arose in the mind of the Turk. He had been used from immemorial times to have his laws made by men, by his chiefs and rulers. But he had never wanted to have a voice in the making of the laws which were to govern him. The supreme new thing which the West has given to the Turk is the realization of modern political democracy. And the moment the ideal took hold of the mind of the Turk the old order of the state organized on absolutism was shaken for good.

The Tanzimatist literature dropped the old Persianized subjects. Women became a subject and more than a subject. For one of the new ideals it wanted to introduce was a better position for women. The greatest poet and dramatist of the school, Abdul-

Hak-Hamid, in his classical plays brought in great women heroines. "The progress of a nation is measured by the status of its women," became a general saying. A classical education (Persian and Arabic) for the higher class of Turkish women had been almost general. Now the Tanzimatists began to give them a highly westernized education. French became as important as Persian in the education of the Turkish girl of means. The fact that they created the modern Turkish theater and made it extremely popular was one of the keys of success in propagating their ideas. But in all the branches of their activities they remained true to the composite mental state of the Ottomans. They were Ottomans in soul and mind. There was more or less deliberation in their creation of a new state. Instead of the old Ottoman who had Ottomanized Persian and Arabic and Byzantine thought and culture, there was now the new Ottoman who was replacing the Old East by the New West. The only difference between the old and new Ottoman was that the old had never taken any notice of the masses and never conceived a nation in which the masses could be considered as participators in the ruling of the state. The new Ottomans stepped down and tried to give what they had to the people. And the success of the new Ottoman among the masses was due to the fact that the western spirit and mind he was trying to interpret seemed to the simple Turk simpler, more objective, easier to grasp than the metaphysical Persian and the rational Arab.

From 1839–76 the empire had been governed by Sultans who were not despotic and, what is more, by great statesmen who were able and wholly westernized. In consequence it proved a period of exceptional freedom and security for everybody. But the new ideal of government by the people was pushed forward very strongly. The political section of the Tanzimat intellectuals, who were known as the "Young Ottomans," came into existence. They took the name "Young Turks," a little later.

The Young Turks retired to Paris to carry on their political propaganda. For toward the end of the reign of Abdul-Aziz, both he and the statesmen of the time were beginning to be nervous about the new political trend which was clearly demanding a constitution. Namik Kemal, Zia Pasha, and their companions in France, in those days, formed a kind of landmark in the intellectual and political life of the Ottoman Empire. Those Young Turks were of a liberal and humane type. Their activities never took a terrorist form. They propagated their ideals through literature, art, and a series of political writings. In the meantime, the political adherents of the Young Turkish ideal at home were gaining ground, and Abdul-Aziz was being keenly criticized for his extravagance, which led the country into a state of bankruptcy.

The head of the political party in Constantinople was Midhat Pasha, who is called the Father of the Turkish Constitution. He represented the original Young Turkish political ideal. He believed that a

democratic and constitutional *régime*, once established, would entirely win over the Christians of the state. He had proved his capacity as the governor of Nish and the Roumelian vilayets; he had established a mode of liberal administration and succeeded in building public works in those provinces which are probably still talked of today. Midhat Pasha's name, in short, was synonymous with first-rate administration. This great westernized Turk had something of the faith, energy, and straightforwardness of the first Ottomans. To him a constitution did not mean something for the Turks alone, and he would have been horrified by the idea of a nationalistic government among the Turks. Probably he thought that the separatist and nationalist hopes of the non-Moslem subjects were simply a reaction to an inefficient and unjust government, and believed that, once a good and representative government was established and every member of the Ottoman world taught the rights of equal citizenship, there would arise such a new country as had never been before.

He had the support of very able generals and high officials, and he won over the Ulema to give their sanction to the new form of government. He persuaded the latter to issue a *Fetva* for the deposition of the Sultan, Abdul-Aziz, who committed suicide. There is no shadow of doubt that Abdul-Aziz death took place by his own hand. After this, Abdul-Hamid II, the new Sultan, urged by Midhat Pasha, proclaimed a constitution for the Turkish nation,

drafted from the French Constitution. Namik Kemal, the dream of whose life was such a constitution, had the satisfaction of preparing the original copy.

The Sultan, on the other hand, had accorded a constitution, not because he believed in it, but because he could not do otherwise, though the western historians say that it was because he wanted to get rid of the International Commission which was sitting in Constantinople and urging him to carry out reforms. Whatever the reason was for forcing his hand, the Sultan did accord it unwillingly. He probably saw that his position was a dangerous one.

The verbatim report of the meeting of the first Parliament shows a greater unity and sense of responsibility in the members, belonging to all races, than that of the Parliament of 1908. The Tanzimatists had succeeded in creating feeling among both Turks and non-Moslems, in however limited a sphere.

Unfortunately the Russian War gave the Sultan a pretext not only for forcing Midhat Pasha to leave the country, but for closing the Parliament. The disasters of the war, which ended in the Treaty of San Stefano, led to an acute renewal of the Eastern Question. Austria came in on the side of the Ottoman Empire, on account of Russian predominance, and England also intervened in spite of anti-Turkish liberal opinion, which was hostile to Turkey on account of the repressions of Bulgarian risings. Bulgaria became autonomous, but only as a

Roumelian province; Montenegro and Rumania became independent; and Great Britain undertook to protect the Sultan's Asiatic territory, in exchange for Cyprus.

The Congress of Berlin, 1876, at which the intervention of England and Austria was mainly responsible for altering the disastrous Treaty of San Stefano, and drawing up a new treaty, introduced a clause which dealt with reform in Anatolia. And in connection with this clause the word Armenia was used for the first time.

Eastern Anatolia was very badly governed. The sturdy and violent Kurdish mountain dwellers had always preyed both on the Turks and Armenians and on their own villagers. But the term Armenia in Turkish, and the special emphasis laid on the welfare of Armenians, undid all the good done by those Tanzimatists who had dreamed of a union of elements. It was obvious to any observer that the Balkans were a district where the Turks, being in a minority, could not survive; the method of massacre in favor there, and the constant interference of the Powers in favor of the Christians, made this inevitable. But it seemed as though the demand for a reform in Anatolia, emphasizing the name of Armenia and Armenians, had a new political significance. Armenians were going to be used as pawns in the Russian and European game to drive out the Turks from eastern Anatolia as the Christians of the Balkans were used for the same purpose there. The Christians of the Balkans, being in the ma-

jority, had with outside aid every hope of eventually exterminating the Turks. In eastern Anatolia it was quite the reverse. Gradually the Ottoman state began to fear that she was intended to lose eastern Anatolia, and lose it to a small minority. The clause not only raised fear in the mind of the Ottoman, but it had a very bad effect upon the Armenian's political outlook. He began to believe that, with Russia and England at his beck and call, he could create a new Armenia, and a very much larger one than he had ever owned before. Russia certainly never intended any such thing; but any wholesale massacre in those parts would give a reason for occupying eastern Anatolia, and the less native population she found in her new colony the better pleased she would be—the more hatred and violence existed amongst the original natives, the easier it would be for her to rule comfortably. It was the most diabolical stipulation that had ever been made in any treaty dealing with Turkey, for it brought the greatest suffering to both Armenians and Turks.

The Armenians at once began to agitate for autonomy, and used terrorist methods. Abdul-Hamid in his turn repressed them by the same methods. In 1895, after a rising of the Armenians in Constantinople, very drastic measures of repression ending in massacre were taken against them. These massacres were a part of the infliction of a despotic monarch's will upon his Armenian subjects, and could be more or less likened to *pogroms* in Russia. But in normal

times even the Armenians did not suffer so much from Abdul-Hamid's *régime* as did the Turks.

After peace with Russia, Abdul-Hamid issued a decree of amnesty, which lured the Young Turks, and in particular Midhat Pasha, back to Turkey. The Sultan saw in the person of these Constitutionalists the threat of a complete overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a Republic. So a bogus trial, at which Midhat Pasha was charged with the murder of Abdul-Aziz, was held at Yildiz, and he and some of his companions were condemned to death. The Sultan altered the death sentence to one of imprisonment for life in Taif, partly in order to pose as a merciful Sultan, and partly to appease public opinion. A strong section of the public was still in favor of Midhat Pasha. He and his companions were strangled in prison by the order of Abdul-Hamid.

Midhat Pasha was the first martyr for liberty and the ideal of a constitutional government—but others followed. The great writers were imprisoned, a terrible censorship was set up, and a most reactionary and despotic government established. The Ottoman administration of those days bears a striking resemblance to the old Russian *régime*. Individuals and groups were being continually exiled into the heart of the Tripolitan desert, and a spy system of the most Machiavellian kind prevailed everywhere. The Turks were the greatest sufferers during this period of reaction; they continued to

read the literature of the Tanzimatists in secret and so kept alive the spirit of liberty, but anyone found in possession of even a page of Namik Kemal's writings was instantly seized upon and punished severely. So greatly did Abdul-Hamid fear the spirit of the Turks that he even had the words, "Liberty," "Constitution," and "Fatherland" erased from the dictionaries. It is scarcely possible for any democratic country to imagine the sufferings of the Turkish people in those days.

Cruel, suspicious, and despotic as he was, Abdul-Hamid had a certain political shrewdness and ability. He meant to rule as an absolute monarch in his own country, and he took every step ruthlessly to insure that end. He thought that the menace to his position as a tyrant lay chiefly in the Turkish element of the empire, and he made it his business, drastically and continually, to suppress any expression of an idea, any corporation among them, which would revive their favorite ideal—constitutional government. The suffering of the Turks was therefore a part of his internal policy. His occasional bloody repression of the Armenians was a part of his external policy. He knew that the Powers were waiting for any chance to interfere and for any pretext to cut into the empire. As the last Ottoman emperor he meant to keep the state an empire. So at the least demonstration of the Armenians for an independent Armenia he struck ruthlessly.

He found his keenest supporters among the non-Turkish Moslems, and his bodyguard was composed

of Albanians and Arabs. The non-Turkish Moslems of the empire were hostile to measures of reform which might diminish the power of the Sultan. The Kurdish and Albanian chiefs were privileged personages, and in a way both communities stuck to the empire during Abdul-Hamid's reign. These same supporters of his internal policy, the Arabs and Albanians, served him in the policy of Pan-Islamism which was consistent with his general point of view. Externally he was very popular among the Moslems of other countries. Very shrewdly, he saw that England and France, the two countries with the largest number of Moslem subjects, would naturally be affected by Pan-Islamism. The building of the Hedjaz railway was a masterly demonstration of his Pan-Islamism. Strangely enough, while the Turks who dared to cherish constitutional ideas had to seek refuge outside the country and mostly in Europe, Moslems from other countries who had grievances and could find no security in their own sought refuge in Constantinople. The next consequent step of his external policy was to seek and obtain the support of some powerful European Power, a counter force to England and France in the Near East. In Germany and the Kaiser he found the desired support. It was not only the unfavorable policy of France and England which led Abdul-Hamid to find support against them. Had they been friendly to the Ottoman state Abdul-Hamid would have still been against them. It was their institutions and their liberal schools of

thought which were a source of eternal inspiration to the young Turkish generations which frightened the Sultan.

For thirty years the bloody Sultan ruled, undoing as much of the good work of Tanzimat as he could, and creating a despicable class of men in the service of espionage and tyranny, of whom we have never yet been able to rid ourselves. Every *régime* or person since his day wishing to aim at a despotic rule, has used his methods and his evil heritage of Camarilla.

Outside the country, the Young Turks continued their activities, with Paris as their center. Unfortunately a great number of undesirables joined them from time to time, with the object of blackmailing the Sultan and obtaining money. Public opinion in the state itself gradually ceased to believe that the Young Turkish organization was capable of bringing about any change in the *régime*. But in the country itself a younger and indigenous party of Young Turks was coming into existence. Macedonia was breeding a new type of Young Turk who was to Balkanize Turkey for good—and perhaps for evil too.

In 1906 a very active and youthful section of Young Turks organized the Union and Progress movement in Salonika. Its greatest strength was derived from the active element in the army, which had come to an understanding with a number of Christian *comitadji* chiefs in Macedonia. In 1908 they proclaimed the Constitution in Resne; this

forced the Sultan's hand, and he was obliged to restore the Constitution of 1876. He ordered the elections, and in January, 1909, the second Ottoman Parliament met in Constantinople.

THE NEW *RÉGIME*

CONSTITUTIONAL government was a fact at last. The elections were carried out freely and the representatives of all the races in the empire were indeed representative personalities.

The first effect of the Constitution was universal joy. Everybody indulged in the feeling of freedom brought by waking from the nightmare of a despotic government. The magic words—Liberty, Equality, and Justice—seized every heart; and the way to make a reality of them upon earth seemed only to have a representative government with a Parliament—and they had it at last.

The change of *régime* had been brought about by a new group of Young Turks backed by the army. But they considered themselves as the successors of the earlier Young Turks. And their platform political and otherwise was, to begin with, identical with that of the older school. Their predecessors had conscientiously avoided terrorist methods and never had shed blood. The new *régime* came into existence without bloodshed. In spite of the fact that one of the most tyrannical and violent of *régimes* had been changed into a brand-new constitutional one, the political murders of the first months were not more than three or four. The older reformers were democrats rather than nationalists. They reasoned that

the Christian Ottomans who had become strongly and narrowly nationalistic could be bound to the Ottoman Government by a fair and democratic representative government. They felt that the Turks themselves must avoid nationalism, not only because of the Christian elements which they hoped to democratize, but also because of the large number of non-Turkish Moslems in the empire (the Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds). There was a strong religious tie with the latter—Islam forbade nationalism; the Caliphate was a strong bond, an eternal institution, that would hold together the Moslems of the empire. A thoroughly westernized system of administration, with western officials engaged to demonstrate its operation, would establish the *régime* permanently. These were the fundamental ideals of the earlier Young Turks—who were never able to realize them. Their successors sincerely believed that they were going to realize them. The only difference of opinion among the Young Turks who came into power in 1908 was whether the country was to be administered by a centralized or a decentralized system. This made a pretty sharp division between them in the beginning, with the Decentralists in the minority as usual.

The Young Turks of 1908 also followed the traditional ideal held by the older school of Young Turks in regard to European countries and governments. The early progressives had believed in the liberalism and sense of justice of the West. They had imagined that European countries and their diplo-

mats would give the new *régime* a chance, would back up a *régime* which was struggling for a free and decent government. Had they not helped all the other countries in the Near East? The older Young Turks who had sincerely and strongly advocated these views were all westernized men, educated in the West. They had also lived in the West most of their lives. Hence nobody could think that they lacked realism and judgment in that regard. The new school of Young Turks, hence, started with more than an idealistic reverence and belief in the West, especially in England and France.

But there was a difference between the idealism of the older Young Turks (the Tanzimatists) and the Young Turks of the Union and Progress party who came into power in 1908. It was this. With the Tanzimatists, idealism was part and parcel of their life-philosophy—their training was more intellectual than experimental, and they had never enjoyed power long or fully enough to see how their ideas worked out practically. With the Union and Progress group, on the other hand, both training and experience had that grim quality which could not nurture either idealism or illusions. Hence the era of reform from 1908 to our own day is a distinctly new period and different from the era of reform which covers the years between 1839 and 1876. (The period from 1876 to 1908, it must be remembered, covers Abdul-Hamid's reactionary absolutism.) The Tanzimatist period, 1839–76, was a mighty attempt to reform and change the Ottoman Empire in its ex-

ternal and internal aspects—but always within the Ottoman frame and in an Ottoman sense.

The men who attempted to re-create the Ottoman Empire externally and internally were Ottomans in every sense of the word. They were synthetic and conscious. They tried to re-create a new order of things with the spirit of the West, as one understands the West immediately after the French Revolution. The Tanzimatists were a repetition of the early Ottomans who set out to create a new order of things synthetically and consciously—using the elements of culture and civilization which they had found in the Near East. But the Tanzimatist reformers, although they were superior to the early Ottomans in learning, lacked the virility and the realism of the early Ottomans. And the Young Turks of the Union and Progress group, who thought themselves the successors of the Tanzimatists in spirit and set out to complete what the Tanzimatists had started, were not only different in training and in temperament but were also facing a world in which romantic and high sounding literature and ideals had given way to realism, or materialism. In 1908 the world was already getting ready for the gigantic and materialistic upheaval of 1914 which was to mark a new era in human history. Hence the period of change in the Ottoman Empire from 1908 on must have a new name. One might call it the realistic and Turkish period as against the earlier which was the idealistic and Ottoman period. To the Ottoman Tanzimatist period one

may above all apply the term—ethical. To them the ways and means of realizing an ideal were as important as the ideal itself. To the young Union and Progress group, especially after the first years when they realized the difference between the world as they found it and the world as conceived by the Tanzimatists, the ideal was everything and the ways and means nothing.

The Young Turks of 1908 had been schooled in Macedonia. The fact that the bulk of them came from the lower *bourgeoisie* and from the ranks of young officers meant that a new ruling class drawn more from among the people was already in the making. The army, as the vital source of change, would sooner or later give a militant tone to the changes. It is with some justice that the period of reform from 1908 on was termed a "staff officer reform," by some Anatolian humorists during the national struggle in 1920–22. The Macedonian school, moreover, had given all the necessary grimness and realism. Macedonia was the home of peoples who had all won their independence and reached their aims by an absolutely unscrupulous and revolutionary method. All ways and means were good as long as they led to the realization of ideas. It is a curious fact that in all the stages of Ottoman history the Macedonian Turk has been a doer rather than a thinker. And his "doings" always verged on the revolutionary. The old Turkish chronicles spoke of the Macedonian country as the place where "the fire of sedition" constantly

burned. Naturally the Macedonian Turk is a man of few ideas. For him no idea is worth while holding if it does not possess an objective value. He renounces an idea the moment he knows that he cannot transform it into action or concrete reality in his lifetime. Hence, with this type of ruling force in the Ottoman Empire, things were bound to happen soon and in abundance.

During the first nine months after the bloodless revolution of 1908 which ended absolutism in Turkey, the young revolutionary element stood aside from the machinery of government. The old and experienced element continued to wield the machinery of state. When the Young Turks saw that the old element failed to create a new state machinery, appropriate to carry out the new constitutional *régime*, they grew more and more impatient; secret interference multiplied and embarrassed the already harassed old element in power. The impatience of the Young Turks was due to two causes. They had never been in power themselves, and so could not realize the difficulties that lay in the way of the new *régime* and the impossibility of creating a new state of things overnight even when there are no obstacles in the way. This they had to learn after years of struggle. But the second and fundamental cause of their impatience was more the slow and bureaucratic manner in which the older element handled difficulties and set out to establish reforms. As a matter of fact from the moment the young revolutionary element came into power they faced

difficult situations very differently from the older element.

When the general enthusiasm due to the lifting of a most despotic pressure wore itself out, the fundamental causes of disintegration in the empire came to the surface. Trouble was brewing both among the Christians and the non-Turkish Moslems of the empire, although from different causes. The political leaders of the Christians and the churches which had been something like states within the state opposed every measure that would bring the Young Turkish ideas into action. A long negotiation as to whether the Christians should serve in the army or not started between the state and the Patriarchate. Another endless discussion started on the teaching of Turkish in the Christian schools. Philip Marshall Brown in his book on the capitulations, entitled *Foreigners in Turkey*,* implies that if the Young Turks had carried out their measures without negotiating with the Patriarchates as independent nations, many difficulties would have been averted. But this they could not do without inviting European interference, or at least European censure. The dilemma was due to the Christian privileges which had been obtained under the old *régime* and to the conflict of these privileges with the new situation. And the Christians used and abused the contradictory aspect of this conflict of their old privileges with the new state of things. The opposition of the Christians, although a bewildering difficulty

* Princeton University Press, 1914, p. 20.

for the Young Turks, was consistent with the fundamental idea of the Christian political leaders. They were afraid of backing the new *régime*—if the Ottoman Empire had become too strong and centralized they might have lost their chance of bringing in foreign interference at every conflict between them and the Turks.

The non-Turkish Moslem subjects, especially their chiefs, were also against the new *régime*. They had been faithful to Abdul-Hamid, who had accorded them privileges which they were afraid they would lose. Turkish die-hards, some very sincere people but fearing radicalism as a deadly poison, joined the opposition. Abdul-Hamid's spies, a large class of men who were anxious for their position, also worked with them. And all this element of opposition had for the first time an absolutely free press in which to give vent to their ideas. The general atmosphere was inevitably much inflamed by the lack of experience among the Balkan Young Turks and by the unrestrained elements among them. The state of the press could be judged by the names of the papers published both by the opposition and the Young Turks—*Volcano*, *Gun*, *Bomb*, etc. The explosive material used by both can easily be imagined.

Nine months after the announcement of the Constitution, one of the bloodiest of reactionary scenes took place in Constantinople. The opposition had managed to get control of the regiments in Constantinople and persuaded them to mutiny against

their officers. A reactionary section of the religious body, the Sultan's emissaries, and some foreign emissaries as well, encouraged the reaction. Besides a large number of young officers, absolutely anybody and everybody who was suspected of reformist tendencies was killed in the streets. An outburst in Adana brought about an Armenian massacre in that region while the Young Turks were being killed in Constantinople. A detailed account of the Adana massacres can be found in *The Danger Zone of Europe*,* by H. Charles Woods, who is rather anti-Turkish but gives a fair account, having studied the situation on the spot.

This reaction took place on March 31, 1909, and a Young Turkish army, under the command of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, then marched on Constantinople. It restored order, deposed Abdul-Hamid, and placed his brother on the throne. Thereupon the Young Turks themselves came into power. Although the deposition of the Sultan had had the sanction of a religious Fetva, issued by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the reaction of March 31 had aroused a deep hostility to religious influence among the Young Turks.

After April, 1909, the Young Turks took the reins of government into their hands. Therefore, up to 1918, all the credit for great developments and the discredit for a certain destructive note in national policy, must attach to them.

The Young Turks' belief that the West would

* T. F. Unwin, London, 1911.

give the new *régime* a chance to carry out reforms in peace, was soon shattered. At first Bulgaria threw off Turkish suzerainty. This was more or less expected, and was received with more or less composure by the Young Turks. If there is any one of the young Balkan nations more than another that deserves respect for backbone, efficiency, and hard-working qualities, it is Bulgaria, and in spite of the very painful events of the Balkan War there is still much sympathy between Bulgarians and Turks.

Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been under her protection since 1876. The cooler element managed to restrain any national outburst, and the affair was peacefully settled.

Crete followed suit by attempting to annex herself to Greece. This also was peacefully settled, partly by Venizelos, who was Premier, and a very different sort of statesman from the Venizelos of 1918.

The hardest blow came from Italy. After an ultimatum of twenty-four hours, she occupied Tripoli. Turkey could not hope without a fleet to fight her aggressor or to retain her possessions in North Africa. But Italy's action in thus occupying the possessions of a friendly Power without reason was alarming; it was made the more bitter by the behavior of the Italian army of occupation in massacring the natives. Enver, Fethi, and Mustafa Kemal, young and able officers of the revolutionary class, had themselves smuggled into Tripoli, and organized a defense in the desert. They managed to

keep the invaders at bay until the events of the Balkan War forced Turkey to sign a Treaty of Peace with Italy at Ouchy in 1912 and to call back the young men fighting in Africa; they, however, only reached Turkey after the worst days of the Balkan War were over.

The Balkan Confederation was a logical organization from the point of view of the young Balkan states. It took place in 1912. Each state wanted to snatch for itself that part of Macedonia where people of its own race were living. If the new *régime* had been allowed to develop and grow, Turkey might have stayed permanently in Macedonia, hence the Balkan states chose a favorable moment to attack Turkey. A split in the army had driven the Young Turks from power for a time, some of the best staff officers of the revolutionary and able type were in Tripoli, and the country was rent by internal dissensions. The tired old men who had come into power temporarily did not seem able to carry out a defense or cope with the internal situation. Turkey did not learn of the Balkan Confederation until the last moment.

It is not clear that the outside Powers took any definite part in bringing about the Confederation, but they declared that, whatever the result of the war might be, the *status quo* in the Balkans would be maintained. This declaration meant: "If the Turks are victorious, they will not profit by their victory." The Turks were not victorious and the *status quo* changed entirely.

The Turkish defeat in the Balkans was complete. To the disasters of military defeat was added the spectacle of miserable Moslem refugees—a whole civil population, including women and children—fleeing from the sword of the Balkan armies. The conduct of the Balkan states during this war is clearly shown by the reports of the Carnegie International Commission which investigated the Balkan massacres. The slaying of prisoners of war, their mutilation and starvation, as well as the mutilation and slaughter of the civil population were practiced for the first time on a wide scale in modern warfare by the Balkan states, and mainly on the Moslem population and the Turkish army. It is a thousand pities that, when the Moslems were being massacred and mutilated during the first Balkan War, the western press remained entirely indifferent, whereas, during the second Balkan War, when the Balkan peoples were massacring one another, European newspapers had fuller knowledge of the grim horrors and raised a humanitarian protest. This affected greatly the judgment of those in Turkey who were seriously westernizing the country. In Turkish public opinion the western world cut a sorry moral spectacle. Its cries in favor of oppressed nations and peoples became merely evidence of a religious bias or a political maneuver. A colossal gathering of Turkish women in Istambul appealing to the queens of Europe to intervene and to stop the horrors committed on the Moslem women and children in Macedonia received no answer. The moral damage the

West received in the Moslem and eastern world after the Balkan War made the advance of western ideals and civilization in Turkey synonymous with an absolutely materialistic and selfish progress.

The Turkish defeat in the Balkans created a false judgment in regard to the Turks among the western politicians which colored their attitude toward Turkey at the beginning of the Great War. The belief in the decline of Turkish resistance and fighting ability was universal. As a military people the Turks appeared no longer to possess any capacity which the western statesmen could consider or the western armies could respect. It was the outcome of this psychology among the western statesmen which led them to take the curious attitude they did, in 1914, toward Turkey. Although Greece and Bulgaria were courted assiduously and with promises of Turkish lands, in order to persuade them to enter the Great War on the Allied side, Turkey was ignored. Further, steps which might strengthen the anti-war party in Turkey and keep her neutral were not taken. On the contrary, the war party was strengthened by a series of blunders, if not provocations, by the Allies—just enough to throw the country into war and on the German side.

The Balkan tragedy, apart from the fact of the change among the Turkish westernizers in regard to European morals in politics, made a vast difference in the subsequent changes. Both for the ruling class, that is the Young Turks, and the Turkish masses, it

is an epoch-making period. That the Balkan defeat leading to the final withdrawal of Turkey from the Balkans was a blessing in disguise, no one realized at the moment. Consciousness that all the Anatolian manhood, the energy, and the resources of the empire spent hitherto on the Balkans would now be spared, dawned only gradually upon Turkish minds. Perhaps the early withdrawal of Turkey from the Balkans is one of the fundamental reasons for hope in a firmer future development of New Turkey.

Apart from its internal corruption and decline, the final destruction of the Byzantine Empire was mostly due to two causes: First, the continual waste of energy and Anatolian resources in the Balkans; secondly, the invasion of Anatolia itself (which was only superficially Greek) by alien races, and its complete Turkification. Constantinople itself, with its small hinterland, was not enough to live on either as an empire or as a state. The Turkish invasions had ended it and created the Ottoman Empire on its ruins. After years of decline, the Ottoman Empire seemed to be exposed to the selfsame dangers. The Balkans, a white elephant in every sense, ceased to suck the very life of the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan defeat. The danger of an Anatolian invasion by Russia was not entirely parallel to the Anatolian invasion by Turks in the Byzantine period. Anatolia was already predominantly Turkish; further, the Russo-Turkish frontiers were inhabited by a solid Turkish mass which extended into the heart of Russia. Hence, to an unbiased historical analyst it

was evident that whatever the fate of the Ottoman Empire would be, the Turkish race in Asia Minor was an important factor for consideration. But as the Ottoman façade always had stood in front of the Turk and kept him away, so the historians looking only at the tottering Ottoman Empire predicted the entire disappearance of the Ottoman Turks from Europe and Asia Minor. "They are destined to go back into the central Asian wilds, bag and baggage," harped the western press. This was a reckoning without an understanding of the Turks behind the Ottoman façade. Further, this was a reckoning without realizing the change in the façade itself.

All rulers, reformers, classes, and individuals who had anything to do with the running of the empire had always been Ottomans and Moslems in spirit, both before and after the reform period. The Young Turks who took the responsibility of running the empire in 1908 considered themselves successors to the Ottoman Imperialists. Democrats at heart as their predecessors had been, they hoped to stop the complete disintegration of the empire by a representative constitutional monarchy. As democracy is incompatible with race ideals, the Young Turks tried to keep away from race ideals as stubbornly as the Ottomans had done before them. But after the Balkan defeat they were forced to think on different lines. The Christians, wherever their numbers and geographical position made it possible to form a state or to join the states already created by their respective races, had fought against the idea of a

By Ewing Galloway, New York

TO MARKET IN THE OLD WAY

A Turkish farmer and his son on the road to Smyrna, with camels doing truck service.

Underwood & Underwood

ROAD BUILDING, NEW STYLE

A demonstration of modern methods in Turkey, where American machinery is being largely utilized.

common Ottoman country. Albania, the Moslem non-Turkish majority in Macedonia, had been as eager and as ruthless as the Christians in kicking out the Ottoman rule from Macedonia. The Arabs, also Moslems, were creating a decidedly nationalist organization, showing strong separatist tendencies. The Turks were the only mass of people in the empire who had not shown any definite tendency toward nationalism and who could still be indiscriminately used to support the ghost of the empire. But the Turks themselves began to show nationalist tendencies after the Balkan defeat. Hence from 1912 on, the Ottoman façade was breaking down altogether. So far all movements for reform, all trends of thought that were externalized in the empire, had come from the Ottomans, that is, from above, and had sought to penetrate the masses—often in vain. Now the ruling forces were being affected by what was going on among the Turkish masses for the first time and seeing themselves obliged to act in a different way. The New Turkey was in the throes of birth while the dead shell, the Ottoman Empire, was in its agony. Therefore it is not correct to call the happenings in Turkey from 1908 on a rebirth. The Ottoman attempt at rebirth in 1830 had not succeeded—and New Turkey is a distinctly different thing from the Ottoman Empire. This new state and its people of today began to be from the moment Turkish nationalism came into existence—not merely the nationalism of the Young Turks who adopted the policy after they saw its strength among

the people, but the nationalism of the Turkish people themselves.

The Turks had been purifying the language and literature and giving them a truly Turkish character some ten years before the Balkan disaster. The aesthetics of the Turk were gradually replacing the aesthetics of the Ottoman in the language. Poems by celebrated Turkish poets were being written in the simple Turkish tongue and in old Turkish meter; Turkish words were replacing Persian and Arabic words as well as the Arabic meter. The prose writers also had taken the same direction both in the use of language and in the choice of subject. The classical Ottoman writers were up in arms against the new movement. Satire, invective, ridicule, rained on the heads of the new school, but with no result. The desire to purge and purify and to nationalize the language, to free it from the artificial superstructure of Arabic and Persian, was both articulate and unanimous. Not only poets and prose writers but linguists as well brought their efforts to bear to render the language truly Turkish.

In connection with the efforts of the linguists there rose the question of the alphabet. For years attempts were made to simplify the teaching of the Turkish alphabet. The westernization of the educational system, which rigorously carried out the attempt to teach a whole nation to read and to write, led to the desire to find quicker and easier ways to do it. The teaching of the alphabet became a most important subject, and the general tendency of the

linguists and schools was toward the adoption of the phonetic system. It gave great results. In 1885–90, as far back as I can remember, an average intelligent child could not learn to read and write in less than a year. In 1915, as the general inspector of the model mosque schools, I was able to see an enormous difference. The average intelligent Turkish child learned how to read and write in from four to six months. During two whole years when I was inspecting the schools, out of nearly two thousand boys and girls between seven and fourteen years of age I knew of only five cases which were exceptions to this rule.

But the results obtained did not satisfy Turkish educators and linguists. Not only the phonetic system but the writing itself and the peculiarity of the Turkish vowels demanded far more attention. And from this a discussion of alteration of the Arabic alphabet to suit the Turkish language started. Two distinct schools came into existence: a small minority led by Hussein Jahid, a journalist, writer, and linguist, who wished to adopt the Latin alphabet; and another group, with Milasli Hakki as its most enthusiastic exponent, who wished to alter the Arabic alphabet or to invent an alphabet. Milasli Hakki had created a new Turkish alphabet, based on the old. He had managed to have several books published in his alphabet and he personally carried out an extensive campaign to secure its acceptance.

Those who advocated the Latin alphabet met with violent opposition. Apart from their arguments

that the adoption of the Latin alphabet would facilitate a complete phonetic system and be more suitable for Turkish in every way, their idea was to push more fundamentally toward the West and unite the Ottoman Turks with the West. The arguments against them were strong. The adoption of the Latin alphabet would fundamentally end Islamic and Turkish unity. The Arabs, fifteen millions in number in the empire, used the Arabic alphabet. The Turks who used Ottoman Turkish had more or less adopted the Arabic alphabet. Moslems all over the world had adopted the Arabic alphabet. Islam, as the religion of the Ottoman Turks, was not a nationalized religion—the scriptures and the Koran were written in Arabic letters. Unless the Ottoman Turks separated themselves from orthodox and universal Islam, their children had to learn the Arabic letters in order to read the Koran. Further, the adoption of the Latin alphabet would entirely cut off the Ottoman Turks from their past culture. Hence the reasons against it were political, as well as cultural.

To the adoption of the altered alphabet there was no serious opposition. The reason which kept the Ottoman Turks from accepting it was merely aesthetic. The culture of a people, if it is a real culture and the outcome of growth, considers utility and speed after aesthetics.

Next after the nationalization of the language, the Balkan disaster aroused in the Turk an entirely new sense of himself. It intensified the feeling that

he was different from the others in the empire, and curiously isolated as well. The vast number of Balkan Turks, refugees who poured into Constantinople and Anatolia with their lurid and sinister tales of martyrdom and suffering at the hands of the Balkan Christians, the indifference and even the apparent joy of the so-called civilized outside world at their sorry state, aroused a curious sympathy for everything that was Turkish in those days. The non-Turkish elements, even the Moslems, Arabs, Albanians, Kurds, had their own nationalist clubs, each remote from everything both Ottoman and Turkish. Any Turkish youth was finding himself very lonely all over the empire, especially in the schools. He saw those non-Turkish students who had sat side by side with him on the same benches become strangers with entirely different interests and ambitions. The Turks, both the educated and the uneducated, were conscious of something else which they had never noticed in the days when they were wrapped up in the sense of superiority of a ruling race. This was the belief prevalent among other peoples, and even among the Ottoman intellectuals, that the Turk in the street, the Turk in the field, was a stupid fellow. He was supposed to be a good fighter, but a Quixotic and unintelligent person by whose simplicity and stupidity everybody else could profit. He would do well enough to fight for other people, who might meanwhile prosper, grow rich, and live in peace, because he was in waiting to do the difficult work for them. The Rumanians have a

proverb to this day, "The Turk pays for everybody." As the Ottoman ruling class did not identify itself with any race in particular, it did not care, it even joined in the general laughter at the expense of the Turk. The subtle way in which the Turk himself was aware of this general insulting tone, and the broad and knowing way he met it, is well illustrated in *Karakeuz*, the Turkish screen play in which Karakeuz personifies the Turk. From the very beginning of the play one sees Karakeuz surrounded with endless difficulties. Every other personified race, Albanian, Arab, even the Jew, bully him, assault him, attack him, use him for their own purposes, and if necessary occasionally flatter him to make him serve their purposes all the more. Anyone watching the play says, "That fellow cannot survive," but when the last act comes everybody else is defeated and thwarted while Karakeuz stands and grins after escaping from every possible difficult situation.

The aftermath of the Balkan disaster showed the Turk that the common emblem of the race was completely defeated, isolated, and lost. This was a moment when neither the traditional sense of humor nor the deep-rooted democracy of the Turk could save him. He had to think for himself separately from the others henceforth. With this step nationalism in politics entered Turkish circles.

It was the Turkish students of the University, especially of the Medical School, who first founded a Turkish nationalist institution, a club under the

name of *Turk Ojagi* (The Turkish Hearth). It was established entirely on a cultural basis. The first clause of its constitution banned politics. All Turks, those who called themselves so, could join it. The members belonged to all shades of political opinion. Almost all the writers of note belonged to it. When these *Ojaks* multiplied in the capital and all over Anatolia great pressure was brought to bear by the prominent personalities in the Union and Progress movement to turn it into a political club. Neither they nor a small extremist minority who made a like attempt succeeded until 1924, when a general congress of all the Ojaks altered the old constitution and transformed them into political clubs. One of the historical accomplishments of these clubs was to bring together mixed audiences for the first time, and to open their stage and pulpit to women, from where they addressed male audiences and performed amateur theatricals. As a matter of fact, artists, speakers, great teachers, and musicians all taught, performed, spoke, and worked for the members. It was the beginning of a kind of Turkish Academy and center of learning and art. Hamdullah Soubhi, a brilliant orator, writer, and poet, has worked untiringly for years to establish the Ojaks on a firm basis and make a success of them.

Although these Ojaks tried to confine nationalism to cultural and social spheres, there was a widening circle of nationalism in Turkey, outside the Ojaks, which closely resembled the old political organizations and ideals of the other races on the same lines

which had started some hundred years ago. It meant that in the general struggles henceforth the Turk was going to think for himself and to fight for himself, politically, economically, and otherwise. His rôle as a scapegoat was ended; he was contaminated with the mass selfishness which is nothing less than political nationalism. The Ottoman Empire might go, the Turks would create their own Turkey. It meant a grimmer and a more realistic picture of struggle for the future. Political nationalism is as ugly as any other creed which tends to make men exterminate each other. In the case of the Turk there was one difference—while all the other groups in their nationalistic struggles and quarrels had the Great Powers of the world actually or morally at their beck and call, the Turkish struggle was to be a lonely one and was to depend only on the Turk's own physical and intellectual faculties.

As the movement gained in strength, the Union and Progress government began to take a lively interest in it. But the movement did not take any less interest in nationalism; a more important, a wider and larger political idea began to gain ground among its members. It was Pan-Turanism. While Turkish Nationalism was an ideal to better the conditions of the great majority of the Turks and those who call themselves Turks, and confine itself to the development of Turkey within its borders, Pan-Turanism politically was an aggressive idea. But Pan-Turanism also, just as nationalism, began as a cultural movement.

The different sections of the University in Istambul always drew students from all over the Moslem world—but especially from among the Turkish subjects of Tsarist Russia. There were many intellectuals among the Russian Turks who settled in Turkey and took part in its intellectual and even its political life. This naturally awakened an interest in the lives of the vast number of Turks who, though they spoke the language of the Ottoman Turks, were Russian subjects. A great deal was being written about the history of the central Asian Turks, and their old institutions and literature were being carefully studied. Apart from the publications of Léon Cahun, which were mostly in the field of fiction, Germans, Russians, Finns, and Hungarians were doing research work and throwing some new light on their lives. The study, which we already called Turkology, found enthusiastic adepts in Turkey. The University of Istambul opened an Institute of Turkology, with a large library attached to it. It became a part and a serious part of the university.

All this at first awoke merely a cultural curiosity. Its supreme and practical good was perhaps the amount of attention it attracted to the position of women. The fact that the position of women in the primitive Turkish world had been superior to their present status made a live subject of discussion. The point was emphasized strongly by all nationalist and Pan-Turanist writers. The rights of women were not a thing to be taken from the West, they

said, but had been a part of the racial heritage. And the emancipation of Turkish women from all the chains which the Near Eastern period had imposed upon them became one of the main ideals of all reformers. While the Ottoman Turks were trying to revive ancient Turkish mythology, and introduce old Asiatic Turkish words into the Ottoman Turkish vocabulary, the Turks in distant lands were meanwhile reading and studying the Ottoman literature and classics. The realization of this mutual cultural affinity of Turks all over the world had a great effect on some of the Turkish writers in Istambul. While the greater number of Turkish writers continued with the work of bringing the colloquial and purer words back into literature, those few Pan-Turanist writers dug into Asiatic legends and introduced subjects, heroes, words, which could not take root in the Ottoman Turk's language. The Pan-Turanists were trying to replace the great political figures of the Ottoman period, such as Bajazid, Osman, and even Mohammed the Conqueror, by Jinghiz and Tamerlane. The epics of the Islamic period of the Ottoman Turks were to be replaced by an older and non-Islamic epic period. The Pan-Turanists went farther and advocated the idea that Islam had been uncongenial to the Turkish nature and that it prevented progress—hence they urged a return to the old gods and the Old Turkish religion—Shamanism. I was intensely interested to read *The Plumed Serpent* by D. H. Lawrence, who depicts a similar tendency in Mexico, where the re-

formers try to bring out exactly the same argument against Christianity and urge the revival of an ancient form of their pagan faith. The religious ideas of the Pan-Turanists did not take root. But it is a fact that a speedier and more drastic attitude toward the separation of church and state in Turkey, the desire to alter and to give a new and national shape to Islam, dates from them.

While this cultural oneness was being enjoyed and discussed by the intellectuals, a political side of Pan-Turanism began to appear, more in the governing circles than among the people, although there was no definite political platform or distinct understanding among those who professed it. In a vague manner, of course, everyone knew that Russia had a large number of Turks under her dominion—the number is given as between twenty-seven and fifty millions. If they were to become imbued with national consciousness they might attain independence, and some of them—those nearest to Turkey (from the Caucasus to the Caspian)—might unite with Turkey. The feeling reminds one somewhat of the Pan-Slavism of the Balkans in the eighteenth century which led Russia to take an interest in the fortunes of the Slavs in the Balkans and help them to realize their independence. The Pan-Turanists would say: "If Russia helped the Slavs under Turkey, and created Slavic states, then why shouldn't Turkey, at least intellectually, help the Turks in Russia to set up a national ideal and realize their independence?"

This sentiment aroused suspicion and resentment in the Tsarist *régime*. It might mean a threat, even if it was a very distant one, of Russian disintegration in the future. France and England, the ancient rivals of Russia, were no longer hostile to her; there had arisen a complete understanding between those Powers over the possible spoils of the Ottoman Empire. France and England, instead of their earlier policy which was to preserve the Ottoman integrity, had adopted the policy of dismembering and portioning her among them. Naturally Pan-Turanism aroused opposition among all the Allies. But a fourth Power, Germany, the opponent of Slavic expansion, the rival, too, of English and French trade in the Near East, had appeared on the scene. Her appearance was one of the principal causes to lead the old antagonists to patch up their quarrels. Hence while England, France, and Russia were all against Pan-Turanism, Germany was encouraging it.

Although Pan-Turanism had a certain cultural fascination for a number of peoples of Turanian origin, the political side of it was a mere illusion. Out of the national consciousness of the Turanian Turkish peoples in Russia there might have come into existence independent states such as Azerbaijan, Bukhara, Turkestan, and even Mongolia, but even Azerbaijan, which is nearest to Turkey and uses the same language, was not likely to form a part of Turkey. Just as the Bulgarians, a Slavic people who gained their independence by Russia's help, never allowed themselves to be dominated by

Russia, so Azerbaijan would always prefer to remain independent. Hence between the political Pan-Turanists and the Turkish Nationalists there were fundamental differences on this point. One may safely say that the Pan-Turanian idea existed mainly among some of the leading political leaders of the Union and Progress movement, while Turkish Nationalism was found more among the unpolitical intellectuals and the people in general.

Meantime Pan-Islamism, an old ideal which had been revived by Abdul-Hamid and consequently discredited, became the political ideal of a limited but very convinced number of powerful individuals in the Union and Progress group. Enver Pasha was at its head. Its adherents came, as with Pan-Turanism, from among other Islamic nations who resided in Constantinople and carried out a strong propaganda. Pan-Islamism aroused even greater resentment and suspicion in French, British, and Russian political circles. Both these political trends, adopted by different sections of the Union and Progress movement, aroused neither enthusiasm nor a serious response among the Turks themselves. But they did invite the antagonism of the Allies and the sympathy and encouragement of Germany. And these two ideals, curiously enough, apart from the antagonism which they drew from outside, were trying as hard as they could to destroy each other. The Pan-Islamist argued that any racial or nationalist movement among Islamic peoples would put an end to Islamic internationalism and unity. And the Pan-

Turanists argued that the Turks had ruined themselves by fighting the battles of Islam for a thousand years and that Turkey, as the champion of Islam for a thousand years, had to face the onslaught of the West while the other Moslem nations had done nothing and allowed the Turks to do all the fighting. The Turkish Caliphate, as the symbol of Moslem unity, would always make Turkey a target for the attacks of such European Powers as ruled over Moslem subjects. So far the arguments of the Pan-Turanists were sound, but their weak point was the fact that they were trying to make Turkey champion the Turks outside the Ottoman Empire, which would have meant the continuation of an aggressive and costly policy and one which attracted equal hostility from the selfsame western Powers and Russia. The Turkish Nationalists who disapproved of political Pan-Turanism, as much as Pan-Islamism, seemed to possess a more workable and moderate policy in trying to confine all Turkish energies to Turkey herself within her own territorial boundaries. There was even a reasonably strong desire to come to an understanding with the Arabs and create a dual monarchy with separate Parliaments under the Sultan Caliph, on the model of Austria and Hungary. It was this last idea which set the Turks to talking about a new capital; Aleppo was suggested as being in the Arabo-Turkish border lines.

In brief, of these three movements, the first—a limited nationalism of the Ottoman Turks, whose

object was to develop a cultural union and give an education upon new lines to the Turks within the boundaries of Turkey proper—was the most practical and had the largest following among the people. The outcome of the Great War, the tendency to separate racial and cultural units and recognize their independence, strengthened this trend of thought and with a large number of other events forced the Turks to a limited but very real nationalism. Nationalism in Turkey at present is on the whole an outcome of it; it has kept Turkey within her own territory.

If Turkish Nationalism brought out for the first time the cultural, social, and political consciousness of the Turkish masses in the Ottoman Empire, it also began to affect the ruling classes. The weakness of the opposition to the Union and Progress movement was due not merely to a lack of organization and the inferiority of most of its members, but largely to their lack of recognition of this new force which had risen among them. The Young Turks of the Union and Progress movement were aware of this new factor, although by no means the majority of the party were favorable to it. On the contrary, the Pan-Islamists in the party opposed it with continual violence. But in spite of everything the Young Turks were becoming genuinely Turkish for the first time. Although they had adopted the name Turk some fifty years ago, they had been nothing more than westernizing Ottomans in spirit. The Balkan disaster had affected them directly and in-

directly as well as the Turkish masses. Gradually they were to realize that the only serious support for the disintegrating empire would come from the Turkish masses. Hence they must in some way manage to rule through the Turkish people. As the majority of the Young Turk party—those who were active in politics—were Macedonian bred, the moment they realized the practical force of an idea, they tried to turn it to practical use. With the realization that the Turkish masses were the only force they could depend upon, they tried to enlarge and organize their party on Turkish lines.

Up to the Great War and even during the first years of the War, the party was the controlling force. For the first time it was the Young Turks who managed to lay out a strongly organized "party dictatorship." In the Union and Progress party dictatorship naturally the military and the non-military elements struggled for supremacy—and because of the Great War and of the extraordinary will power of Enver Pasha, the military influence dominated. Hence, if the first aspect of the Young Turk movement in 1908 was a party dictatorship, the second aspect was its military spirit, the staff officer methods that prevailed to the end of the Great War. Naturally with this military spirit the leaders managed to establish a strong centralized government. Like all convinced people who have at the same time executive ability and few scruples, both their misdeeds and achievements in the line of progress and change are of an extraordinary char-

acter. The general assumption that Turkey was ruled by a triumvirate is not correct. Of the three men mentioned, Djemal, Enver, and Talaat Pashas, Djemal was never strong enough to impose his own ideas. He had quite a large following among the intellectuals and very little following in the party. His executive abilities, his overdrastic measures, were valuable for the party organization. And he was obliged either to follow the party orders to some extent or to leave it. He followed in most cases, and unwillingly. The incontestable power of Enver and Talaat Pashas was due to their strong following, although of different sects, in the party. Talaat represented the civilian and democratic element, Enver the young military and staff officer element. Although not exactly strong in numbers, the moderate and the liberal element managed to curb the excesses of the party up to 1915. With the Great War, which plunged the country in a very perilous and superhumanly difficult struggle, the military aspect of the party controlled the machinery and individuals entirely. All the belligerents in the War gave a greater measure of dictatorial power to their governments. But Turkey had to go farthest in this direction.

Both before and during the Great War the most remarkable of the changes they brought about were on lines of westernization and can be summed up something as follows:

The army, after the Balkan disaster, under the wilful personality of Enver Pasha, quickened its

modernizing pace. A large number of German experts were used, under a German military commission in charge. From the earliest period of westernization, German experts in the Turkish army were traditional, but they did their most effective work between 1913 and 1918. The navy used English experts, and Admiral Gamble rendered it valuable service. But as Turkey could not spend as large a sum on her sea power as she did on her land power, it did not do very well. Turkish inferiority to Greece in sea power has been one of the political disadvantages under which she has suffered.

The Ministry of the Interior, in the reorganization of the *gendarmerie*, police, and civil departments, used a large number of foreign experts. Thanks to the financial abilities of Djavid Bey, Turkey managed to create for the first time an entirely western department. Frenchmen did valuable work in that section. But the greatest achievement of the new *régime* was in the complete change it effected in the educational system. The increase in the primary schools, the westernization of the mosque schools, the establishment of a considerable number of normal schools and *Lycées*, the enlargement and the better organization of the University, with mostly German professors, were among the remarkable accomplishments of the *régime*. Education became a byword both in the new government and among the people in general. Turkey during the first years was like a self-organized educational camp. Men and women, everyone who had some-

thing to teach, went into teaching as their supreme patriotic duty. A large number of educational organizations, apart from the governmental ones, came into existence for the teaching of adults among the masses.

The outstanding change brought about by the *régime* was perhaps in the position of women. Turkish women belonging to the high official and rich classes always had a very up-to-date education, even in Abdul-Hamid's time. From 1908 on women had equal chances of education with men. In 1916 the University opened its doors, and of the large number of students who were sent to Europe, especially to Germany, a considerable number were women. Naturally the Great War gave this movement a practical turn. The governmental departments as well as financial houses and trades had to use a great number of women. Not only in the big cities, but also in smaller towns and outlying districts, women had to take up some trade and go into work in order to sustain their family. The large amount of public work that women were obliged to do led to a natural freedom and did away entirely with the partial seclusion among the majority in the cities. And as breadwinner the position of woman became vital and important. The laziness attributed to Turkish women in the West is applicable to a much smaller minority in Turkey than elsewhere. They have at all times been hard workers. Both in the fields and in their homes, and in the earlier arts and crafts, Turkish women have always been much

more hard-working, responsible, and well-balanced beings than men. Both in the past and the present Turkish women have always shown great force of character and remarkable purposefulness in life. But one must admit that all Turkish men of the progressive type, regardless of the political party to which they have belonged, especially from 1908 on, have been in favor of the progress of women and have helped to educate and to give them rights, in the educational, economic, and social areas. From the moment Turkish women entered the economic field there has been no discrimination whatever of the kind of which the European feminists complain. Women have always received the same salaries or wages as men, and the fact of their being married or unmarried never hampered them in their search for work.

The prevalent journalistic stuff published in the West about Turkish women, declaring that they were freed from harems in thousands, their veils lifted, and they themselves thrown into public life by a decree in 1926, is both absurd and false.

A very significant event of the new *régime* in 1916 was the passing of a revised family law. The Islamic law concerning women had two weak points: polygamy and divorce. Polygamy, apart from the court life and that of the conservative rich, was not widely practiced. General public opinion banned it, and economic conditions were making it an impossibility for a Turk in the city to have even

one single wife. But in certain rural districts, especially in eastern Anatolia, the rarity of men and the rarity of labor both led men to take more than one wife whenever they could.

In the question of divorce, a man had the right to repudiate his wife at any moment, while a woman had to go to court and prove certain things before she could obtain a divorce.

We have already mentioned that a lay judicial system with western codes and courts, under a separate judicial department and Minister of Justice, had existed for some time. And we also mentioned that the Sheriat (Islamic laws) still provided special courts under the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the head of the Islamic religion. The family law was the special concern of those Islamic courts. The extreme conservatives as well as the religious bodies were opposed to any change in this domain. The family belonged to religion, and a change might lead to an entire disintegration of society, they argued. In 1916, the Islamic courts were placed under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, and the family law was revised in favor of women. This had to be done within the spirit of Islam, if not under its orders. Marriage in Islam is a mutual contract between man and woman. The revised law interpreted marriage from that particular point of view. Women could insert into their contracts every right, that of divorce as well. In all other points Islamic law was more favorable to women than the western

codes, hence only these two points were emphasized. Educated women could, and did in a small number of cases, take advantage of the revised law. But the vast number of uneducated women naturally could not profit from it.

The period between the Balkan disaster and the Great War on the whole proved that an energetic government, taking into consideration the principal needs of the country, could set up a New Turkey in a shorter time than one had hoped. Reforms in administration, in education particularly, had been rapidly carried on in spite of internal upheavals and external disaster. The Great War, although it did not stop the reforms, brought in new complications. When the Great War was declared, two things were harassing Turkish minds, two things which became more vital and more urgent with the new political conditions which the Great War naturally was introducing into international politics.

In the first place, the Turks were haunted by the specter of Russia. To experienced observers the understanding between the traditional European rivals on the question of the Ottoman Empire looked ominous. There was a general belief, which caused much anxiety, that this understanding was based on a secret recognition by England and France of Russia's claims on Constantinople and the eastern provinces.

A Turkish journalist wrote an article, some time before the Great War, in which he declared that Turkey's peace and independence depended chiefly

on her coming to an understanding with Russia as to mutually acceptable conditions, and opening the Straits to Russia. A few other men as well were convinced that, if Turkey made her seas free and opened the Straits, half the complications of the Eastern Question would vanish. Probably the freedom of the seas in general means much more to future world peace than we now happen to realize. But the idea was too new at this time, and it roused much controversy and angry comment. Anyone who had written an article of the sort, except this particular journalist, would have been accused of taking bribes from Russia. The old world firmly believed that it was Russia's intention eventually to seize Constantinople and eastern Turkey, and the objection which the Mediterranean Powers would feel to any such action on her part seemed a useful safeguard. Somehow, any such thing as a cool discussion of this vital question appeared to be impossible at the moment.

Secondly, the capitulations formed yet another chain round the neck of Turkey, and the country was ready to seize any occasion for ridding itself of them. They had existed in the Near East before the coming of the Ottomans. In great commercial centers whose *raison d'être* is commerce, and yet where the customs of various peoples disagree, a certain amount of mutual sacrifice in the adjustment of relations is a necessity.

It was a necessity of this sort which had forced the Byzantines to accord exterritorial rights to Rus-

sian and Italian commercial colonies. Moslems and Turks, as well as Christians, enjoyed certain privileges in their particular colonies in Constantinople. So we see that the tradition of capitulations was established in the Near East even before the founding of the Ottoman Empire.

The Turks were both broad-minded and practical enough to see that, in order to preserve the commerce and prosperity of the Near East, they must accept and respect certain privileges of important trading peoples in their empire. In 1415 the Conqueror confirmed the exterritorial rights of the Genoese, and later those of the Venetians. Suleiman the Magnificent made a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with France in 1535, which was followed by others with England and other Powers. These were not mere gestures made by the Turkish Sultans according to caprice, for they had sufficient power to do away with the capitulations at once. But to build a stable and enduring state one must have a broad and comprehensive understanding of a country's entire needs. Although capitulations today are a sign of slavery and a pretext for foreigners to worry and hamper the free growth, commercial and otherwise, of eastern peoples, in those days they had their uses. As long as Turkey had sufficient power to check external interference, the capitulations worked well and served everybody's purpose.

But when Turkey became weaker, and was regarded by the Powers with a certain lack of goodwill, not to say active and extreme greed, foreign

states began to use these commercial rights as pretexts for worrying her, and, as they constantly extorted new territorial concessions from her in her weaker moments, the capitulations gradually encroached upon and swallowed up the territorial sovereignty of the Turks to an incredible degree. Economic change or construction on a national scale became impossible in Turkey without the consent of the Powers. Professor Brown in his *Foreigners in Turkey* says: "The result of this position of affairs has been an attitude of irritating superiority on the part of the privileged foreigner; a corresponding resentful hostility on the part of the humiliated Turk; and incessant diplomatic controversy of a most trying nature."* China is today a good example of the hostility and resentment which are aroused in the people of a country when they are made to feel that they are no longer masters in their own house. In a later passage Professor Brown makes the following remarks on the question of Turkish capitulations:

> Recalling with pride that the privileges voluntarily and generously granted to foreigners and Christian subjects alike were granted when the Turks were at the height of their military power, the descendants of the race of Osman might well claim with equal pride that the continuation of these greatly modified immunities of jurisdiction might properly be regarded, as suggested in the introduction, "as evidence of a more enlightened and more liberal interpretation of the law of nations than has yet been granted in

* p. iii.

Europe, the place of its origin, though not of its exclusive development or application."*

Certainly, in 1914 the Turks were far from feeling any self-congratulation on the wise and liberal measures of their ancestors. They saw that an independent Turkey was an impossibility as long as capitulations continued.

These were the two important facts—Russia and capitulations—which the new *régime* was facing when the Great War broke out.

With Russia on the side of the Allies, the Turks naturally felt suspicious and their friendship with Germany became closer. However, in spite of a suspicion based on bitter experience, the tradition of friendship with England and France was so strong that public opinion inclined favorably toward the Allied side; Turkey has always had, and still cherishes to some extent, a weakness for the two Powers, France and England, which are supposed to stand as representatives of western culture.

Turkey declared her neutrality. There were two inevitable factions in the governing class—those for and those against war. The war party was very small, but it had at its head the strong and wilful personality of Enver Pasha. The peace party was championed by Djavid Bey, and, though it had the country behind it, and also the intellectuals, it still needed to show some justification for the confidence it reposed in Russia, the hereditary enemy of Turkey. It was necessary for it to produce some assur-

* *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

ance from the Allies that, in the event of Russian success, they had no intention of crushing Turkey and dividing her up among themselves. Turkey wanted to get some advantage out of her neutrality, albeit in a modest way.

Turkey now did her very best to come to an understanding with the Allies and obtain their consent for a modification of the financial side of the capitulations, but their attitude was most discouraging. They made no promises; they simply demanded the dismissal of German experts and commanders, and ordered Turkey to deport the crew of two German ships which had taken refuge in the Dardanelles. There is not the slightest doubt that, had the Allies consented to modify the supreme symbol of Turkish humiliation, the capitulations, twenty Enver Pashas would not have sufficed to drag Turkey into the general lunacy of war.

When one thinks of the supreme cost of their refusal to Turkey and the ceaseless suffering it has caused her for ten long years, when one sees today Persia abolishing her capitulations overnight and thinks what years of bloody struggle and misery were necessary to change the Allies' attitude toward the East, one cannot help feeling an extreme resentment at the stupidity of it all. It is at least a satisfaction to idealists in Turkey to know that the eastern peoples have profited by Turkey's struggles, and may in future obtain their rights with less suffering because of the immense sacrifices which have been made by the Turks.

The already weakened position of the peace party was shattered when England commandeered two Turkish dreadnoughts, which were being built in the country, and refused to pay any compensation for them. Intense popular resentment was aroused by the thought that these ships had been paid for by the pennies out of every poor Turk's pocket, and the rumor that they were to be presented to Greece, who would employ them to fight against Turkey.

Germany chose this psychological moment to offer Turkey two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, and the war faction was sensibly strengthened. At the same time this party was proclaiming that, in the event of Russian and Allied defeat, Turkey would be able to abolish the capitulations and even regain some of her lost territory in the Caucasus.

On September 8, 1914, Turkey declared the capitulations abolished, an act which raised a general protest, even from her ally, Germany. When the two warships, which were now units of the Turkish navy, though still under German command, attacked Russian ships and ports in the Black Sea, Russia declared war on Turkey, and England and France soon followed suit.

Before speaking of the disasters of the War, it may be interesting to dwell for a moment on the discouraging attitude of the Powers which gave such a supreme chance to the war faction in Turkey.

The psychology of this attitude can best be explained by again referring to Lord Salisbury's words

on Turkey at the Berlin Conference. "We have backed the wrong horse," he said. Her defeat in the Balkans had convinced European diplomats that Turkey was no longer of any use as a military power. Only a knowledge of this psychology enables one to understand the astounding way in which the Allies offered enormous areas in Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria if they came into the War on their side, and yet did not deign to keep Turkey out of the War by satisfying her very modest and just demand for a modification of the capitulations. To the West, eastern peoples were no more than pawns, to be played against each other in the game of furthering European interests, and Turkey did not seem to them to be a strong enough pawn to take into account. The diplomats practically laid bets on the peoples of the Near East, as they would back horses at a race. Turkey was an unpromising animal, she hadn't the look of a winner—why should they back the wrong horse? Neutral or belligerent, Turkey did not frighten them; perhaps it was really better for her to commit the folly of entering the War on the wrong side, for then she would furnish them with a perfect pretext for wiping her out of existence and partitioning her territory among themselves.

But the Turkish resistance at Gallipoli, which prolonged the War for two more years, gave them food for thought. I do not desire to speak merely of the strategic value of any battle. The Turks are utterly sickened by war, and no one could be more pacifist by nature than the common Turkish soldiers

who were doomed to surrender their lives on the battlefield. They know, too, the ugly backwash of war, perhaps even better than European armies do. The miraculous feat of resistance in Gallipoli was accomplished more by the Turk's whole-hearted determination to survive than by any desire on his part for military glory. It stands as a landmark in modern Turkish history, for it has clearly shown that, when there is a question of Turkey's survival, the combined armaments of the most efficient Powers are of no avail against her.

It was only to be expected that Turkey should be defeated in the long run. Beside her fronts in Gallipoli, Syria, and the Caucasus, where she fought against the forces, combined or separate, of Russia, England, and France, she was also at war with the Arabs, her own subjects. The entire non-Turkish population, Christian or Moslem, organized itself against her and stabbed her constantly in the back.

Pan-Islamic institutions existed, and Turkey proclaimed the Holy War, still believing in the solidarity of religious union. But such was the irony of fate that not only were there Moslems fighting in the French, English, and even Russian armies, but Turkey's own Moslem subjects, chiefly Arabs, were in league with the enemy camp. This cured Turkey of Pan-Islamism once and for all. When it came to defending their own territory, the Turks could only depend on their own strength and their own meager resources.

Curiously enough, no one seems to have realized

how much the attitude of the Arab Moslems, in allying themselves with the Christian Powers, weakened the value of the Caliphate, both as a spiritual and a political point of Moslem unity. One can safely say that, had not the Arabs passed over to the Allies' side, it would have proved an almost impossible task to abolish the Caliphate in Turkey.

The disaster in Syria was complete, and in the Caucasus it was a case not only of military but of moral defeat. The Armenians, who had made secret preparations, unknown to the Turkish army, to help the Russians, were deported, and massacres took place during the deportations. The Russian army, which brought in Armenian forces, retaliated by massacring Turks in the eastern vilayets. The Armenian massacres not only roused bitter hatred against the Turks throughout the world, but were used as the basis of war propaganda by the Allied press. Naturally no one mentioned the Turkish massacres. In a way I am glad of that, for the exploitation of a people's sufferings to further a political end is both cynical and inhuman, and in the end is even hurtful to the martyred people themselves—theirs ceases to be a human tragedy. No people in the world, after all, be they Turkish, Armenian, or Greek, can be indicted as a whole. There is no such thing as a guilty nation.

Professor Toynbee, who compiled an account of the Armenian massacres with Lord Bryce, evidently hated to see human suffering used as an instrument

for furthering political ends, for in his book, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, he says:

> During the European war, while people in England were raking up the Ottoman Turks' nomadic ancestry in order to account for their murder of 600,000 Armenians, 500,000 Turkish-speaking Central Asian nomads of the Kirghiz Kazak Confederacy were being exterminated—also under superior orders—by that "justest of mankind," the Russian *muzhik*. Men, women and children were shot down, or were put to death in a more horrible way by being robbed of their animals and equipment and then being driven forth in winter time to perish in mountain or desert. A lucky few escaped across the Chinese frontier.*

Professor Toynbee, in a footnote, admits that the numbers on both sides are conjectural. I want to add that this is not a solitary instance of Turks having suffered massacres and atrocities at the hands of other nations. But I will try as far as possible to avoid details of massacre, though I want just to add, as a passing remark, that the policy of the western Powers, and more especially of Russia, in leading the Turks and Armenians to fly at one another's throats after five long centuries of tolerable existence together, was really no more advantageous to the Armenians than it was to the Turks. I have cited the fact elsewhere that General Yudenich started to turn eastern Anatolia into a Russian colony from which Armenians were excluded—although Russia's pretext for occupying eastern Turkey was that of creating an Armenian state.

* p. 342.

On the whole the Allies treated the Armenians worse than the Turks, for the latter did at least know that they had nothing to expect from the Allies, but must, on the contrary, carry on a desperate struggle to be allowed to live. With the Armenians it was different; they were continually petted, encouraged, helped, subsidized, and armed against Turkey with the promise of an independent Armenia, which the Allies knew to be impossible. If an Armenia had appeared in the Caucasus, it would have been merely as a part of Russia; if in southern Turkey, as a colony of France. As it was, the Armenians obtained nothing. They simply massacred others and were massacred themselves, obsessed by a destructive hatred which they carry on from one generation to another and which serves every other purpose but their own.

The Communist Revolution in Russia relieved Turkey on her eastern front. Russia not only evacuated those regions which she had occupied during the War but also the Turkish territory which she had taken in 1877. In 1917 a Treaty of Peace was signed between Russia and Turkey at Brest Litovsk.

Observing the collapse of Imperial Russia and the general disorder in the Caucasus, where the majority of inhabitants were Turks or Moslems, Turkey naturally began to think out a definite policy that would not hurt this new Russia which, by renouncing its aggressive claims upon her, had become a potential ally. We will return later to the evolution

of this policy. It is only necessary here to say that whereas the Balkans in Europe had once been the chief European field where Turkey had been exhausted, her struggles were now transferred to the Caucasus.

Turkey's chief motive in entering the War on Germany's side had been her fear of Russia, and now that Russia had abandoned her aggressive claims on Turkey there seemed no necessity to continue fighting; even those who had in the past been strongly militaristic were agreed on this point. Only their traditional fear of Russia had forced the population of Turkey to endure such hardships and disasters as they had never yet known. So a very strong current of public opinion pressed the Government to come to an agreement with the Allies and end the War, no matter how great a sacrifice this might mean in the Arab provinces. For some time Turkey was kept from suing for peace by her loyalty to Germany; finally the surrender of Bulgaria forced her, too, to ask for a separate peace. There were still some people who insisted that the honor of Turkey demanded that she should not ask for a separate peace; but during the last year of the War an atmosphere of idealism was spreading, all over the world, a general desire for peace and for a wider and better understanding among the nations.

Turkey asked for peace, and the Entente statesmen eagerly welcomed her proposal. On October 30, 1918, the armistice between Turkey and the Allies was signed on a warship at Mudros.

The Great War has opened a new human era. Whether this new era will be one of peace and construction, or the final scene in which the curtain will fall on western civilization, depends very much on a clear understanding of the possible spots where the prophesied future Great War is likely to start. However small and secondary the Near East may seem in comparison to western Europe and America, it is one of these susceptible points. On the events in the Near East, especially around the Mediterranean, world peace largely depends. And the normal condition of the Near East is largely dependent on the relation between Greeks and Turks. It cannot be repeated often enough that after the horror of the years 1918–22, mainly caused by Greek imperialism helped and launched by the western Great Powers, it is necessary in the future to leave these two people alone to adjust their difficulties by common sense and peaceful methods. If Greek imperialism always has Europe at its beck and call, peace is an impossibility in the Near East.

There are two kinds of Greece. One is the small practicable state with a people who want to solve their own problems in their own way and to carry on their unrivaled trading life, developing along the lines which every trading people seeks. This Greece is a valuable neighbor in the Near East. The type of Greek who belongs to this real Greece is a trader, a pleasant and joyous comrade, whose rather shrewd way of getting the better of you in a bargain you do not resent because he does it in such a clean-cut and artistic way. In his own country he is ruthless,

unruly, and more given to rioting than any other individual in the Near East. Yet it is he who represents the old commercial life of Greece, its internal democracy, and its intensely critical spirit. He is important to the development of the Near Eastern people, for he has contributed and contributes to the development of the critical spirit.

This kind of Greece at first refused to be drawn into the lunacy of the Great War, though the Allies promised her the best part of Asia Minor—Smyrna and its surroundings. She had a perfect right to choose and act for herself, but when she did so the Allies took offense. They looked upon Greece as a valuable lapdog which was fed and nourished with the best its masters could afford, and the expression of any individual desire was unwelcome to them. Evidently, they never regarded her as an independent Power. Was not the Near East a chessboard where the various Powers of the West could play with each small state as it pleased them? Greece was in disgrace, and her expression of a lawful desire to choose her own national course was looked upon as an expression of pro-German policy on the part of her King.

The Allies succeeded, by the help of their bayonets, in bringing into power the second kind of Greece in the person of M. Venizelos—the Imperialist Greece which has played such a sinister part in the Near Eastern world. Greek imperialism once more came forward at this particular juncture which was the most favorable for it.

Greece had come into the Great War when there

was not much left to be done; yet, having suffered no loss of resources or man power, she stood up among the Allies to claim her share of the victor's booty.

Russia was out of the field altogether, and Italy was unpopular. Too strong an Italy in the Mediterranean would be a menace to others, especially to French ascendancy. But Greece in the Mediterranean would mean a docile instrument in the hands of France and England, with M. Venizelos at the head. So, in 1919, Greece not only obtained Turkish territory on the European shore from the Peace Conference, but was also promised that part of Asia Minor which had been allotted to Italy by the secret treaty of St. Jeanne du Maurienne.

The Greeks were to be landed in Smyrna at a moment when the Italians were temporarily absent from the Peace Conference. The landing, so the Powers thought, would be easy. It was to take place under the protection of the Allied fleets. The Turks, who had been on the field of battle for ten years, were war-weary and decimated, and had, besides, been carefully disarmed by the Allies for the episode. They tied down the Turks like sheep and offered them bound to the knife of the Greek army. Once the Greeks had landed, they could easily exterminate the disarmed population, and the Allies would see that they were not hurt by Turkish warships or armaments.

The moral effect of this cynical and ugly plot was curiously different on both parties; it brought out

all that was finest in the Turk and all that was basest in the Greek.

The landing was to be justified by the seventh article of the peace treaty: "The Allies have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any strategic situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies." As no strategic situation had arisen to endanger Allied security, the meaning of the clause had to be considerably stretched.

On May 14, 1919, the High Commissioners informed the Turkish Government that Allied troops would be landed in Smyrna with the assistance of the Allied fleets. The Turks, troubled by the rumor that these Allied troops were to be Greeks, tried to find out what the phrase meant—but the answer was again, "Allied." Technically this was true, but it was also a very ugly bit of prevarication.

The Greeks landed the next day, under cover of the Allied guns. Professor Toynbee says:

> On the 15th May, 1919, a destructive force was let loose in Western Anatolia, as sudden and apparently incomprehensible in its action as the eruption of a volcano. One morning, six months after the close of the European War, civilians and disarmed soldiers [Turkish] were massacred in the streets of Smyrna; whole quarters and villages were plundered; then the rich valleys in the hinterland were devastated by further arson and bloodshed, and a military front came into existence.*

The fact that this spectacular violence and butchery was enacted by Greeks under the very eyes

* *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

of the Allies, that no human voice was raised in protest, and further that no account of it was permitted in the western press, combined to sink Turkish opinion of western standards of morality and humanity far below zero. The Greeks, on the other hand, when they saw that robbery and arson and the massacre even of women and children were accounted of no importance and liable to bring no criticism upon them, carried their system of extermination right into the heart of Anatolia as they marched forward.

Such was the general indignation in Turkey that, before a month had passed after the Greek occupation, disarmed and war-weary Turks, both men and women, were fighting the Greeks. It is an ironical fact, though true, that although the Allies had quietly watched the Turks being slaughtered on the quay of Smyrna, they became anxious for the safety of the Greeks in the interior the moment the Turks objected to being killed silently and obediently.

Nothing in modern history has done so much harm to the prestige of western civilization in the eastern world as the landing of the Greeks in Smyrna.

I want here to stress very strongly the point that no nation in the world can be indicted for what some individuals or groups, or even its army, may do in murderous moments—moments which come, unfortunately, even to the most highly civilized nations. The Greeks as a nation cannot be indicted. But it is the duty of those statesmen who talk of

saving western civilization and rebuilding the world to make a very serious study of the policies and methods which have led to these exterminations of one nation by another and to the stifling of all human and moral sense both in individuals and in entire nations. Unfortunately the great statesmen who steered their people successfully through an abnormal period of war have since proved themselves incapable of handling the post-war problems of the world. The unsettled state of the Near and Middle East, and the unnecessary prolongation of the War for four more years, were the outcome of obsolete policies carried out by ancient and discredited methods.

The Nationalist struggle which created the Turkish Republic was a result of the Turkish people's will to live. Before any leading names were connected with it, it was already going on all over the country, and actively in those regions of Smyrna and Cilicia which were undergoing a process not only of occupation but extermination. Its center was eastern Anatolia, where the unification of the entire movement took place. At first, from May 15, 1919, to March 20, 1920, the movement was pacific, consisting in a series of congresses where declarations and preparations were made to try to persuade the Sultan and his Government to coöperate in the realization of Turkish aims and to make the western Powers understand the folly of their policy in Turkey.

Here are some extracts about the process of or-

ganization in the movement, taken for the most part from my book, *The Turkish Ordeal.*

Mustafa Kemal Pasha left for Anatolia on the 16th of May, the day following the occupation of Smyrna. The date is a turning-point in the Nationalist movement. He was given the task of pacifying the East by the Sultan and Damad Ferid Pasha. Behind his obvious acquiescence in the order of the government, he had come to some understanding with Ali Fuad Pasha (the commander of the 20th Army Corps in Angora), Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha (the commander of the 9th Army Corps in Erzurum), and Rauf Bey. Rauf Bey started, about the same time, from Istamboul and after a short visit to Ali Fuad Pasha in Angora, the two went on to Amassia. There, on the 19th of June, the Amassia Protocol was signed by M. Kemal Pasha, Ali Fuad Pasha, Col. Refet Bey and Rauf Bey. Col. M. Arif, who was present, writes in his book called "The Anatolian Revolution" a summary of the resolutions which is confirmed by the others:

"The central government is entirely under foreign control. The Turkish Nation is resolved to refuse foreign domination, and this is proved by the various organisations of defence all over the country. The activities of these groups must be unified.

"A representative Congress must be called at Sivas and the date as well as the place must be kept secret till the opening.

"Those commanders sent from Istamboul whose convictions are doubtful from the Nationalist point of view must not be accepted."*

It was also decided that, in case of necessity, Ali Fuad Pasha should take the civil and administrative control of middle and western Anatolia. The com-

* pp. 41–42.

mander in Konia, Mersinly Djemal Pasha, and Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha accepted the decisions by telegram.

So far, up to the signing of the Amasia Protocol, there seemed to be no sign of a desire to break away from Istambul and form a new government in Anatolia: moreover, the Amasia Protocol was so worded that it could also be taken as an attempt to unify and organize the national defense against the occupation.

The first National Congress, which took place in Erzerum, had arisen from the desire of Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha for a more legal pretext for action. So this Congress was summoned, with Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its president.

During the Congress the Minister of War ordered Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha to arrest Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Rauf Bey, and appointed him (Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha) Inspector General of the military forces in eastern Anatolia (replacing Mustafa Kemal Pasha), asking him at the same time to close the Congress.

Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha refused to obey the orders from Istambul, deeming them unlawful, and advised the central Government not to appoint an Inspector to replace Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Once having accepted Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the leader of the movement, Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha was loyal to his word, and took orders only from him. Mustafa Kemal Pasha then resigned from the army.

In the meantime the Erzerum Congress, having

chosen subcommittees, started work along these three lines:

The preparation of the National Pact: the organization of the Anatolian defense of national rights: the election of a representative body (*Heyet-i-Temsillié*) which would, in case of necessity, take the place of a temporary government in Anatolia to carry on the national defense. But the Congress emphatically declared that if the elected body (in case of necessity) formed a temporary government, it should follow the established laws of the central Government and should, after realizing the National Pact, cease to be a government. The Congress made a profound impression on the Sultan's Government, and the immediate result was that the question of the calling of elections was discussed seriously.

The Erzerum Congress had taken place on July 23, 1919, and in August, 1919, feverish preparation was going on for another Congress in Sivas. The necessity of another Congress in a more central place, where the representatives of western and middle Anatolia—even Istambul itself—could come, had been talked over and accepted in the Erzerum Congress.

The Allies in Istambul, as well as the Sultan's Government, took different steps to prevent the second Congress. The French officers called on Reshid Pasha, the Governor of Sivas, and declared that the Allies would occupy Sivas in five days if the Congress took place. On the heels of this ultimatum the

British began to land four battalions, which they brought from Batum, at Samsun. Colonel Refet immediately marched to Samsun with the military and Nationalist forces and asked the British to evacuate at once, which they did.

The Congress of Sivas took place in September, 1919. Its demands were identical with those of the Congress of Erzerum. The "Anatolian and Rumelian League of Defense of National Rights," which had been started in Erzerum, was more thoroughly organized. Most of the political clubs of the Union and Progress movement in the provinces changed their names and took on a more revolutionary complexion.

The central Government also gave orders to Ali Galib, the Governor of Malatia, to gather the tribes from round about and march on Sivas and arrest the representatives. The orders of Istambul were brought to the knowledge of those in Sivas, and the Nationalists in Malatia frightened the Governor into a speedy flight. But this act of treachery on the part of the central Government led the representative body (Heyet-i-Temsillié) to break with the Government in Istambul and take the reins into its own hands. The loyalty of Sivas was great.

The break with Istambul frightened the Sultan very seriously. Damad Ferid's cabinet fell. The Sultan called upon Ali Riza Pasha, who was sympathetic to the Nationalists. Relations between the Nationalists and the central Government were resumed.

As soon as the elections were over, the question whether the Parliament should be opened in Istambul as usual, or whether it would not be safer if it chose a new seat in Anatolia, was discussed once more. On this occasion Mustafa Kemal Pasha urged that the opening of the Parliament in Anatolia would be preferable. But the position of Istambul was shaky; if the Turks had shown any sign of regarding it as of secondary importance they might have lost it altogether—so, at least, the majority thought—and in the end Istambul was chosen. The leader of the overwhelming Nationalist majority that came to Istambul in January, 1920, was Rauf Bey. Like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, he had advocated an Anatolian seat for the Parliament, but both had to bow to the majority.

The long-talked-of defense which was being organized in the Smyrna Mountains began to take shape very fast. The inception of the movement was intimately connected with the political organization which was crystallizing round Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Sivas.

There always existed in the mountains of Smyrna semi-political bands who have achieved great local fame—like the companies of Robin Hood. They were in eternal conflict with the Ottoman Government. They lived by kidnapping the children of the rich and holding them up for ransom, robbing the rich merchants, and killing the government officials and *gendarmes;* but they were sympathetic to the poorer peasants. Legends and songs of romance

gathered around them. In the early days of the Greek invasion, not having seen the manner of the occupation they had come down from the mountains and joined the Greeks. This was due partly to a desire to loot, and partly to their hatred of the Ottoman Government. But before a month had passed, they had taken up their arms and marched back again. Keukjé Effé was one of the first to lead his band against the Greeks. The simple leaders and fighters among the people soon gathered around Aidin and Nazelli. With some technical help from the regular officers, who kept themselves behind the scenes, they made the region too hot for the Greeks. A perpetual warfare raged, Aidin alone being captured and recaptured seven times. Finally the front of Nazelli was held for a long time by the Turkish Nationalist forces under Mehmed Effé, commonly called the *Demirdji*.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE REPUBLIC

An armistice is usually the first practical step toward peace. The Armistice of 1918 between Turkey and the Allies was only an introduction to another war. The Ottoman Empire died with it. The Ottomans passed away forever during the great struggle which it created. Properly speaking the term Turkey, although used by western people in connection with the Ottoman Empire, was never used by the Ottomans themselves. It was used after 1908 at times, but never as much as the term Ottoman Empire. From 1908 on the Ottoman Empire both as a term and as a fact gave way to Turkey.

The terms of the Armistice were quite severe, but not much more than Turkey was already prepared and able to accept. She had already faced the possibility of the loss of her Arabic-speaking possessions. With the birth of political nationalism among the Turks after the Balkan disaster, the final dissolution of the empire was an event which the Turkish masses were beginning to visualize as possible. An open nationalistic movement among the Arabs had been apparent from 1912 on. Turks and Arabs left alone might have come to some mutually acceptable political arrangement. But Arab Nationalism di-

rected by France and England was moving in a different direction. The Arabs expressed such enmity to the Turks, by the way in which they killed Turkish prisoners of war and civilians and made common cause with the Allies, as to make the Turks realize that even the tie of religion could not link the two nations in any sort of immediate friendly relationship. Therefore they evacuated the Arab lands without regret. They also evacuated Baku, Batum, and those parts of Russia which they had occupied after the downfall of Tsarist Russia.

The Turks placed complete faith in the declarations of European statesmen, which seemed to hold out a promise that surrender would no longer mean the entire partition of Turkey. The faith was born because of a new element that had entered European politics in the personality of President Wilson, the representative of a hitherto non-imperialist nation who had created a general idealism and faith throughout the world. Nineteen hundred eighteen was a year which made secret treaties and territorial greeds incongruous with the general public opinion of the world. The rights of peoples was the favorite term and theme. Whatever the governments had done and were responsible for, the peoples were going to have their rights recognized. President Wilson's Fourteen Points spoke clearly concerning places where the Turks were incontestably in the majority. No one could foretell that the geographical ignorance of leading statesmen coupled with the old political cupidity would rein-

state the old secret treaties. President Wilson's third point was:

> Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states.

This declaration, made in New York in September, 1918, only a month before the Turkish armistice, caused immense enthusiasm in Turkey:

> The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that knows no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

Mr. Lloyd George had even gone farther on this point, and said on January 5, 1918:

> Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race. . . .

The only tricky clause in the armistice was the seventh, which ought to have put Turkey in mind of the old diplomatic phraseology wherever she was concerned: "The Allies have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies." The truth is, Turkey never gave any pretext for putting this clause into force. Until the moment when the Allies themselves began to violate the terms of the armistice, the Turks on their side respected all its terms. In order to illustrate the general feeling in

Turkey I will quote the opening lines of *The Turkish Ordeal*, which was written only three years later:

My own condition—physical and moral—at this time might be taken as typical of the general feeling in my country after the armistice was signed and the Allied troops had entered. I felt stupefied, tired and utterly sick at heart of all that had happened since 1914. I was conscious that the Ottoman Empire had fallen with a crash and that it was not only the responsible Unionist leaders who were buried beneath the crushing weight of it. Though disintegration had begun nearly a century before, and though I firmly believe that war or no war the Empire would have been doomed anyhow, yet with the aid of a far-sighted policy, a less abrupt and unfortunate end might have resulted. But at that moment the sudden finality of the fate of the Empire was an unavoidable fact.

That the years of elaborate political work carried out by the different Powers in Turkey among the minorities and the series of atrocities committed by all the racial units were going to bear fruit, no one doubted. As Russia was hors de combat it was evident that England and France—perhaps Italy—would take the largest share of the spoils of war. Italy would naturally be compensated in Austria, but the other Powers would spread their jurisdiction over a part of the Ottoman Empire, dividing it into Mandates and zones of influence. Even those who had believed in the moral superiority of the Allies in Turkey were not blind to the fact that the big talk about justice, rights of the people, etc., would not be applied to this country. Yet the 14 points of President Wilson, so ostentatiously announced, and the war weariness of all the peoples, including the visitors, made it advisable to leave the Turks in the lands where they were in an incontestable majority.*

* pp. 3–4.

The western peoples, who had sacrificed twenty millions of their manhood, were on the eve of a great change, but western diplomacy was not. It was bound by a series of secret treaties, all contradictory and intricate, and all the logical outcome of century-old western greed in the Near East.

The Treaties. The plan for the partition of Turkey was in all probability clearly present to the minds of those western statesmen who refused to help the anti-war faction in Turkey in 1914. So it was not surprising that in April, 1915, they signed the first plan of partition in London, dividing Turkey among Russia, England, France, and Italy.

This Treaty (the Sykes-Picot agreement), and the ones which followed, were entered upon for various purposes: first, in order to keep Russia in the War; second, in order to bring Italy, Greece, or other countries into the War; third, in order to carve out the largest shares for France and England; fourth, because, apart from these agreements, the Allies had committed themselves by promises to non-Turkish subjects, mostly Arabs and Armenians, who were commissioned to stab Turkey in the back during the War and inherit her property after her defeat. These promises, both to the Arabs and Armenians, were in contradiction to the Powers' other arrangements, but then it was never intended that they should be fulfilled. As Professor Lybyer says:

> Armenians and Arabs were heaped for a time with flattery and large vague promises, only to be thrust back painfully in many cases into conditions of limitation and sub-

jection, where not merely their imperialism, but even their national existence is threatened with extinction. Many of them enjoy less political freedom under European rule than was allowed them by the Turk.*

The old Franco-British rivalry had come to an end in 1904, and was followed by an understanding between England and Russia in 1907. The chief reason that these once supreme rivalries had been swept aside was the appearance of Germany in the political arena of the Near and Middle East. The Bagdad railway concession made to Germany had caused great anxiety, and its extension to Basra had roused England's traditional fear lest any other Power should approach the route to India. As Professor Toynbee says:

The direct motive was covetousness, and it rested locally on nothing more substantial than the precarious honour among thieves who find their business threatened by a vigorous and talented competitor. Some of the thieves, at any rate, never got out of the habit of picking their temporary partners' pockets.†

The secret agreements had accorded to Russia Constantinople, the Gallipoli Peninsula, the European shore of the Sea of Marmora, and a part of eastern Anatolia, including Trebizond, which she had occupied in 1916.

France was given Syria, Cilicia as far as Sivas, Mosul, and western Kurdistan.

* "Turkey under the Armistice," *Journal of International Relations*, April, 1922, p. 463.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

Italy was given the southern half of Asia Minor —Adalia, Smyrna, and a small sphere of influence to the north of Smyrna.

England was given Mesopotamia, the Mandate of Palestine, Haifa, and Acre, and she was to support the independence of the Hedjaz and of the remainder of Arabia.

The land claimed by and granted to Russia in eastern Turkey was identical with that which was later pledged to become an independent Armenia. And yet, when the Russians occupied this promised Armenia of the future in 1916–17, General Yudenich tried to plant Cossack colonies on the lands which were being left bare by the massacred or deported Armenians—and, curiously enough, all Armenians were excluded from these colonies as ineligible. Professor Toynbee says:

> The intention was clear and the terms of the agreement debarred our Government from protesting against it. Yet at the very time when the agreement was being made, I was being employed by His Majesty's Government to compile all available documents on the recent treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish Government in a "Blue Book," which was duly published and distributed as war-propaganda.*

The promises made to Arab Nationalists did not agree with the secret clauses of the Sykes-Picot agreement, but the text of this was unknown to them until after 1917, when the Bolsheviks published it. The Arabs have never since recovered from

* *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

their disillusionment. The proposed Arab independence had meant nothing more than a division of the Arab-speaking lands between England and France.

By this time a new factor had appeared in the situation. Russia had withdrawn from the War, and Greece was becoming an important factor in the European situation. In order to keep her interested, some delicate morsel had to be squeezed for her out of the already worked-out plan of partition, which left no area free. Greece, then, was to be compensated from the Italian claims. In fact all these treaties and agreements failed utterly to fulfil any of the geographical, racial, or national feelings and interests of the peoples concerned, and each, moreover, contradicted the rest.

When the armistice had been signed, the various parts of Turkey were taken under what was supposed to be a temporary occupation. Constantinople was occupied by the Allies with the English troops dominating, Cilicia by the French, and Adalia by the Italians. In the seven long centuries of Ottoman history there had never before been such happenings. Independence is a vital asset of the Turk's self-respect, and the large emigration of the Turks whenever the lands they lived in were occupied by strangers is partly due to this unbreakable spirit of independence. They naturally detested foreign occupation; and, in addition, the occupying Powers in Constantinople and Cilicia made things yet harder for them to bear. Without going into details the conditions of things can be imagined by merely men-

tioning the fact that both in Constantinople and Cilicia the native Christians, who hated the Turks, were employed to deal with them. Everywhere the Turks were disarmed and the Christian natives carefully armed. In Cilicia especially, Armenian legions were recruited under French authority and used in the search for arms in Turkish houses; this proved to be the beginning of a most bloody feud between the two races, who might yet, had they only been left alone, have found some *modus vivendi* in post-war life. As it was, the Armenians lost any chance of ever again coöperating with the Turks in Cilicia, and the Turkish population were goaded into organizing an armed resistance which later obliged the French to evacuate and come to terms. The Armenians were transported and settled in Syria by the French. It is most unfortunate that they were used by the French authorities to punish the Nationalist Arab risings in Syria, though their situation in Syria is safe as long as the French occupation lasts.

The occupation in Constantinople did not involve so much bloodshed, but it had an equal if not a more violent effect in stirring up the Turks to offer the utmost resistance. The Italians in Adalia behaved best, although their presence was as deeply resented.

The condition of the Turkish Government in this internal muddle and disaster was pitiful. The prominent members of the Union and Progress movement who had been responsible for entry into

the Great War had left Turkey. The Government had passed into the hands of the Sultan without any organized party on his side to frame a definite policy, and the Sultan in turn had passed completely into the hands of the Allies. Although he occasionally managed to have a Government with a few members whose integrity and patriotism were nationally known, they were utterly helpless to carry out any measures. The Sultan received orders from the Allies, and if his Government did not approve of them it had to resign and let those who were willing to carry out the instructions of the army of occupation take responsibility.

Among the unforgivably criminal phases of Union and Progress policy was the party dictatorship. In the first place they established the tradition of party domination as replacing the old autocracy of the sultanate. That was an evil which Turkey would have to suffer later. But the immediate effect rose from a different condition. Unfortunately, all that was vital, intelligent, and able had had some contact with the Union and Progress movement. There were those who had worked with it to overthrow the absolute monarchy, there were those who had backed its admirable policy of education and social reforms. Yet among the best there were a large number who disapproved strongly of its drastic and inhuman methods. And they had become articulate in the last year of the War. Because of the Great War which was a life-and-death struggle for Turkey, because of the blind autocracy of the

leading men backed by the extremist element, those who might have formed a separate organization and taken the reins of the government in their hands were helpless. In the meanwhile the direction of affairs was in the hands of the Sultan and those who openly boasted of being mere sycophants and paid agents of the Allied occupation.

On the other hand the Allies made the mistake of hounding every simple individual who stood up for Turkish interests, as having had something to do with the Union and Progress movement. Hence under the mask of punishing the movement, which was universally hated in the West, they were pursuing a wholesale extermination policy in Turkey without any check from public opinion in the West. From a narrow political standpoint nothing could have been more intelligent. And if the Allied policy of those days did not succeed, the reason was neither lack of will and ruthlessness nor lack of material efforts; it was merely because they did not reckon with the moral backbone of the Turkish masses. Yet however unbearable the conditions, their belief that these conditions would end with the signing of peace, gave the Turks the courage to bear them with admirable patience. However great the present suffering, however vast the lands of which Turkey would be deprived with the signing of peace, there was going to be one free corner for the Turks, where they might work out their future salvation. The limit of Turkish forbearance was reached when this hope for a free Turkish corner was shattered by the

Allies. It came through the revived attempt to create a Greek Empire in Turkey.

The ancient idea of establishing a Greek Empire in the Near East at the expense of the Turks and of the Slavs was proved to be impossible, for there was no reality on which it could be built save a few historical documents and inscriptions on stones, telling of a Greek civilization in Asia Minor some twelve hundred years ago. Professor Lybyer speaks of the attempt to revive this impracticable idea in 1918–19 in these terms:

> The policy in regard to Greece shifted toward granting her an empire, as the pleasant insinuating ways of Venizelos more and more obscured the facts that his position even in Greece rested upon allied bayonets, and that his people were not the heroes and philosophers of classic lore, but a modern group of very mixed descent, given to trading and shipping, inept in administration. . . . British and French leaders alike became bedazzled to the extent of visualizing a trim, tight, strong, benevolent Greek Empire holding the Straits for the benefit of mankind, not only against disarmed Bulgarians and Turks, but—ye gods!—against the revival of Russian power and the coming of the Slavs! . . .
>
> No effort was made by the Paris conferees to investigate the situation on the spot and learn whether in Turkish Thrace and the neighborhood of Smyrna the conditions of population, popular demand, and economics would justify Greek ownership. . . . It was presently designed to give Greece Thrace up to the very outskirts of Constantinople and a section of Asia Minor around Smyrna, both of which areas contained in 1919 a large majority of Turks. . . . Nor could their frontiers be counted as otherwise than temporary. Whatever Balfour and Clemenceau may have

intended, Venizelos had in mind the future addition of Constantinople, with more remotely a further expansion into the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor. . . . Fortunately for the world, the Greek people have not a military and political capacity equal to their self-confidence. With an army only slightly diminished by their judicious participation in recent wars, and with the abundant open or tacit help of Britain, they have been able to win only minor successes against the Turks, whose man-power has been depleted terribly, whose capital city is occupied.*

This plan for establishing a Greek Empire was the prime cause of the national resistance that the Turks have offered in the West. From the day of the occupation of Smyrna, the western Anatolians started their own defense and became exponents of the Turkish Nationalist movement.

But yet another empire was to stretch across eastern and southern Turkey. Again I quote the words of Professor Lybyer, who is, I believe, very sympathetic to the Armenians:

The Armenians asked at the Peace Conference for an empire laid out generously from the Mediterranean in Cilicia to the Black Sea from Samsoon to Batum, and even to the Caspian: not only Turkey, but Persia and Russia were to contribute to its lands. . . . As a matter of fact, there never was an Armenian state ruling at one time the half of this area.†

I believe that everybody knows the extent of the hatred which the Armenians bear toward the Turks. Try and imagine a similar degree of distrust and hatred felt in southern and eastern Turkey, and add

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 456–458. † *Ibid.*, p. 458.

to this hatred and fear the fact that the Turks had been in an incontestable majority even before their deportations and massacres, and you will understand how, the moment this other Armenian Empire was talked of, the east and south of Turkey were ready and determined to go to any lengths to prevent it. Colonel Rawlinson, who was a prisoner of war in eastern Turkey, gives illustrations of the feeling entertained among all the peoples of the Caucasus toward the Armenians and the possibility of such an empire. Leon Milikoff, an Armenian patriot who has passed his life in furthering the Armenian cause and naturally hates the Turks like poison, gives a vivid account in his book, *La Révolution Russe*, of the absurdity and foolishness of such imperialism. In spite of its prejudice against the Turks, his book seems to be the first expression of a constructive Armenian point of view, and therefore is to be recommended to anybody interested in the Armenian question past and to come.

As things turned out, however, these two fictitious empires, intended to bring about the final extermination of the Turk, proved perhaps the two most important moral factors in creating the Turkish Republic.

A few pages from *The Turkish Ordeal* are illustrative of the internal situation at the time:

> The Western politicians who were dreaming of dividing the whole of Turkey were more than encouraged by the internal situation of the country. Turkey had never appeared to be such an easy prey to partition and extermination. The

Sultan was ready to take part with any strong Power to turn against his own people, and the Power he most favoured seemed to be England. Evidently he was dreaming of an English protectorate similar to the one in Egypt. There had been cruel and corrupt Sultans in Turkey, there had been drunkards and imbeciles in its history, but never a son of Osman had fallen so low as to manoeuvre for the subjugation of Turkey so that he might live comfortably. The Entente Liberal (the Sultan's party and the opponents of the Union and Progress who surrounded the Sultan), seemed also intent on the same idea. Absolute monarchy under a British Protectorate they meant to have, and in order to have it they were meditating the closing of the Parliament. The Parliament was closed by Tewfik Pasha very soon after.*

There were different associations at this time all over such parts of the country as were either under occupation or threatened with it. Their representatives were at Constantinople, and none as yet were revolutionary in the strictest sense of the word. The eastern associations, those of the Black Sea and Erzerum and the southern vilayets, had great vitality. True, they were threatened with the fictitious Armenian Empire with Trebizond as its port; but in spite of the imminent danger of such a plan being agreed upon during the course of the coming peace conference, they were the least helpless of the entire Anatolian district. The independent fighting character of the people, and the isolated geographical position of the region made them safer than the western part of Anatolia. A fresh army of invasion was absolutely necessary in order to establish an

* pp. 11–12.

Armenian state over there, and eastern Anatolia can claim the honor of having been the center where the foundations of the new Republic were laid. As yet, however, there was no central organization, no rallying-point where the Turks could prepare to carry out their resistance. In fact a faint hope still lingered that the western Powers would not enter upon such an absurd and bloody program in Turkey.

Even in this hopeless state of affairs two things still made the Turks believe that a new era might come. I must quote again from *The Turkish Ordeal:*

> I soon began to notice a gradual awakening even among the Turkish youth, usually so despairing and indifferent to everything after the war. A few Turkish officers expressed profound surprise at the regular allied forces allowing such disorder and anarchy to go on. A few civilians abused all the soldiers, including our own, and said that there was nothing left for the Turk but to turn Bolshevik and pull down the inhuman edifice we called "Western Civilisation." One said, "I thought the British had more intelligence, if not more humanity. We are the only possible obstacle to the great wave of Bolshevism. We would have been a buffer state if they had treated us decently. Now we will let it inoculate us and pass the germ on to the West."*

Greece, with its industry and Christianity, was more liable than Moslem and agricultural Turkey to catch the infection of Communism, but this was not thought of by the West.

A newer, younger, and more idealistic West now appeared to the Turks. This was the America of

* p. 6.

Wilson and of the few fair-minded journalists who came to us of their own accord. Through the wholesome curiosity of the latter and the efforts that they made, the Turkish aspect of the question gradually began to penetrate the dense cloud of hatred and prejudice and political obstruction raised by the older West.

As America was the only Power that seemed to have no desire for territorial acquisition in Turkey, and as President Wilson had shown the one gleam of justice and common sense which had illumined the prospect before the defeated countries, most of the enlightened Turks imagined for a short time that America might help to clear up the situation without anyone taking up arms and beginning another war. A body of people called the "Wilsonian League" got together in Constantinople and prepared a memorandum to be sent to President Wilson. This memorandum proposed a scheme whereby Turkey might be helped financially and economically, have experts and advisers sent to her for a certain number of years, and be guaranteed a period of peace which would give her a chance of setting up a new *régime*. America did not respond. But even had she responded, the eastern part of Anatolia showed itself very much adverse to the scheme from the very beginning. In the Erzerum region, where the Nationalist struggle had its birth, the Armenians had perpetrated massacres under the Russian occupation in 1916, and the greater part of the population had emigrated and died in the course

of their wanderings in eastern Anatolia. America, whose sympathies were with the Armenian side, seemed more likely to prove hostile than helpful. The feeling about America among the people of Erzerum at that time is illustrated by an amusing incident which took place during one of the preliminary sittings of the Erzerum Conference in 1919. Mustafa Kemal Pasha had proposed an article which dealt with the necessity of economic and political aid from some great Power which had no territorial designs on Turkey; all the western Powers were on Turkish ground at that time, with the exception of America. One of the eastern representatives got up and asked Mustafa Kemal Pasha to name openly the Power which he had in mind. Able politician that he is, he immediately saw the antagonism of eastern Anatolia to any idea which might bring American influence to bear, and refrained from pronouncing the name. However, the whole thing died away very soon, and Turkey grew accustomed to the knowledge that she must henceforth expect no help save from herself—a truth which was brought most fully home to her by the occupation of Smyrna, where a spectacular inauguration was carried out before the eyes of all the Allied fleets (except Italy), America included.

THE TREATY OF SÈVRES

"N'Y TOUCHEZ PAS, IL EST BRISÉ"

The western politicians at last prepared a treaty of peace for the Turks at Sèvres and called it after the place—Sèvres, a place associated with things of beauty, and now to be connected in human minds with the greatest suffering and bloodshed. It was a cracked piece from the very beginning—but half a million human beings had to be slaughtered in order to break it completely and bury its pieces in Lausanne.

The only possible obstruction to the realization of the Treaty of Sèvres was the National Pact which the Turkish Parliament of the Nationalists in Constantinople had issued. It was practically the same declaration issued by the two Congresses of Erzerum and Sivas. Most of the demands therein were no more than what Mr. Lloyd George had pledged himself to in 1918, and President Wilson had promised to the peoples in his Fourteen Points; and the Turks had been made to understand that they would obtain them when they laid down their arms and signed the armistice at Mudros. Professor Toynbee speaks of the Pact thus:

> The Pact was something more than a statement of war-aims or a party programme. It was the first adequate expression of a sentiment which had been growing up in the

minds of Western-educated Turks for three or four generations, which in a half-conscious way inspired the reforms of Midhat Pasha and the Revolution of 1908, and which may dominate Turkey and influence the rest of the Middle East for many generations to come. It was as emphatic an adoption of the Western national ideas as any manifesto of the Greek War of Independence, and it was at the same time an appeal to Western public opinion. You revile us, it pleaded in effect, for having failed to establish a *modus vivendi* with you, but such adjustments have to be reciprocal. As one among your own prophets has said: "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you."*

This was exactly what the Powers did not intend to do. What they did propose to do was clearly inserted in the Treaty of Sèvres. It was a combination of the various secret treaties concerned with the partition of Turkey, and the way in which it was to be forced upon the Turks had already been decided. Coercion was the method, exerted chiefly through Greece, who was to receive her share of the victim and establish her bogy Eastern Empire. The painful events that succeeded the occupation of Smyrna, epilogue to the Greek invasion, had induced some leading idealists in Turkey to believe that the Powers would modify or alter their ideas concerning Greece and that a more reasonable peace would be offered to Turkey. But the only alteration in the minds of the leading politicians in Paris was that they must increase the dose of terror and break the backbone of the Nationalist Turks. They never realized that it was not nationalism, but the invin-

* *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

cible human instinct for self-preservation that was fighting in Turkey.

The Powers eventually increased the dose of terror by the famous *coup d'état* of March 16, 1920. Its purpose was to do away with the leaders while the Greek army was busy in doing away with the population, women and children included. Hence the already occupied city of Constantinople was re-occupied by additional military and naval forces. Nationalist or otherwise, anybody who could in any way lead the Turks, was dragged from his home to the Allied warships and taken to Malta as prisoner, and all the Turkish institutions, especially the military ones, were occupied. The Parliament was raided, the prominent members arrested, and the House was closed. The British Headquarters issued a proclamation signed by General Wilson threatening with death everyone who should shelter a Nationalist. A few persons managed to escape from Constantinople in spite of the rigid military cordon.

With a *régime* of terror set up in Constantinople and a majority of the Nationalist leaders carried to Malta, the Allies believed that the Turkish masses in Anatolia could not hold out against those great odds with only the help of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and a few generals and civilians. As usual the vital and valuable human element of the Turkish masses was left out of account. "All corporate action is started by individuals and carried on mainly by an active minority while the mass follows behind. But the readers of the *Jungle Book* will remember that

it was the stolid herd of buffaloes, and not Mowgli on the leader's back, that trampled the life out of Shere Khan," says Professor Toynbee.* And no truer sentence has been written concerning the Turkish struggle in any language.

The moment the Parliament in Constantinople had been closed and the leading deputies removed by the *coup d'état*, the representative body in Angora under Mustafa Kemal Pasha issued a declaration to the whole country asking the people to choose new representatives to replace those who had been taken away or dispersed and were unable to reach Angora. A new Constituent Assembly was to meet in April. And on April 23, 1920, the Assembly met in Angora and set up a new government under the name of the Government of the Great National Assembly.

The fundamental forces of government in Turkey had disappeared or rather passed into the hands of the occupying Powers. The leading thinkers of the Ottoman world were in Malta or living in retirement. At the most critical moment of their history the Turks were facing the responsibility of decisions and actions which would either create a new state or bring about extermination. The Turk, who had been gradually appearing in the literature and in the thought of the passing Ottoman, was now the sole person to take charge of the situation, without much preliminary and normal preparation for it. Hence the most important question during the

* *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

two weeks before the opening of the Constituent Assembly was the discussion of the degree of responsibility to be left on the shoulders of the Turks' representatives. The few representatives who had escaped from Constantinople, and who became naturally the nucleus of the new Government, were all very much westernized men; their ideal of government was based on existing familiar forms. The Government was to be a constitutional monarchy without a monarch, with a legislative assembly, a cabinet and executive, and, as a neutral power in place of the monarch, a Regent, who was to be called the President of the Assembly.

This scheme naturally divided the responsibility between the representatives of the people, the executive, and the President, who was to be Mustafa Kemal Pasha. But he refused it at once. As he has always done in his whole career, he would lead but take no responsibility. He proposed to give all the responsibility to the representatives of the people. Both the legislative and the executive were to belong to the Assembly. The Assembly was to select the members of the cabinet individually, on personal merits, and each member was to have individual responsibility toward the Assembly; there was to be no collective responsibility. The cabinet, in fact, was to be a set of officials whose business it was to carry out the decisions of the Assembly. The head of the Government was also to be the President of the National Assembly, but he too was to have no responsibility.

The critics of this scheme around Mustafa Kemal Pasha saw many flaws in it. The influence of the French "Convention," as well as that of the Soviets, was evident. They thought that this exaggerated political democracy, so suddenly thrust into the hands of the people, would paralyze the executive, create a mob rule, and finally lead to a dictatorship. On the other hand the bulk of the people's representatives looked at it from a different point of view. All of them simple Anatolians, mostly without any academic education, relying on their own common sense and moral backbone, judged it the right plan to be adopted at the moment.

The traditional constitutional forces of the country had utterly failed; the only people fit to take up the responsibility seemed to be the people's representatives. Hence they shouldered the responsibility with simplicity and courage. The Anatolian, the typical Turk, was going to rule for the first time—and rule at a moment when he was asked to shape the Turkish destiny for ages to come.

Because of the urgency of forming a government at once, because of the necessity of absolute shoulder-to-shoulder unity, the critics of the Government of the Great National Assembly agreed with Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The Assembly accepted the scheme and elected Mustafa Kemal Pasha as President.

The result was very different from what the critics had feared.

The Assembly underwent the severest test of po-

litical ability, courage, and highest self-abnegation, and passed through it admirably. It aroused a sense of political responsibility in the Anatolian representatives of the people and they showed a firm and distinct objection to anything resembling personal rule. The wide-awake guardianship of the liberties of the people, coupled with a sense of reality and ability to recognize and use the best in the leaders, had hitherto been unknown to this degree in Turkish history. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reluctance to take any responsibility gave him the appearance of a wise man whose ambitions were exaggerated by popular ignorance. For the moment he became the Turkish George Washington. Yet the Turkish George Washington, admired and trusted, was checked and limited in the questions concerning people's liberties, while he was allowed absolute power in military questions and in the adjustment of the difficult foreign policy. As a matter of fact few men, from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire on, have shown better judgment and capacity than Mustafa Kemal Pasha on those two lines.

Nothing could have been of greater significance for the Turk of the future than the fact that, when the Ottoman Empire fell and a new Turkish state was created on its ashes amidst the greatest odds any people in history had to face, it was not one person or a few persons, but the representatives of the Turkish people who had the power and the responsibility, and it was they who created it.

A Constituent Assembly, with an Anatolian ma-

jority possessing absolute power, at such a critical moment, brought into evidence for the first time the political genius of the Turk. Less brilliant than the Ottoman, less fiery than the Macedonian Turk, he was gifted with a kind of common sense and stability which hitherto has not been seen in the Near Eastern people. After 1908, the Turk who had gradually replaced the Ottoman as the dominating spirit in the country was Balkanic, hence volcanic. He possessed the radical spirit, the adventurous streak, and the cool-blooded cruelty of the Macedonian. The Macedonian with all these characteristics mentioned, with his absolute objectivity and desire to transform into concrete shape the few ideas he possessed, very soon had organized a party dictatorship. And a party dictatorship monopolized not only the economic resources of a country, but also all thought; patriotism, the right to express one's opinion on what one deems to be for the ultimate good of the country, was ruled out. When one argued with the most level-headed of them in those days, he would say: "The Turkish people are not educated enough, and the masses are inert. In order to effect any change a strong and highly organized minority must rule. The minority will naturally be a party, and to keep a party from disintegration strong discipline and complete solidarity are necessary." For sudden and radical changes which are not the result of growth and popular education it is true that only this sort of organization is necessary. In theory it sounded reasonable, but in practice this

admirably disciplined spirit was apt to put party above country for the country's sake, to stifle every opposition—and behold, the party had become an instrument of absolutism.

The majority of the Assembly, consisting of Anatolians, rose above this defect. There were parties in the Assembly; but party or individual, they always put the highest interest of the country above party. During the most critical years of Turkish history, from 1920 to 1923, these Anatolians allowed no dictatorship, either of party or of person.

The Anatolians also rose above the adventurous and rash temperament of the Macedonians. They demanded nothing more than the National Pact. It is a curious fact that in spite of her supreme difficulties and dangers, the Turkey of the Great National Assembly did not lack temptations along this line. The Arabs, utterly disappointed with the West, were longing to make common cause with the Turks, who could, if they had chosen, have made themselves a nuisance in Syria and Mesopotamia. They could also have gone much farther in the Caucasus. But they avoided every temptation to adventure, in whatever form it was offered.

There is yet another point in favor of those Anatolian deputies. The struggle of the civil war at times necessitated very drastic measures. The revolutionary tribunals called the "Tribunals of Independence," came into existence in 1921, but their activities were watched with jealous care and they were abolished at the first possible moment. Only

by reading the verbatim reports of the Great National Assembly in those days and comparing them with the verbatim reports of the past and present National Assembly, can one realize the bold freedom of spirit which they possessed.

Perhaps this extraordinary national struggle, which led the Turks to transfer their capital to Angora, in the very heart of Anatolia, and forced the Anatolians to take part in ruling the country at its most critical moment, was a blessing in disguise, as it was most certainly a turning-point in Turkish history.

Some of the internal difficulties the new Government had to face looked as if they would end its existence in no time.

The Allies and the Sultan armed and sent one expedition after another into Anatolia to defeat the Nationalists. The leading Nationalists were all condemned to death by the civil and religious courts—the latter making it a religious duty for every Moslem to kill any of the men condemned by a religious decree. The Nationalists were outlawed.

The National Assembly issued a proclamation declaring that, since the Sultan-Caliph was a prisoner in the hands of the Allies and the Government in the hands of foreigners, it had assumed all powers, both legislative and executive, and had constituted itself the true government of the people. The Government of Constantinople was repudiated and all its measures after March 16, 1920, declared to be null and void. Henceforth the new Govern-

ment had yet another task, namely, to fight continually for months not only against the alien invading forces but against those sent from Constantinople.

A perhaps more important task was to determine how to deal with the irregulars. They had begun the resistance in Anatolia against foreign invasion when the army was entirely prostrate. They had received popular support in their guerrilla warfare, in maintenance and arms. They had been of immense value, but they were neither disciplined nor well equipped enough to resist a modern army of a hundred thousand Greeks. Consequently the Greek army, during the first few months, marched on without any very effectual resistance being offered it. The Government had the double difficulty of creating a new army out of nothing and struggling to bring the irregulars into the army and to put them under discipline and regular training. They resisted. Hence there was another armed struggle with them, while the scanty regular troops, newly formed by the Government, were already fighting with the Greeks and with the expeditions sent from Constantinople. But the force from Constantinople (called the Caliphate army) was defeated, and most of its members went over to the Nationalists. This was effected by the end of August, 1920. By 1921 the irregulars were also incorporated in the regular army, after a hard and dangerous conflict. In 1921 the Government of Angora had established

itself as a tolerable *régime* and had taken up the struggle with the Greeks seriously.

The deep-lying cause of its strength, the swift way in which it established itself in the place of a government which had lasted seven centuries, was in a sense the outcome of a long process of change. But the immediate cause was the Treaty of Sèvres.

To the Turk in the street it had seemed a death warrant, individually and nationally. The east and south of Turkey were to become Armenia, the west and northwest were to be Greece, and the rest was to be divided between England, France, and Italy. There was no room left, no further right of existence for the Turks after that treaty. And the treaty was signed by the Sultan while the Government of the Great National Assembly was fighting against it.

The misdeeds of the Greek army in the occupied regions intensified the desire to coöperate with every possible force that would drive out the Greeks. The *régime* which the Greeks set up in the occupied areas gave the Turks some notion of the kind of fate which awaited them if they did not clear the country of the invaders. The silence of the West, acting as an encouragement to massacre and violence, made a profound impression. The Turks had been accustomed to see foreign fleets sent to their waters whenever Christians were in danger, and to the mind of the ordinary peaceful Turk this simply appeared as a humanitarian act. But now the fleets

which had helped to land the Greeks, had watched their butchery of the Turks and had raised no voice in protest. For the first time the West, its methods, and everything connected with it, became unpopular and hateful. It was too utterly inhuman, in Turkish eyes, to last any longer. And for its downfall every Turk was to fight. War and defeat had failed to embitter the Turk against honorable enemies, but their disregard of their given and written word, their action in the extermination of the civil Turkish population, nearly destroyed the work of a century in westernizing Turkey.

Because of this general hatred of the West and the ideal of westernization, the Turks tried to create a new ideal with which to replace it. And it was called the "Eastern Ideal." It may roughly be described as an amorphous collection of ideas arising from a thwarted desire for a more congenial state of affairs. These ideas were much influenced by the Russian Revolution. The leaders of the Eastern Ideal were enthusiasts of the Russian Revolution and readers of Karl Marx. They believed his creed to be the coming creed of humanity. These men, very few in number, had no definite ideas about the possibility of applied Communism in Turkey. The country was at the time a vast and unexploited land which needed a large population, very up-to-date machinery, and first-rate transport, to make it prosperous. But there were only some fourteen millions, with very little means of transport or communication; and agriculture, the staple means

of livelihood, was still in a primitive state. Also, though the land was free so that everyone who could work on it could own it, there was not enough money to work it properly; and what men there were had been on the battlefield for years. So far, the administration, an imitation of the West and its social life, was that of a Moslem community which had been slightly westernized. There was as yet no industry, and in consequence no labor question. Such being the state, Marxism—even a mild form of Socialism—seemed out of place.

When one spoke of this to the believers in the Eastern Ideal their only strong argument was: "Western civilization and the present imperialist systems are doomed. All over the world, especially in the East, something new is struggling to be born. This new state of things is still in flux, but it is already attacking the whole fabric of the Old, so that by the time Turkey is westernized, there will no longer be a western civilization. Therefore Turkey must take part with all that opposes the West—its further destruction means the future freedom and salvation of Turkey and the East."

The Turkish irregulars stood for the Eastern Ideal. They had seen the worst during the first stages of the occupation and they had been the first to rise up against it without any legal support. Their forces were helped, voluntarily and otherwise, by the people. But whether they were patriotic in intention and moderate and unselfish in their aims, or whether they were using the revolution to

acquire wealth and power, they needed a new label in order to be justified in what they were doing. There came into existence an organization called "The Green Army," which was supposed to represent Turkish Communists. Its adherents were mostly among the irregulars. It was extremely unpopular in the army circles and it was soon dissolved.

The Turkish Communist party was another outcome of the Eastern Ideal. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was watching both the Western Idealists and the Eastern Idealists from a practical and political point of view and seemed to have no definite preference for either one or the other. Although the Communist party came into existence at his express desire, he was not a Communist. But he was well aware that the Treaty of Sèvres had so intensified hatred of the West in Turkey that something had to be done in order to control such trends as were the outcome of this hatred. If the country went suddenly Bolshevik of its own accord, then it would be safer for him to have a nucleus of the party in his hand, by which means he might obtain control over the new forces. Besides, there were Communist Turks in Russia who had their own organizations, and they were entirely under the thumb of Moscow. And above all they were watching every movement in favor of Bolshevism in Turkey proper. Hence for every emergency of the future he had to have control over Turkish Communism through a party. But when he saw that the members of the party

were sincere, and not merely pawns in a political game, he used the Western Idealists against them and dissolved it.

There was another form of Eastern Ideal which had nothing to do with Communism. Its followers were fairly well organized in the eastern provinces and called themselves "the Preservers of Sacred Traditions." They were composed of extreme conservatives and clericals. They cordially hated Communism as the enemy of Islam; and in the east, especially in Erzerum, their center, they worked hard to keep out Communist influence and defeat Communist propaganda. They dreamed of restoring the primitive form of Islam in Turkey—to them the struggle in Angora had phases similar to the struggle of early Moslems in Mecca. They also were defeated. Hence the conflict between the Eastern and the Western Ideals in forms, which was most violent in 1921, ended—at least outwardly—in a victory for the Western Idealists. If the final phase of victory was due to the triumph of the Nationalist Cause, it was also significant for future Turkey and the position of the ideal of westernization.

This ideal is a century old in Turkey, and it had a wider and more comprehensive background than is generally supposed. It had its intellectuals for generations, its social and political aspects, and great names—names of martyrs—have been connected with it. Yet such was the universal hatred of the West during the struggle that it was nearly wiped out by the Eastern Ideal, the effect of the Com-

munist Revolution. The leading exponents of the Western Ideal were working with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and trying hard to shape the new state on western models. They intended to direct the educational, social, and political life of the people along those western lines which had already a long history. Only in their foreign policy were they in complete agreement with those who opposed the West. They revolted against western armies attempting to convert Turkey into a series of colonies, and believed that in order to face this aggression Soviet Russia was the only Power with whom friendship and alliance was possible.

Although weak in numbers, the westernizers could count on certain elements in their favor amid the general chaos. The dispersed army leaders were their strongest supporters. Although for the moment the regular army was inferior to the irregulars (the supporters of the Eastern Ideal) still it was bound to assert itself. The army, a purely western institution in Turkey, was the only caste not shattered. Its strong opposition to any ideal tending to break up the reforms of a century could be serious.

As a moral and intellectual force Turkish Nationalism also favored the westernizers. Modern Nationalism, even in Turkey, is of western origin, and all the well-known Nationalist writers and thinkers inclined to back the westernizing process against any form of Communism or religious revival in the state. Zia Keuk-Alp, the most prominent figure of modern Turkey as a writer and thinker, started a

strong campaign for westernization the moment he returned from Malta. He retired to Diar-Bekir and published a weekly, gathering around him a wide-awake youthful circle who propagated westernization under the garb of nationalism.

This phase of Turkish thought during the great struggle is significant for the whole awakening East. China probably is going through the same phase—doubting whether to adopt westernization on national lines, to return to their time-old civilization completely, or to accept the Communism which Moscow preaches as the future creed of mankind.

The countries nearest to Russia, the peoples who have a personal knowledge of Moscow's methods, are those which are least likely to adopt a Communist *régime*. But all discontented classes and nations are very much fascinated by Russia. There is a psychological reason for this. The ruthlessness of the West was always directed against the weak, against the lower classes among themselves, and against the eastern nations in the outer world. Moscow has made capital out of this point, by teaching the selfishness of the West in every eastern and western language.

There is a distinctive Communist literature showing up western ruthlessness toward the weak, and toward the eastern nations on an international scale. One hears an English Communist speaking in London using absolutely the same terms and even sentences, used by a Turkish Communist of 1920. Probably the same is done in China, in Africa, or in

India. Those peoples who have suffered from western selfishness, not to say unscrupulousness, find their sentiments put clearly into an international propaganda literature. Russia has given a clear utterance to their griefs, therefore Russia has agreeable associations in their minds. Further, Communist Russia has always backed the under dog. The effect of this in those struggling human groups or nations is profound. It is a curious human phenomenon, nevertheless a fact, that whenever a human mind—even one antagonistic to Communism—is shocked by any show which denotes an abuse of wealth and power in the West it immediately feels itself in sympathy with Russia. George Young in an admirable article in *The Yale Review*, entitled, "The Near East Goes West," speaking about the rivalry of Russia and England says:

> All we can say is that this is a rivalry in which the race will not be to the swift nor the battle to the strong. That army of empire-builders will win "who build within the mind of man the Empire that abides."*

At present Moscow is supplying agreeable food for thought to the oppressed and aggrieved. It is supplying them with an ideal, though in an indirect way. The West has yet to come out with an ideal which will be fair to the under dog. When, in 1918, the West came forward with an idealistic political attitude represented in President Wilson's Fourteen Points, chiefs and peoples in the farthest corners of

* Summer issue, 1929, p. 731.

the East knew Wilson's name and uttered it with the reverence due to a prophet who promises salvation. Now Moscow is mentioned with the same reverence. In most places they do not know whether Moscow is a man or a country—but they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the name promises salvation. The Turkish villagers in the remote corners of western Anatolia, sitting on the ashes of their homes which usually contained the corpses of their kith and kin, hardly knew whether Europe was a man or a country. But they knew that it was the cause of this endless bloody misery in Turkey and they said over and over again: "What has the poor Turkish villager done to that man Europe that he persecutes us so?" Yet the Turks did not adopt Moscow as the man or the influence which fights this misery-bringing influence of Europe in the East.

If it is possible to judge from what has gone before, one may safely say that whatever happens, western ideals are very firmly established in Turkey. A Turkish student of history with any sense of humor might say: "The Turks come into civilizations and historical periods at their declining moments, and the Turks give them a new lease of life. They came into the Middle Ages when that period was at its end. And they adopted the best in the declining age and made it last five more centuries. Now they have come into the Western civilization entering its decline. Who knows if, when the West has destroyed its own civilization and started a new one, the Turks may not develop it and become its

keeper and sole representative for five centuries more?"

While the Turks were in the throes of new trends of thought internally, in the throes of creating their new state, they were carrying on with it one of the most catastrophic of external and internal wars. The Graeco-Turkish War was the biggest, of course, in their history. Both the fighting capacity and organizing genius of the Turk and the military genius of Mustafa Kemal Pasha were of immense importance. But a key to the final victory may be looked for in the moral strength of the Anatolian people. Only their endurance, the willing sacrifices offered by individual men, women, and boys under age, made the final clearing of the country possible. No amount of military genius and organizing capacity could have carried the Turks through that crisis without the kind of human material they possessed.

The first period of the Graeco-Turkish War up to 1921 was carried along at the same time as the struggle against the forces sent from Constantinople and the armed effort to discipline and incorporate the irregulars in the regular army.

In this period the Greeks reached middle Anatolia, invading all the Smyrna district, Brusa, and finally Eskishehr.

The Turks seriously defeated the Greeks for the first time at Inn-Eunu, near Eskishehr in January, 1921.

An Allied conference was held at London after

the defeat of the Greeks at Inn-Eunu, and there was some talk of moderating the terms of the Sèvres Treaty. It took place in February, 1921, and the governments of both Constantinople and Angora sent delegates.

This conference made no definite proposal to the Turks. It simply suggested autonomy for Smyrna under Greece, and declared itself neutral in the Graeco-Turkish struggle. The Turkish delegates were to take these proposals to the National Assembly; they were also invited to another conference which was to sit in London in August or September.

While the Turkish delegates were on their way home, the Greeks began a second offensive in March, 1921, at Inn-Eunu, and were again defeated.

After these two defeats the Greeks made a supreme effort and attacked the Turks with all their forces in an attempt to reach Angora before another conference could be held in London. In July they defeated the Turks and took Eskishehr. The Turkish army retreated to the east of the Sakaria River.

On August 25, 1921, the Greeks attacked once more, being this time absolutely certain that they would reach Angora. The battle of Sakaria, which lasted twenty-five days, may be called the most decisive battle of the Near East in this century. The Greeks were eighty thousand strong, and their equipment and transport first rate; the Turks numbered only twenty-five thousand, and they were short of artillery, had few guns, and practically no equipment. The Greeks fought well, but were de-

feated and retired to Affion. A sentence of Professor Lybyer explains the apparent miracle of this Turkish success: "They [the Greeks] fought for glory and the 'big idea' [the ideal of the Greek Empire], but the Turks fought for their hearths and homes."*

The French, who had tried to come to an understanding and were in a desperate position in Cilicia, made a separate treaty with Angora (The Angora Agreement), and evacuated Cilicia in October, 1921.

A year later, on August 25, 1922, the Turks passed to the offensive; but before doing so they sent a delegate to London to try to arrange for a pacific adjustment and persuade England to effect the evacuation of Anatolia by peaceful means. He was not received in London. The Turkish offensive from August 26 to September 11 swept Anatolia clear of the Greek army.

It was a costly victory for Turkey, for the Greeks burned a hundred thousand houses (these are official figures), including five of the finest and most prosperous towns of western Anatolia, and left over half a million Turks homeless. Of the massacres and violations it is best not to speak much—the sooner they are forgotten the better. The peace of the Near East depends a great deal on friendly relations between Greece and Turkey. Her foolish campaign of imperialism in Asia Minor cost Greece, too, dear; of the hundred thousand men who took part in it, three-fourths lost their lives.

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 469–470.

At last the Conference of Lausanne assembled; its work was to bury the broken bits of the famous Sèvres Treaty. The Lausanne Treaty, signed later, was not contrary to the spirit of the western world which recognized the rights of peoples to self-determination. The declarations on this point both of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were mere baits to hurry the Turk to disarm and to end the war. Before the ink was dry on them, the same Powers had come forward with that supreme piece of treachery against the rights of peoples, the Treaty of Sèvres. It is a matter of rejoicing for all peoples, especially for western peoples, that disarmed and war-weary Turks were able to force the Great Powers to act in accordance with the rights of peoples. This is a western doctrine, and western peoples can justly be proud that the Turks thought it worth while to sacrifice all and to impose it on armies and forces which seemed well-nigh invincible.

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

THE situation created by the Lausanne Conference finally caused the collapse of whatever was left of the internal power of the Ottomans and of the shell of the Ottoman Empire. The conference invited delegates from the governments at both Constantinople and Angora. The anomaly of two governments in one country became in a moment most acute. It was mere irony for the Sultan's Government to send delegates to Lausanne. It had fought together with the foreign invaders to coerce the Turks into accepting the Treaty of Sèvres. The meeting at Lausanne was the result of the struggle of the Turks themselves—and only their representatives could go. With this issue was also involved the necessity of ending one of the governments—if for nothing else, then for logical purposes. Hence the unworthy ghost of a once great empire had to give place to the young and vital reality of a state which had created itself. The fall of the Ottoman Empire resembled that of the Byzantine Empire. Once more the representatives of a dying suzerainty had been concentrated in the imperial city of Constantinople with hardly any hinterland around it. Once more the Turks were conquering Constantinople in 1922 and thereby ending an empire—this time one for

whose construction they had for centuries shed their own blood.

If the sultanate in Constantinople had been merely a constitutional monarchy which had passed out of use and function and must yield to a new state within its borders, nothing would have been easier than to abolish it. But the Sultan's position was not the same as that of any other monarch, even of one who was at the head of a national church. He was the Sultan, that is to say King, but he was also Caliph, the head of all Moslems throughout the world. His position was therefore exceedingly difficult to deal with. The National Assembly abolished the sultanate, that is the Government of Constantinople with the Sultan at its head, but left the Caliphate in the person of the ex-Sultan untouched. As the last Sultan had fought against his own nation and felt his position to be a delicate one, he took refuge on an English warship and left Turkey. The Commissary of Sheriat (equivalent to the position of Sheikh-ul-Islam) in Angora deposed the refugee Caliph and elected Prince Abdul-Medjid as Caliph by a Fetva (religious edict), on November 17, 1922. This was the last time the Turks used the Fetva. The new Caliph recognized the sovereignty of the Great National Assembly and abandoned his claims to the sultanate by a written document. Thus the anomaly of two governments ended, the Ottomans passed out of history, and there emerged the new state of things which the Turks had been creating for a generation.

Hence only the delegates of the Turkish state were qualified to negotiate and sign the Treaty of Lausanne in July, 1923.

The Treaty of Lausanne disposed of a number of thorny problems with which the Turks had been struggling for a whole generation. The National Pact was realized, except that part of it which concerned Mosul. The capitulations were abolished. In order to bring about racial unity in New Turkey and Greece, the Greeks in Anatolia were exchanged for Moslem Turks in Greek Macedonia; the Greeks in Constantinople and Turks in western Thrace were not to be exchanged. The rest of the Christian minorities were to have such rights secured to them as were accorded to other minorities in Europe under post-war treaties. The position of the Turko-Iraq frontier was left to be discussed between England and Turkey, and, if necessary, submitted to the League of Nations. Turkey and England came to an understanding in regard to this frontier in 1926.

The first important act of the Great National Assembly was to take a new name; on October 29, 1923, by a constitutional amendment, it called the nation a republic. The Government created in 1920, with an ultrademocratic form, was gradually altering itself toward a more usual constitutional form. The opposition, under the name of "The Second Group," had continually stood up for an orthodox constitutional form. Although they were occasionally accused of being adherents of the sultanate,

still one point on which they had insisted, the collective responsibility of the Cabinet under a Prime Minister chosen by the President and accepted by the Assembly, had replaced the old loose method. The Government of the Great National Assembly was from the beginning much more democratic than any existing republic, yet there had been a strong opposition to the name of republic, particularly from Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself. In his speeches delivered in Cilicia on his return from Smyrna in 1922 he had more than once declared that a republic was a rotten and outworn form, and that the Great National Assembly as a government was the most suitable for the Turkish people. Yet it was he himself who proposed to the Assembly the name of republic. It was accepted by the Assembly and he was elected the first President of the Turkish Republic. The same Assembly which adopted the name of republic, voted against according to the President the power of veto. There is one point to be seriously studied in connection with the development of the new Turkish state. So far it has stubbornly preserved the constitutional and democratic form, even when it became in spirit a personal dictatorship. However, from 1920 up to 1925, both in spirit and in form, the Assembly preserved its full force and continued to effect very fundamental changes.

On March 3, 1924, three important laws were passed at one sitting: I, to expel the dynasty; II, to abolish the Caliphate; III, to abolish the office of the Commissariat of Sheriat and *Evkaff* (the Reli-

gious and the Pious Foundation Departments), and attach all educational institutions with a religious significance to the Commissariat of Public Education. The Pious Foundations were to be attached to the Commissariat of Finances, and the Religious Department which had to do with dogma was embodied in a "Presidency of Religious Affairs" and attached to the office of the Prime Minister.

The causes and results of these three important laws were various; and as they affect both the internal and the external policy of the new state, they require a brief review.

I. The law to expel the dynasty is the least important. The Republicans feared intrigue by any member of the dynasty which might endanger the young republic. It was more or less what happens to any old dynasty when a country abolishes a monarchy and starts a republic.

II. The abolition of the Caliphate was very important, more so from an external point of view.

The separation of Caliphate and sultanate had already meant a departure from the original idea of the Caliphate in Islam. But the Turks were not the first to make this departure.

Islam, as we have already seen, is a religious democracy, whose laws are derived from the Koran and the prophetic traditions. At the head of the democracy is the Caliph, elected by the faithful on the conditions of capacity and performance; he holds office only so long as he is able to apply the Holy Law of Sheriat and defend the state. Hence

the two conditions of his office are elective and temporal. These conditions were strictly obeyed until about twenty years after the death of Mohammed, when the elective nature of the Caliphate—one of the two conditions—was altered and it became hereditary. But apart from this alteration, the Arab Caliphs kept the Islamic state in Damascus and in Bagdad under the Islamic law. In the thirteenth century the Caliphate was brought to an end by the invasion of Hulagu, a descendant of Jinghiz. The last Arab Caliph took refuge in Egypt, where a Moslem dynasty was ruling. He was courteously received, and his descendants continued to reside in Egypt, without however—and this was the alteration of the second condition—any temporal power. Hence in history we see the Caliphate, which demands a Caliph to be elected and to possess temporal power as the two fundamental conditions of its existence, swept aside. The Arab Caliphs resided in Egypt without being elected or having any vestige of temporal power. Selim the Grim, the great Ottoman Sultan, who for the first time deliberately started a Pan-Islamist policy, turning the direction of Ottoman conquests from the West toward the East, conquered Egypt and brought the Arab Caliph to Constantinople. Selim was invested with the office of the Caliphate by the last Arab Caliph. From that period on the Ottoman Sultan was also the Caliph of the Moslems throughout the world. This point was stressed by all Pan-Islamist politicians; Abdul-Hamid used it with a certain

amount of success and the Young Turks tried to use it in 1915 without any success.

By the end of 1918 the Caliphate, as a political institution, had proved a fiasco. The separatist tendencies of the Arabs and Moslems within the Ottoman Empire showed that Islamic internationalism had faded away and its place was being taken by nationalism among the Moslem peoples. The *Jihad* (Holy War) proclaimed by the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople in 1915 had made no difference to the Moslems of the empire. The Moslem Arabs fought against the Turkish army more desperately than the Christians. They made common cause with the Allied Christians on a nationalistic basis, with no religious scruples whatever. On the other hand the Moslem subjects of England and France fought willingly against Turkey under the banners of their Christian rulers. The Caliphate, apart from its uselessness as a political institution, was proving a source of political complications with the western Powers who had Moslem subjects. They either suspected Turkey constantly of intriguing against their sovereignty, or else they themselves intrigued in Turkey in order to get control of the Caliphate and use it on behalf of their own ambitions.

All these drawbacks in the position of the Caliphate, with its utter uselessness as a political institution, were fully realized not only by those who knew something about the political situation in and out of Turkey, but also by the common Turk who had to fight in Arabia against his once Moslem

brothers and in other fronts against other Moslems. It was this that had caused almost no opposition to the separation of sultanate and Caliphate. The Caliphate was to have no political significance. But when it was abolished entirely in 1924 the arguments used against a Caliphate with no political or temporal power were quite different from the previous ones. The open argument was that a Caliphate could not exist without temporal power; the Caliphate instituted in Constantinople in 1924 was nothing more than an imitation in the Islamic world of the Papacy of the Christians. Had the Caliphate been instituted in the person of an individual who did not belong to the old dynasty of the Ottomans, it would have taken root as a new spiritual institution—a departure from the old sense of Caliphate, but nevertheless an institution which would have persisted. But the Caliphs were to be chosen from the members of the House of Osman. The House had ruled for seven centuries. The Turkish Republic naturally feared that it might lay plans to restore the sultanate and blot out the Republic. Therefore the Caliphate had to be abolished. It was too costly an institution for the Turkish lands. The Moslems of the world might elect their Caliphs as best they could. The last Turkish Caliph, residing in France, is a historical analogy to the Arab Caliph of the thirteenth century in Egypt. As to the position or the restoration of the Caliphate in the future, it is difficult to say anything. However, the institution will not be revived in Turkey. The westward urge

of the nation, even at the time when it called itself a Caliphate, was its dominating feature. Without the Caliphate it has nearly evolved into a western state, with religion and state separated entirely.

If ever outside of Turkey any Moslem state becomes free and strong enough to restore the Caliphate, it might come into existence in a more or less altered form. There is a second alternative. The Moslems of the world might in a joint conference elect a Caliph, and appoint a residence for him in a free Moslem city outside of Turkey, and let him direct the spiritual affairs of the Moslems. This attempt has been made, without any success, both in Egypt and the Hedjaz. If a future attempt of this sort should establish a new Caliph, a spiritual head of Islam in a new city, an interesting situation in the world would rise. The Turks to all intents and purposes would refuse to recognize it. Hence there would be the same direct division among the Moslems as there has been among the Christians since the Reformation. As in the Catholic and Protestant division of the Christians, one with the Pope at their head and the others recognizing only their national or communal religious organizations, there also would be Catholic and Protestant Moslems, the Catholic Moslems recognizing the Caliph (a kind of Moslem Pope) and the Protestants refusing to recognize him and separating their religion from their worldly affairs entirely. After all, looking at this happening in Turkey from the angle of gradual secularization and reform, one can easily say that

it is in one of its aspects the Reformation in Islam. Whatever happens the Islamic world will have a different complexion from that which it had before the Turkish reforms.

There are curious analogies, if not repetitions, in human history. Again looking from a religious angle at recent events in Turkey, and imagining a future Islam with Moslems divided into Catholic and Protestant Moslems, one will be further struck by a corresponding likeness in racial temperament between Catholic and Protestant Moslems and Christian Catholics and Protestants.

It is mostly the Celts, Latins, and southern Europeans, who are emotional, sensitive, subjective, and given to religious contemplation, that have remained Catholics, preserved the detailed ritual and the intimate contact with their religion, always dragging it into the domain of their worldly concerns. The northern races, with more objectivity although with no less idealism, became Protestants. Ritual became simple; religion gradually was ousted from their worldly concerns.

The Arabs, Indians, and probably the Persians will be the Catholic Moslems of the future. They are, like the Celts and Latins, subjective; they constantly drag religion into worldly concerns; and they attach great importance to detailed ritual, color, and symbolism in religious ceremony.

The Turks, already the Protestant Moslems of the world, are more like the Christian Protestants. They have a clear objective mind and are utterly

simple in nature, and they keep their religion out of their worldly concerns as a matter of course.

It is the Catholics in the Christian world who have created a great art in religion, and preserved a deep emotional character which goes with more or less fanaticism. The same will be true of the Moslem Catholics, if such a definite separation takes place. It is the Indians, Arabs, and Persians who may create an art in the future in Islam. And if they show any fanaticism—they are naturally fanatical as are all strongly emotional races—they will show it in the realm of religion. The northern peoples express themselves more in that sphere of human life which is apart from religious faith. Man and the nature which surrounds him interest them most. They shine in practical achievements and if they have a fanatical bent, as all human beings have to some degree, it is shown in the domain of ideals which are outside of the realm of the supernatural. How many "isms" they have produced, and for how many "isms" they sacrifice themselves! With the Moslem Protestants, the Turks, it is the same. The Turk expresses himself more or less in the every-day, familiar affairs of life. Man and nature are the main fields in which he has ever been creative or original. He is more utilitarian than the other Moslems. Above all, if he shows any fanaticism, it is for the realization of some idea outside the realm of the spiritual world. In all history Turkish cruelty has had no religious basis. In the religious quarrels of the Arabs among themselves there are features which resemble the Inquisition of the Catholic

Church. There is no such thing in Turkish life, in its religious aspect. From the religious point of view the Turk has been most tolerant. As a matter of fact there is no cruel strain in the Turk in a normal state. But let him get hold of an idea which he wants to transform into action or form, an "ism" which he wants to adopt and propagate, and then he shows that utter ruthlessness and that cool, calculating power of organization and method which characterize the northern and Protestant Christians of the West.

III. The law to abolish the office of the Commissariat of Sheriat and Evkaff was more or less a logical outcome of the secularization which had been in process toward the latter part of the nineteenth century, and very feverishly active within the last twenty years. And it had an important effect on the structure of the new state.

We know already that the Turks, unlike other Moslems, began to amend the God-made laws of their state as early as the sixteenth century, and Islamic jurisdiction within the state gradually yielded to man-made jurisdiction. But the head of the Islamic Church, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, sat in the Cabinet and sanctioned any radical change or reform the state had to bring forward. His jurisdiction was restricted to the Sheriat courts where all questions of marriage, divorce, and inheritance were to be solved among the Moslems.

After 1908 the Young Turks adopted the definite tendency of separating the church and state.

The Turkish sociological writer, perhaps the only

one who tried to explain the tendencies of the Turkish changes, Zia Keuk-Alp, first spoke openly of the necessity of removing the Sheikh-ul-Islam from the Cabinet, in order to be able to advance the program of secularization; he wanted the Sheikh-ul-Islam to be like the other heads of churches, the Patriarchs. Zia Keuk-Alp was not an ordinary member of the group of Turkish intellectuals; he was one of the influential members of the Central Committee of the Young Turkish party. Hence his written ideas were either of the kind which he could impose upon the party, or were those ideas of the party with which he agreed. Under him an active campaign for the secularization and nationalization of Islam in Turkey was carried on. The Koran was translated into Turkish for the first time, and he constantly propagated the idea of reform in Islam. He believed that the change in the direction of progress and enlightenment in the West had come after the Reformation, and that Turkey or any other Islamic nation could not progress or live without a deep reform in Islam.

Although he was not able to get the Sheikh-ul-Islam out of the Cabinet, he managed to end the Sheikh-ul-Islam's jurisdiction by placing the Sheriat courts under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. The revised family law of 1916 was also due to his efforts, and it was a great step forward in favor of women. As a matter of fact he has greatly helped the cause of women in Turkey. In his writings there is an enormous amount of data gathered from the early social customs of the Turks when

women were men's equals. He probably stretched the point, to produce the necessary psychological effect in the minds of the people. The equality of women, he tried to prove, was one of the fundamental assets of Turkish society; he made it almost a historical necessity, a racial trait which had to break free from the chains of foreign culture and civilization, acquired in the Near East. While Zia Keuk-Alp was arguing for this change in Turkish society concerning women on grounds of historical and racial necessity, other Turkish writers advocating the equality of women took a utilitarian point of view. Why paralyze so many useful members of society in an inactive life? Why not make use of every woman in the creation of the new Turkish world? Further, the world conditions created by the Great War helped to realize this desire for the equality of men and women. The whole world needed the effort and hard labor of all its members, men and women, for survival.

In 1919 the Sultan's Government, succeeding that of the Young Turks, abolished the revised family law of 1916 and a number of regulations which had been given out along the lines of reform.

The new Turkish state created in Angora retained the Sheikh-ul-Islam in the Cabinet under the name of the Commissary of Sheriat (all Ministers in the Turkish Cabinet since 1920 have taken the title of Commissary instead of Minister).

In 1924, by the third law mentioned, the office of the Commissary of Sheriat came to an end. "The Presidency of Religious Affairs," which dealt with

questions concerning dogma and faith, came into existence and was placed under the office of the Prime Minister. The schools of theology were swept away. Family law, the only remnant of Islamic law, was annulled, and the Swiss code was accepted in its place in 1926.

In 1925 secularization was complete in all but two points: first, Islam was still the state religion, according to a clause in the Constitution; second, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was attached to the Office of the Prime Minister.

In 1925 a violent change took place, and what the outside world calls a dictatorship came into existence.

The Constituent Assembly of 1920, which had created the new Turkish state, had dissolved itself in 1923 and elections had taken place. The People's party, the embryo of which had always existed as the personal supporters of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the Constituent Assembly, reorganized itself, and most of the members were elected under its name.

The party published no program; it had nine points, or rather principles and vague declarations some of which became obsolete before the year was out. It can be termed a party which had no definite program and contained members holding very different views and principles.

In Turkey there were and probably still are three kinds of people in and out of politics: reactionaries, conservatives, and progressives.

The reactionaries have never been in power for

any length of time within the last twenty years. Their only support, the lower ranks of the clerical class, the ignorant, and the scholastic students of theology, were swept out by the Young Turks, especially during the Great War. The last reactionary rising during the Young Turkish *régime* was the bloody counter-revolution of 1909. Enver Pasha broke their back by making military service obligatory for the theological students during the Great War. The vast number of students who had entered the theological schools because it made them exempt from military service were no longer able to preach and propagate reactionary ideas, denouncing all progressive changes as contrary to religion. Bereft of any support at home, the reactionary politicians invariably sought foreign support, and in turn became the human material through which foreign intrigue played some part in Turkish politics. During the Allied occupation they found work and favor in the Allied camps—and they were used in the Caliphate army against the Nationalists in Anatolia. They did very mischievous and treacherous work. Gradually a reactionary began to mean a person who collaborates with foreign forces to the detriment of Turkey. They became taboo. Their principal leaders now live outside of Turkey, because they are in the Black List made after the Treaty of Lausanne which condemns them to perpetual exile. Hence they live in non-Turkish Islamic countries, more or less under foreign control—mainly Egypt, Syria, and Cyprus, where they still

preach their reactionary dogma and their impossible political creed—going back to the oldest form of Sheriat and the sultanate. Those at home who agree with these reactionary political creeds are very careful not to express their ideas. In the ranks of the People's party they do not count. Every day their power in Turkey diminishes, and in future events in Turkey they can safely be set aside as a nonexisting class.

The conservatives also have not been in power for any considerable length of time in Turkey within the last twenty years. But they were a considerable element and had their say to some degree in the Young Turkish party. They did not oppose reform altogether. But they were loyal to the old constitutional monarchy and the Caliphate, and they opposed violently any measure which threatened to alter the old social form, especially in the cases of the family and women. They stick to the fundamentals of old forms for the sake of stability as well as because of the fear of losing the Turkish-Moslem soul. They are in some respects very much like the English conservatives.

Their support came from the higher ranks of the clergy (Ulema)—those who held a part of the jurisdiction of the country, at least in the domain of the family, and whose head, the Sheikh-ul-Islam sat in the Cabinet and had the power to veto any measure which he deemed contrary to the spirit of Islam. One must in all justice repeat that this higher class of the clergy in Turkey have been both

liberal and humane in the best sense of the word. They always declared themselves against tyranny, be it of Sultans or of the mob. Further they advocated and sanctioned progress whenever it did not interfere with the constitutional sultanate and the old order of society. This class of clericals, the supreme support of conservatism, disappeared when the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam (or the Commissariat of Sheriat) was abolished in 1924 and their jurisdiction and political power in the state came to an end.

The second support of the conservatives was the very stable *bourgeoisie*, or the second class in Turkey. They were composed mostly of Turkish traders, officials, and the *rentier* class in the cities and the landowners and notables in the rural districts.

During the incessant struggles and upheavals of the last twenty years the *bourgeoisie* in the old sense has disappeared. The *rentier* class is pauperized; a vast number of officials left over from the empire days, without employment and pay, are likewise pauperized. The trading class has also changed its complexion. Commerce and trade have gradually begun to require political backing. The place of the non-party, conservative trader of some standing is taken by the adherents of the ruling party. It is a feature of all one-party countries. In Italy, Russia, and Turkey the change in economic ideas and in politics has altered the position of the economic class. The traders are obliged either to back the policy of the ruling party or at least to be neutral.

Any opposition to the new principles is detrimental to their position. Hence the upholders of conservatism in the cities have disappeared, the *rentier* and the official being submerged in the third class, and the trader being either replaced or obliged to adhere to the governing party. The latter has been anti-conservative in spirit during the last twenty years. The landowner and the notable also have undergone a change; those who are left are obliged by self-interest to humor the party in power.

In 1925, when the change within the People's party took place, the conservatives had also ceased to be of any importance at all.

The progressives, very few in number in the beginning of 1908, had increased tremendously, partly due to the rapid increase in schools and education, and partly due to the fact that they had the support of the army—the only unbroken caste and power in Turkey which counts. Hence in 1925 the majority, both in the country and in the party, at least outwardly declared themselves progressives. They were strong, they had powerful support, they were fashionable, and they were eligible for employment in the Government—for until a full economic development is attained in a nation, the Government is the surest way of livelihood. All changes will be brought about by the agencies of these progressives in Turkey for at least half a century. So strong is the momentum of the label of progress.

If one had to define the difference existing among the progressives in Turkey one might say that it is

as between liberalism and extreme radicalism, political or otherwise. Politically one may also define the difference as that between constitutionalism and dictatorship.

The dictatorship of the Young Turkish party had taught certain lessons to serious progressives. Although it had effected beneficial and necessary changes, it also had made very grave mistakes, the moment it was entirely out of control. Especially during the Great War, because of the extraordinary situation it created, the staff-officer type of man had become prominent—the type who believes that by a strong organization and rigid discipline, military in spirit, the greatest changes can be effected. With this kind of dictatorial spirit and organization in a party which suppresses all opposition and does not accept criticism, it is impossible to prevent the rise of a dangerous class of people, a class who not only control the right of the individual to think and act, but also monopolize economic resources.

The withdrawal of several members, men who had been of first-rate importance during the struggle, and the formation of a separate party under the name of "Progressives," took place in 1925. They published their program, which was decidedly liberal in spirit. Its importance lay in the fact that it was a clear symptom of the existing duality of opinion in the People's party. It also indicated wherein lay the fundamental difference. This somewhat disturbed the extremists in the People's party and pleased the moderate and liberal

element. Not only two-thirds of the municipal elections in 1925 were in their favor without any effort on their part, but a large number from the People's party promised to join them. The press itself took up their cause, also without any effort on their part. This was a clear indication that the future development of the Government was desired to be on progressive and liberal rather than on radical lines.

The Kurdish revolt, which had been under way for some time, took on a graver aspect and proved a trump card for the extremists in the People's party to play against the Progressive Republicans. They argued that the clause in the program of the Progressive Republicans advocating freedom of thought had encouraged the insurgents. The Kurdish rising was attributed to foreign intrigue, and political anxiety was fanned almost into panic at the possibility of another armed struggle. The very desire of peace in the general public and in the Assembly created a psychology which would accept any drastic means to prevent armed struggles and political complications that might endanger the newly created Turkish state. Then Mustafa Kemal Pasha played a superb political game. He proposed the Law of Maintenance of Order, which would reëstablish Revolutionary Tribunals, with absolute power to arrest and execute anyone suspected of endangering public order. The Prime Minister of the day, representing the moderates in the People's party, vainly declared that a revolutionary law of the kind and tribunals for the re-

gions in revolt were well enough, but they were not necessary for the peaceful parts of the state. After one of the famous long speeches of Mustafa Kemal Pasha lasting some ten hours in the party meeting, the Law of Maintenance of Order was passed in March, 1925.

The army then pacified the Kurdish regions, and the tribunals suppressed opposition and instituted a reign of terror which lasted nearly two years. The dictatorship thus created never called itself by that name in Turkey. It had been voted by an Assembly. But the long tradition of oppression and spies became at once a part of the *régime*. The press was terrorized by the arrest of leading journalists who had criticized the Government before the passage of the Law of Maintenance of Order.

Apart from the application of the revolutionary law in a retroactive sense in several cases, apart from the arrest and execution of the members of the opposition party (who had parliamentary immunity) the moral responsibility of the reign of terror rests on the majority in the National Assembly. In the triumph of the People's party it goes without saying that the personality and political shrewdness of Mustafa Kemal Pasha have played a great rôle. But what is of supreme interest is the change of a democratic state, of five years' standing, into a dictatorial one without either altering its form or even closing the National Assembly.

"The 'Great' man," says Dean Inge, "is generally carried along by some big wave, whether of

action or thought. His own idiosyncrasies fit the circumstances in which he is placed; thirty years before or after he would probably not have done much." This description applies to the Turkish situation and that of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Before the Smyrna triumph, Mustafa Kemal Pasha could not have led his party into such a powerful and absolutist *régime;* even in 1925, in spite of his great prestige, he could not have done so if he did not possess the lightning power of seizing favorable circumstances at the right moment. After all the Turkish dictatorship was not and is not unique in the world. The post-war world favors dictatorship. Bitterly disillusioned about the old institutions which were not sufficient to stop the great catastrophe of 1914, it seeks something new. The old order crumbled down, crushing what was good as well as what was rotten. The new generation is morbidly impatient to see a new world rise overnight. Hence such words as "liberalism" and "freedom of thought," which imply a slow growth, are out of favor in politics. The mob cry of the world is for "spontaneous generation," a sudden, artificial generation—a process that will turn men into the desired shape with the desired behavior and thought. Hence there has never been so much "doing" instead of "thinking" as there is in the world today. Dictatorships have the appearance of "doing" all the time, whether they accomplish lasting changes and effect internal reconstruction or not. So they are the latest fashion in politics.

By Ewing Galloway, New York

A SPINNER IN THE SUN

The Turkish variant of the spinning wheel in use, in the back yard of a Constantinople cottage.



By Ewing Galloway, New York

A TURKISH SCHOOL TODAY

In this classroom in Constantinople, girl students unveiled sit with boys and men to study their language and literature in the Latin alphabet which has been substituted for the old Arabic.

No other country in the world stands more in need of "doing" than Turkey. In such a country a strong, centralized government, if not a dictatorship, with stabilized forces backing it, is inevitable and perhaps necessary. This fundamental psychology in the world and in Turkey will tend to create and to maintain strong, centralized governments in Turkey, although the dictatorial form is a passing phase.

The continuation of reforms in Turkey under the dictatorial *régime* from 1925 to 1929, and especially their nature, are more interesting and significant than the terrorist methods by which they were supposed to be made possible.

This process of reform has been going on for nearly a century, but within the last twenty years it has moved with tremendous rapidity. The version in the western press, usually the outcome of the most superficial and hurried observation after a pleasant and short Mediterranean trip, is that Turkey was changed overnight from an eastern into a western country. This is worse than superficial; it is false. Whether the recent reforms could have been carried out by other than terrorist methods is a question to be seriously considered. And there is no doubt that they were bound to be carried through—but whether in three years or in thirteen or thirty years, no one can tell. Naturally one includes among the reforms which were sure to be realized only the fundamental ones that will endure. The nature of the leading reforms effected by the dictatorial

régime confirms the assumption that they are the continuation of earlier tendencies to westernization and are not departures from the fundamental line of progress that the Turks have taken.

The first and most spectacular of these reforms was the "Hat Law," passed in 1925. It was also the most futile and superficial in comparison to the others which followed. But it was the only one which accomplished an external change overnight. In a week it made the Turks don European hats (the only part of the city dwellers' outfit which had not been westernized) and made them look like westerners, although the manner in which it was accomplished was utterly un-western. The westernization of Turks is not and should not be a question of mere external imitation and gesture. It is a much deeper and more significant process. To tell the Turk to don a certain headdress and "get civilized" or be hanged or imprisoned, is absurd, to say the least. The opposition of individuals among the men in the street, really much more westernized than those who carried the measure through, had a note of wounded self-respect rather than of objection to wearing hats. Among all the recent measures, this was the most seriously opposed in the country itself. Any opposition to the "Hat Law" was labeled as reactionary. The interesting fact connected with the substitution of the hat for the Turkish fez is that it attracted the greatest attention in the western world. Other more fundamental changes taking place in Turkey were either entirely unnoticed, or

criticized, or neglected as unimportant items of foreign news in the western papers. But the moment the Turks put hats on their heads the general cry in the West was, "At last the Turks are civilized; they wear hats." Hence those who enacted the "Hat Law" might say: "We have killed a few, and imprisoned a large number, but it was good psychology; has anything in the past brought the Turks so much into the limelight? Has anything brought them nearer to the European in the European mind?"

On the whole the dictatorships have probably sensed the mob psychology of the West more keenly than anyone, especially the Turkish dictatorship and dictator. Count Keyserling says: "Now that the fez, together with other external distinguishing marks, has disappeared, it is easier to get a true picture of this people."* Count Keyserling personally does not need to see the Turk wear a hat in order to get a true picture of him. For he declares later:

> To him who knows what psychic atmosphere means, it is *a priori* clear that the contact with the life and spirit of the Greeks during a period of seven centuries, and the intimate relationship with Europe during a period of five, produced of necessity a state of psychological unification.*

Evidently for men outside the class of Count Keyserling, it is necessary to see an outward similarity in a people in order to classify them with this or that trend of thought. This represents the kind of

* *Op. cit.*, p. 320.

new superficial, "doing" western mind that has created the "Boy Scout" type of institution.

The chief result of the "Hat Law" was that it enriched European hat factories at the expense of the already impoverished Turks. Broadly one can say that it could not have been passed without a *régime* of terror. The Islamic reactionaries, the liberals, the people who understood the spirit of the West, were all opposed to it for different reasons. What would have happened was this: The very small number of Turks who wore hats in the summer in Constantinople would have increased gradually and in a generation hat wearers would have been in a majority in the cities. But the Turkish peasant would have stuck to his old headdress.

The adoption of the Swiss code in place of the Islamic family law in 1926 was a reform of a much more serious nature. It could have been put through without much coercion, although there would have been some bitter criticism.

A year after the Sultan's Government had been abolished in Constantinople there was serious discussion whether the revised family law of 1916, abrogated by the Sultan's Government in 1919, should be restored with or without alterations. In 1924 the National Assembly took up the question, and it aroused great interest, especially among the women of the cities and of Constantinople in particular. At a large meeting of women in the Nationalist Club there was elected a committee of women to study the situation and send a petition to

the National Assembly. The committee made a selection of the family laws of Sweden, France, England, and Russia, and having found the Swedish law most desirable it sent a translated copy with a petition attached to it to the National Assembly. Their petition had at the time no definite result. But there was a group of very keenly interested young deputies working for the adoption of a western code rather than the restoration of the revised family law of 1916. Mahmoud Essad Bey, the young deputy of Smyrna who became Minister of Justice in 1925, was one of the leading spirits in the movement. In 1926 the law following the Swiss code was passed. It can be termed perhaps one of the two most significant and important changes that have taken place during the dictatorship. This particular law will mean the final unification of the Turk with the family of European nations, by giving the Turkish family that kind of stability which constitutes the western ideal of the family.

The adoption of the Swiss law, which is entirely western, instead of revision and alteration of the Islamic family law which could have made marriage a freer if a less stable institution and brought it nearer to the present Russian family law, was one more triumph in Turkey of the Western Ideal over the Eastern Ideal, and one of more permanent import than is realized at present.

The educational rights that Turkish women have gained are no longer questioned even by the smallest minority, and the sphere of women's work has

been constantly widening. It is perhaps a blessing that they have not obtained the vote. Thus they have been protected from the danger of being identified with party politics, and their activities outside the political world could not be stopped for political reasons.

In the Turkish home, women continue to be the ruling spirit, more so, perhaps, because the majority contribute to the upkeep by their labor. At the present time, offices, factories, and shops are filled with women workers in the cities; and in addition to their breadwinning jobs, and sometimes in connection with them, women have interested themselves in child welfare and hygiene, and in organizing small associations to teach poor women embroidery, sewing, weaving, and so on. The favorite profession of Turkish women today, after teaching, is medicine. All this is the city aspect of the situation. In the rural districts, women still continue to live their old life with its drudgery, and will continue to live under these conditions until a more up-to-date agricultural system is adopted and the rudiments of education can be given in those districts. It would not be an underestimate to say that something like 90 per cent of the Turkish women are very hard workers; the question is not how to provide more work for them but how to train them better for their work and to give them more leisure. The small percentage of the idle rich (much smaller in Turkey than elsewhere) do on a miniature scale what the idle rich of other countries do. Unfortu-

nately Turkey is judged by the life and attitude of these idlers, who are conspicuous to the eyes of the traveler, rather than by the hard-working majority.

On the whole, within the last twenty years women in Turkey as elsewhere have profited by changes more than men. It has been fortunate for Turkey that the emancipation of women there was the result of an all-party program rather than a sex struggle. The contribution of the Republic to women's social emancipation in the introduction of the new civil code has brought the movement to its highest and historically its most important stage. But a generation at least must pass before its full effects can be seen. The general criticism that with westernization a great deal of evil and western immorality has penetrated into Turkish customs is not very important. The evil affects a small number of the idle, while the good penetrates into the majority, although more slowly.

In 1928 the clause in the Constitution which declared Islam the state religion was abolished. In the foreign press this step was criticized very severely, on the ground that it amounted to the abolition of religion in Turkey. This criticism was not only superficial but inaccurate. If religion, in the best sense, is in any danger of losing its hold on the Turkish people, it is not due to absence of governmental interference but to governmental interference itself. The men who sponsored this measure may or may not have been atheists, but the measure itself does not do away with religion. No secular

state can logically have a basic law which establishes a state religion. The abolition of the clause from the Constitution was therefore in true and necessary accord with the nature of the new Turkish state at its last stage of secularization. "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." The Turks have at last rendered up the things that were Caesar's or the state's; but Caesar or the state still keeps things which belong to God. Unless the Presidency of Religious Affairs is made free, unless it ceases to be controlled by the office of the Prime Minister, it will always be a governmental instrument. In this respect the Moslem community is less privileged and less free than the Christian Patriarchates. These are free institutions which decide upon all questions of dogma and religion according to the convictions of their particular group. The Islamic community is chained to the policy of the Government. This situation is a serious impediment to the spiritual growth of Islam in Turkey, and there is always a danger in it of the use of religion for political ends.

Now that the state has freed itself entirely from religious control, it should in turn leave Islam alone. Not only should it declare, "Every major Turkish citizen is free to adopt the religion he (or she) wishes to adopt," but it should also allow the Moslem community to teach its religion to its youth. Now that the schools give no religious instruction, and the religious institutions are abolished, the

Islamic community, if it is going to last as a religious community, must create its own means of religious teaching, its own moral and spiritual sanctions. Further, in the ritual and in the fundamentals of worship, there are likely to be changes among the Moslems in Turkey. Those changes should be allowed to take place without governmental interference. The occasional proposals by the university professors of new forms of worship in Islam—such as substituting organ music for vocal music, entering the mosques without taking off the shoes, placing benches so that the faithful may pray seated, and doing away with a number of complicated body movements in prayer—have met with profound displeasure. All these changes might take place by the wishes of the people, but governmental interference in this most sacred part of men's rights would constitute a dangerous precedent. It would fetter the religious life of the Turks and bring politics into religion. The fundamental meaning of the long and very interesting phases of secularization is that Turkish psychology separates this world from the next. To take religion out of the political state but at the same time to keep the state in religious affairs, is one of the contradictory aspects of the last phase which must be corrected.

Not only in Turkey but wherever religion is interfered with by governments, it becomes a barrier, and an unremovable one, to peace and understanding. Yet the fundamental doctrine of every religion is peace and the brotherhood of men. If only reli-

gions could be freed from political influences all over the world, the barriers between peoples of different creeds would break down sooner than one supposes.

The change of the Turkish alphabet from the Arabic to the Latin characters in 1928 is as important as the adoption of the Swiss family law, in its future significance. The desire to change the Turkish alphabet showed itself in a much earlier movement, as has been indicated. The serious impediments were: First, that it would impair Islamic unity, as all Moslems used the Arabic alphabet; second, that the Koran is written in the Arabic alphabet, and it might be considered as a sacrilege to write it in other letters; third, that it would impair cultural unity among the Turks inside and outside Turkey, for all Moslem Turks, who speak the same language, use the Arabic letters.

By 1928 the circumstances affecting this question had changed. First, Islamic unity was practically gone during and after the Great War, as far as the Turks were concerned.

Second, the Turks had ultimately altered their conception of Islam by a secularization which appeared unorthodox if not heretical to the other Moslems. The writing of the Koran in Latin letters seemed a very light matter in comparison to the feat of abolishing the Islamic law, especially its family clauses, and abolishing the Caliphate. The trend toward the nationalization of Islam among

the Turks resembled the trend toward the nationalization of Christianity at the time of the Reformation. The Turks have translated the Koran into their own tongue; they have begun to say the Friday prayers in Turkish; and naturally, they will also write the Koran in their own letters, whatever those letters may be. Third, a conference in Baku, with a large number of delegates from Turks all over Russia, adopted the Latin letters in 1925. The Azerbaijan Turks have been writing Turkish in Latin letters for four years, and other Turks in Russia are gradually adopting them. The use of Latin letters would therefore no longer impair the cultural unity of the Turks. It would work just the other way.

There was finally a strong practical argument in favor of the adoption of the Latin letters. The quantitative ideal in education under the Young Turkish *régime* was becoming more important than the qualitative value of education in Turkey, partly due to the general illiteracy of the country. Mass education was one of the undying movements which the constitutional changes in 1908 had brought about. It was natural to seek the easiest way of teaching the alphabet.

From 1921 to 1922, during the year when military activities between the Greeks and the Turks were suspended, the young element in the Turkish army had started an admirable movement to educate the men. Demonstration of the difficulty of

teaching adults the Arabic alphabet won adherents for the Latin alphabet with its comparative simplicity.

Hence in 1928, with all these factors in favor of the Latin letters, with the extra strength of westernization centered in a dictatorial government, there was a chance of carrying out the reform of the alphabet. It had the support of all progressive people in Turkey, whether adherents or opponents of the dictatorship. Popular opposition to any measure of which the army approved, after the reign of terror from 1925 to 1927, of course would have been useless.

The way this measure was carried out deserves serious consideration. The time allowed for the change was absurdly short. The preliminary study of the ways and means of applying it—perhaps the most serious measure involving cultural problems ever adopted in Turkey—was neither properly conceived nor conducted by any important experts. A far more serious investigation of the question, not only by Turkish specialists but also by eminent western authorities, was needed. The martial way it was rushed into effect, the martial orders given for the time limit by a mentality which was purely that of a staff officer, indicated a lack of understanding of the most far-reaching change ever carried through in modern Turkish history.

For the time being it reduced the reading public to the minimum. Many papers were obliged to suspend publication, and those that continued to exist

hardly paid expenses. Now the graver danger of being cut away from the Turkish culture of the past is looming on the horizon. The new generation rising within the next twenty years will be as strangers in the country and to its past. The continuity of Turkish culture has been abruptly broken. The younger people will read and write, but will not be at home with any culture half a century old. Without a past, without a memory of the accumulated beauty in the national consciousness, there will be a certain crudeness, a lowering of aesthetic standards. If the change had been brought about in fifteen years instead of five months, with enough experts to work it out, with enough funds to edit the essential works of Turkish culture in Latin letters, these drawbacks would have been infinitely reduced. Yet with all its drawbacks, if one thinks of the Turkish nation two hundred years hence, the measure is nothing but a serious step toward that ultimate psychological unification with the West which seems to be the Turkish destiny.

In the Turkish schools today, Arabic, Persian, and Turkish classics have given way in the curriculum to science and history. Religious teaching and the reading of the Koran occupied some hours up to 1925; then they were altogether abolished. Into the teaching of history nationalism of a sort has penetrated, but the emphasis has been transferred from the Ottoman past to the pre-Ottoman Turkish period. The purely cultural and liberal has yielded in late years to the utilitarian spirit, the

idea that learning is for its use rather than for its intrinsic value gaining ground all the time and ousting the platonic ideals of the earlier westernizers. Otherwise there has been little change in the fundamentals of the educational system which the Turkish Republic took over in 1922. The number of primary schools has increased, but not enough yet to provide education for the majority of the children. Perhaps the best recent step is the opening of primary schools in central towns where the children of the peasantry can be educated. There has been a decided increase in the teaching of modern languages and a still greater emphasis on sport and physical training. Of course the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the phonetic system has made necessary the training of a vast number of primary teachers who will know how to use them, and within a few years one can reasonably expect better results in primary teaching. The drastic repression of thought in 1925 is still having its effects, and the complete facts about the workings of the present educational system cannot be told until those who are closely connected with it, or are studying conditions in the country at large, can express their opinions more or less freely.

The introduction of the Latin alphabet was the last reform to be carried through under the dictatorial *régime*. In March, 1929, the Law of Maintenance of Order, which made a party dictatorship possible without altering the Constitution merely by using a constitutional sanction for dictatorship,

was abolished. But the momentum of the past four years, plus the temperament, the self-interest, and the conviction of certain minds that a dictatorship is the essential thing, still make its oppressive atmosphere felt in Turkey.

WHITHER TURKEY?

Toute la maladie du siècle présent vient de deux causes; le peuple qui a passé par '93 et par 1814 porte au coeur deux blessures. Tout ce qui était n'est plus; tout ce qui sera n'est pas encore. Ne cherchez ailleurs le secret de nos maux.

Confession d'un Enfant du Siècle. ALFRED DE MUSSET.

HUMAN groups, large or small, countries, near or far—all touch each other, help or hinder each other, in their onward march. Never in human history has there been such a baffling intermixture of human beings, race, mind, and purpose. No forecast of a single nation is possible without some knowledge of the world which surrounds it, immediate or remote. In a conversation with a distinguished Englishman two years ago, the talk drifted into a discussion of the possible future clash between the East and the West. The gist of what he said was: "By the time the clash begins, they will have taken so much from each other, will be so much intermixed, that it will be almost impossible to tell who is who and what is what."

When one sees in the theater of a New York sky-scraper, the brand new architecture of a brand new people, black men quivering with the primeval throb of Africa, singing airs that scorch your ears with their intense warmth and passion and seize

your heart with their unfathomable sadness or wild joy; when one sees in a western state of the same land buildings medieval in their exquisite curves and simplicity, with colored roofs and lovely gardens with fountains by which a Moor of the thirteenth century might find himself completely at home; and in that same medieval building the latest art of the new world, the art of the screen, created with the thousand and one devices of science; when one sees a Chinese in a tweed suit, addressing a New World audience with a perfect Oxford accent and thoughts that belong to it, telling of the westward urge which is altering the oldest and what was once deemed an everlasting civilization; when one sees in the heart of the wildest steppes, men of all races, Slavs, Mongols, Armenians, and what not, opening a new era, an era which is an irrevocable mixture of West and East, with the ideals, philosophies, and moods of all peoples coloring it all; when one sees in the oldest and most conscious country of the West where the spirit of Christianity is supreme, a woman launching a new Hindu Prophet; when one sees a Turkish shepherd boy, wearing a cap with his Turkish trousers, and singing "Valencia" at the top of his voice to the yellow, endless mounds of Anatolia; when one sees . . . never mind what else—a gigantic scene where the mixing, shifting, and boiling of ideals, philosophies, customs, faces, and manners go on in the most incongruous way—no wonder one says with the Englishman: "Who is who and what is what?" Never has there been a

time when so obviously "things were not what they seemed."

One human era has passed away with the Great War and a new era is being inaugurated. We are hardly conscious yet of the world-in-the-making behind the term "post-war," as distinguished from the old world which we call "pre-war." We are still groping in the smoke raised by the gigantic forces of destruction let loose in 1914; we are still writhing in the throes of birth, the supreme agony and pain which nature and spirit impose on all creative periods and actions. Against a background of black chaos stand out in hardly perceptible relief the future directions in which the changing worlds of East and West may move.

Because of their sharp outline, because of their throbbing youth and vitality, Russia and America catch the eye of the world first. Europe, the Mother West, is comparatively in the background. It is torn between all that is youthful and impatient for change, and all that is old and tired. It seems still halting between a cradle and a grave. Is it going to be reborn, or is it going to fade out of the picture, smeared over with the distinctive colors of Young Russia and Young America?

Whether one is for it or against it, or whether one is simply studying impartially, as one of the possible future factors in the development of one's own country or of the world in general, one is forced to give very close attention to Russia.

The germs of thought and spirit which have made the new Russia were there long before the Great War. Although the doctrines of Karl Marx, which are primarily western, are responsible for the new Russia, its spirit was and is fundamentally eastern and utterly different from everything the West has created so far. Fülöp-Miller in the opening chapter of his *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism* brings you face to face with its ultimate significance. It is a mighty effort to change the archtype of humanity itself. It is an effort to wipe out the individual man, "the man with a soul," and replace him by the "mass man," or rather by the organization composed of "mass man." In reading Fülöp-Miller's picture of this "mass man" organization, marching on with horrible rapidity and devouring all individual men, one feels uneasy and almost miserable—the soul of humanity seems to be at the mouth of a pit. But when a Communist, a really idealistic one, for whom Communism is a religion, a religion which aims at human salvation, when this type of Communist tries to explain his doctrines and you listen to him with impartial attention, it sounds quite different. "What is an individual?" a Communist would say. "An individualistic individual is an isolated, selfish, and impotent creature, who works for his own salvation and good. Yet he is always miserable and lonely. The reason is that he is only an atom in the great whole. God and Peoples are identical. The individual value is measured only by

its capacity to serve and to complete the whole. The millennium is the bringing together of all men in a league of higher unity."

This sort of reasoning is much nearer to the conception of felicity in Hindu philosophy, to the mysticism of the Old East, than to any western philosophy or mysticism. The western mystic, even in merging into the whole, preserves his personal note, his individual soul. He is influenced by that part of Christ's teaching which lays emphasis on the worth of the individual soul. The salvation of one individual is more important than a world movement. The eastern mystic is quite different. If he is a Christian, as the Russians are, he is influenced by that part of Christ's teaching which advocates the giving up of property, only he goes much farther and throws into the common salvation of mankind his soul. All parts must lose their significance and self-awareness for the creation of the perfect whole. This ideal is in its own way deep and beautiful.

But the Russian method of working out this ideal into a system of life for the good of humanity, is neither deep nor beautiful. In action it follows western materialism. The modern materialist believes that men can unite only in mechanical activity and that only in the external man are there common elements out of which collectivity can be manufactured. But in order to embrace this new concept of life, a man must get rid of his individual soul, of the distinctive qualities of which he is all the time conscious. As this is the only road to human

happiness for the Communist, he thinks all ways and means of achieving it are good. If two-thirds of humanity is to perish in order to turn the rest of mankind into Communists, let them perish. It is all for the ultimate good. A Communist, just as fanatical as any Christian Jesuit who burned the bodies of men in order to save their souls, shrinks from no human outrage to realize his religion. The Communist activities against religion, property, and above all against freedom, the bulwark of individualism, appear hideous to the western mind, but from the Communist point of view they are consequent and necessary processes.

The power of Communism does not lie in the fact of its material success or failure as a system in Russia. Men are as oppressed, as poor, as they have ever been—and even hungrier. But it is a common suffering and a common hunger. It has been ruthlessly leveling men, wealth, and all the enjoyments of life. Its strength lies in the fact that it is a new human doctrine in favor of mass humanity. Wherever masses suffer in a country from within or from without, Communism is the millennium. Moscow is the *Kabaa* of the new Mass Creed and Lenin is its prophet. This new system or rather religion—social, economic, and political—fights capitalism and individualism (or the soul) with absolute ruthlessness, and proposes to replace them with a super-military and super-mechanical human organization.

To the ultra-individualistic European, America appears to have aspects identical with Communist

Russia. America, just like the new Russia, aims at the happiness and prosperity of the mass. She levels human values and emphasizes a mechanical, material organization for collective benefit. The American ideal has no mystical, eastern state of soul behind it. Her goal of a material millennium is based on a frank democratic ideal worked out with unparalleled efficiency. Hence for the new Russia the surface material organization of America represents the ideal state. What the new Russian objects to in America is the ways and means, as well as the principles, which create this material state. Democracy and capital leave more elbow room for the individual initiative and the individual soul. It is specially effective in the domain of economics. Its way of standardizing life differs from that of the Communist. America raises the standard of every man to that of an ideal *bourgeoisie;* Russia levels down the *bourgeoisie* and attempts to create an ideal single class.

America has raised the standard of the man in the street as it has never been raised before. Every American, from the poorest paid shop girl to the millionaire, is undergoing a perpetual education from the cradle to the grave. An enormous number of scientific and educational organizations handle the child almost from the moment of its birth. An enormous number of organizations keep the American in the street in touch with what is going on in the world at large—intellectual, artistic, political, and economic. Youths of seventeen sit side by side

with youths of eighty (there are no grown-ups in America) and listen to what is going on in the remotest corners of the world. There is a vital and never-to-be-satisfied curiosity sucking out in a few years all that the world has created in centuries. I thought of two famous sayings of the Prophet as I went through America: "Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave," and "Seek knowledge even if it be in China." The early Islamic principle which set no age limit and no distance limit on knowledge seemed to be on the road to realization in America.

On the surface America looks to the casual observer like a huge human machine working for the material well-being of the Americans. And like all ultra-mechanized organizations, it is in danger of swallowing up the soul. But just a little below the surface it is not at all a machine. There is the sensation of a huge inner vibration in America that assails one who looks a little below the surface. Penetration into the inner significance of America is a slow process for the foreigner, and he inevitably comes out of it having sensed but not understood it.

At the very landing on American shores, a rigid and gigantic architecture dazes one with its new significance. Curveless and straight, it is as unique as the pyramids of old. You feel that this first contact with America gives you the outer material significance of a mechanized world where figures, machines, and a mind without a soul behind it are at work. But as one goes along, and tries to understand its drama, its literature, and its style, which are all

in the making and very distinctive, one becomes conscious of an ever present, inescapable interrogation point. That question mark behind America's great material achievement is a healthy sign, it is a force that counterbalances the possible danger of mere outward mechanization swallowing the soul. How often one sees this question in the eyes of some unknown university student, some youth in a remote corner of America.

America's importance lies in the fact that she believes that the common good, the common prosperity, can be reached through a democracy only with or in spite of the power of capital behind it, that democracy allows both elbow room and a possible inner growth which will be able to alter the rigid outer strata of materialism.

"What impressions did you get in America?" I asked a distinguished Belgian intellectual at the Williamstown Institute.

"*Ils ont la nostalgie spirituelle, Madame,*" he answered.

Homesickness for a spiritual state is a good sign in the West. It is a recognition of the limitations of merely materialist achievements.

America and Russia hence stand as two alternative political and economic models for the new world in the making. America is a great experiment in democracy with capitalism behind it, and Russia is a great experiment in proletarian dictatorship with the power of organized labor behind it. They are the two future paths which are most clearly

marked out for the nations in reformation who have turned their backs to the Old West.

Any individual or nation that has had a European past naturally looks with avid interest to all that is going on in Europe, the Old West.

The first glance shows that its material prosperity and its material forces are on the wane. This is also true of Europe's great Asiatic colonies. With the change and a new life force in Asia, the days of Europe's material ascendancy and exploitation of Asia are numbered. Asia has its own soul and it is different from that of Europe. The adoption of the mechanical and material civilization of Europe is a necessity for self-defense and self-preservation. The use of machine guns and airplanes in Asia does not at all mean westernization, or rather Europeanization.

The intellectual and moral ascendancy of Europe in the Near East, particularly in Turkey, was nearly wiped out because of her a-moral (not to say immoral) attitude in the Eastern Question, particularly in the years which led up to 1922. It shattered the eastern belief in the high standards and ideals of Europe. For to reach these ideals of the European spirit and mind Turkey's best children have left behind them, within the last century, a trail of martyrdom and suffering. Therefore the question which vitally interests the westernized Turk today is: "Is Europe going to disappear after giving her material achievements to the entire world? And what will the world lose if Europe as a cultural and intellec-

tual unit passes away, as Oswald Spengler has prophesied?" The answer is: "Complete loss of individual freedom, and the extinction of all ideals which live for their own sake rather than for utilitarian purposes—in short the extinction of spirit and the domination of matter." With the shadow of the Dark Ages on the world, when man's destiny will be either robotry or extinction, one naturally studies all possible symptoms in Europe. And so far, the external symptoms have not been reassuring. Count Keyserling sees below the surface, and gives a picture of the Europe of the future as something distinctly different from materialistic Russia with its Asiatic soul, and materialistic America with its ultra-standardization. The future unity of Europe is to take place through inner relationships. Purely external unity has never possessed stability. Hence his future Europe is not to follow the road indicated by historical materialism. He rejects uniformity and consequently rejects the limitation of the individual and the extinction of individual freedom. "Europe is emerging as a unity, because [it is] faced at closer range by an overwhelming non-European humanity,"* and in the realization of this difference from the non-European, Europeans become conscious of the things which they have in common rather than of those things which divide them. Europe is based solely on the perception of similarities among European nations, rising above differences between individual nations and cultures.

* This and the following quotations are from chap. xii of *Europe*.

Socialism and nationalism are both processes, but merely preliminary ones in the creation of future European unity. "It is obvious that in Europe, too, whatever can be socialized will be socialized; that falls in the same category as reliable train-service." But the ultimate ideal is far from being an efficient handling of the material necessities of life. Europe has to go beyond this. "Thus every accentuation of socialism, democracy, and prosperity means, for Europe, the accentuation of its inferior functions; it would be just as if the German were to take pride not in Goethe, but in the drill sergeant." Europe must go beyond socialism. To stick at socialism is to remain in a merely material and inferior state.

Nationalism is also another phase, an evidently necessary one, but a nationalism which is no longer "a struggle for existence" or "the glorification of one's country at the expense of the others." "The road of humanity lies through nationalism to bestiality," says Grillparzer. Nationalism expressed in political terms, in inter-massacres, illustrates Grillparzer's saying admirably. What the cultural nationalists in Turkey tried to express very inadequately before they were finally beaten by the narrower sort of nationalist, is elegantly defined by Count Keyserling. Nationalism expressed in culture is nothing but the individual style of a nation, her way of adjusting herself. Nationalism for the European means, "to recreate the nations which have existed until now into better nations," and

that for the best interests and uniqueness of the whole. Hence Europe's path lies beyond nationalism, just as it lies beyond socialism. The future Europe will use socialism for the betterment of those who suffer from an ugly inequality; and it will use capitalism as an efficient way of handling questions of material comfort for everybody. Europe will also use nationalism for the distinctive beauty of each part, so that the composition of the whole may have that uniqueness and inner distinction which non-European humanity lacks when it has for its aim nothing but the material and external uniformity of men.

Whither Turkey? Of these three civilizations of the future, collectivist Russia with her Asiatic soul, standardized America, with her ultra-capitalist system and her democracy, and Europe which as yet has no obvious direction but which may escape the narrow confines of nationalism, the over-mechanized and standardized tendencies of both democracy and socialism, and develop a unity from these seething phenomena and transcend them with her free soul—of these three which will be the guiding light for struggling New Turkey?

As we have already discovered, a prominent characteristic of the Turks has been their ability to make a synthetic and harmonious whole out of very diverse elements, both of thought and of human material. Islam, Byzantium, and their racial trends combined to form the Ottoman Turks and their system. It was decidedly non-western. At its best

very despotic superficially, it left much more elbow room for the individual than some of the modern democracies. Hence with the first penetration of the West, the western idea of individual freedom found sympathetic ground in which to root and flourish. The first conscious European Turk, Namik Kemal, puts forward as the essence of European culture that spirit of individual freedom. Out of the large bulk of his writings, dramas, essays, history, and poems, two verses have engraved themselves into the Turkish consciousness: "How magic art thou, oh Freedom, although when we are free we become thy slaves." All the other ideas that came with westernization, such as the emancipation of women and the secularization of the state, could be interpreted as already having existed in old Turkish life. The first drastic suppression of European thought in Turkey, which came from Abdul-Hamid, attacked the concept of freedom as the supreme disintegrating force in the Ottoman Empire. The word itself was erased from the dictionary and an army of organized spies worked to eradicate that particular concept. But a thought that has been given so much space in literature for nearly two generations does not die out by force. The strangulation of the leading men who tried to make a reality of freedom, their punishment, imprisonment, and exile, and suppressive methods of all kinds for thirty years failed to wipe out this supreme concept of what the Turks called the essence of European culture. In 1908, the overthrow of this despotic

régime had for its aim the restoration of individual freedom and rights in Turkish society.

The penetration of the West in the Near East, among many queer aspects, has a very curious one which no western historian has so far taken into consideration. From 1839 on, if one takes individuals of the so-called races in the Near East—a Turk, a Serb, a Bulgarian, and so on—and compares them to the European, one sees that in spirit the Turk is nearest to the European, in spite of his Islamic and Asiatic background, while in externals, in the adoption of material conveniences, the Turk is decidedly behind. The spiritual nearness of the Turk to the European is all the more startling for this material contrast.

With their grim realism and practical Balkanic training the Young Turks of 1908 grasped this fact very clearly. The tremendous ground to be covered in order to create a European nation in externals, especially in the practical application of the principles of the material West, became a bewildering problem. There was no time to be lost. The mind was too far ahead, and to evolve a material state in keeping with the spirit demanded more time than the Turks could afford to give. The mercantile side of the European mind did not judge the Turkish merchant from the point of view of his initial honesty, it judged him for his efficiency. Things had to be changed overnight. A non-stop speed in change and reform had to be adopted. Quality lost value and quantity became all impor-

tant. To accelerate change in the masses, if one lacks the necessary time for slow growth, the next best thing to do is to force it. The supreme reason for the party dictatorship started by the Young Turks perhaps was this. The importance of the individual receded before the importance of the mass; freedom had to yield to organization. The burden of the Turkish press before the Balkan War, a time when ideals dominated the Young Turks as ideals and not merely as useful assets for material success, was, "Only a free individual can realize what duty and responsibility are toward the state and society. Responsibility is the outcome of individual rights. Duty imposed merely from without is a slave's job, its performance is due to the lash of the task master. Responsibility can be created only in free individuals with individual rights."

After the Balkan War, when the importance and freedom of the individual gave way to the necessity for change in the masses, the philosophy of the *régime* was well expressed by the writings of Zia Keuk-Alp. The theme of his poem expressing this spirit was: No individual but society, no right but duty to that society, exists.

This was the parting of the ways of two kinds of westernizers in Turkey, and probably also a parting of the ways with the Europe of the future. The new spirit worked more easily because of the Great War. Europe itself had resorted to dictatorial means and Turkey, like other countries, had to submit to anything in order to reach the final victory which

had become the universal cry of all the fighting nations. Like all the defeated nations in the Great War, Turkey was forced into a deeper reflection, into a more serious facing of facts and forces than were the victors. The sudden danger of being wiped out by the post-war invasions intensified the life forces in Turkey almost to a supernatural degree. From 1918 to 1922, the center of thought and action was down in the depths of the people. It was the man in the street, the peasant on the soil who had to do both the acting and the thinking. It was the surging up of elemental forces that brought about the new government of the people.

The dominant emotion of the Turk at the time was his hatred of Europe, the force that had destined him to an ignominious death. His disillusionment with the civilization of Europe was equaled only by his hatred for Europe's political and mechanical forces. "Europe has no civilization, it is a greedy political gang, it is a treacherous slaughter machine," said the man in the street. How, for the first time in nearly a century, the West was questioned as a civilization and a violent effort was made to replace it by some other more genuine and working ideal, is well illustrated by the clash of the Eastern Ideal and the Western Ideal. The triumph of the Western Ideal in Turkey at such a time, with so much legitimate hatred directed against it, is one of the curious and illogical freaks of history. In *The Turkish Ordeal* I have given a full description of the struggle and of how this tri-

umph of the Western Ideal was not merely a triumph in externals. Whatever name modern human movements bear—Asiatic, Eastern, and so on—the people behind them are bound to learn the methods and processes that science and learning has placed in the hands of human beings under the name of modernism. Perhaps the more non-European a present community is in spirit, the greater emphasis it will lay on the force of the machine as the means of success and survival. In the new Russia, the image of the machine has replaced the image of Jesus Christ on the icons.

From the day the Turks felt the necessity of creating a government of their own "for the people and by the people," from the day they realized such a government, they were more typically European in the best sense than any other people. They were standing up for individual rights, as well as for national rights against that very Europe which had given them those ideals.

After the realization of Turkish aims culminating in the Lausanne Treaty, the logical thing would have been for the Turkish Republic to develop on normal and constitutional lines. A people who could carry on such a struggle without a dictatorial *régime* could surely continue to act under constitutional forms when life is more normal. But somehow human events move out of the pattern which the logic of a historian constantly tries to fit them into.

The conditions and forces which led to the dictatorship of 1925 have already been recorded. But if

a student of history still wishes to keep this particular event within the logic and pattern of history, he might say, "Is the Turkish dictatorship of 1925 not a repetition of the Young Turk dictatorship in the Great War?"

Curiously enough the Young Turk dictatorship stands historically as the forerunner of all post-war dictatorships. Whatever the idea behind them is, they all have the same machinery for creating overnight things that usually take generations to evolve. They all have followed the same short cuts for transforming thought into action.

A Turkish diplomat who went to Russia in 1920 said, "Why, the Russian machinery is an exaggerated form of the Young Turk machinery." The Italian dictatorship resembles in spirit the Turkish party dictatorship up to 1918. The new Serbian dictatorship, in its idea of centralization, was called by a correspondent of the *Times* of London similar to that of the Young Turks.

Some of these dictatorships cut deeper than others, and have as their aim not only to bring about external changes but to alter the inner man himself. In this sense they are infinitely harsher and more drastic than the earlier despotism of monarchs, which left life in the lower classes to follow whatever course it wished.

H. G. Wells, in an article on the Fascist dictatorship published in the London *Sunday Express* of February 6, 1927, says:

> There is considerable reason to suppose that organized

brotherhoods maintaining a certain uniformity of thought and action over large areas and exacting a quasi-religious devotion within their membership, are going to play an increasingly important part in human affairs.

This description holds good for the Turkish dictatorships, that of the Young Turks during the War and the one of 1925.

Mr. Wells is one of the few articulate voices declaring the Italian dictatorship non-European. "She has fallen out of the general circle of European development," he says, and adds, "She is now, for other countries, merely Mussolini." If one takes H. G. Wells as a representative European, one has to interpret Europe as the early Young Turks, those before 1908, interpreted it. The emphasis must be on the individual. Fascism is a different theory. It embodies what Zia Keuk-Alp said the Young Turk state should represent: No individual but society and state, no individual right but duty, exists. With some change in the wording one can apply this to the Communist state also. After all there is nothing new in the thought. It is the individual vs. the state, or the individual vs. the mass.

Accepting the fact that the European's traditional attitude of mind opposes dictatorship, we have then to admit that nearly half of Europe is already non-European, and the majority is lost in admiration of this non-Europeanism, which always refers to reliable train service as the supreme argument. Knowing that it is quite possible to have a reliable train service without depriving a people of

its freedom, one is obliged also to admit that the temper of mind prevailing at the present emphasizes Europe's inferior material functions and that the dominating trend in Europe is non-European. And with this in view one can judge the Turkish dictatorship. It is only non-European in the measure that half of Europe is non-European.

In comparing the Turkish dictatorship with the most outstanding European dictatorship, namely that of Italy, one is struck by a great degree of difference. The Italian dictatorship has the advantage of frankness; it denounces parliamentarianism openly, abolishes constitutional machinery, and deliberately glorifies the organized minority which it creates for "good government" and progress. The Italian dictatorship is further, ultra-nationalistic, not only in its perpetual saber-rattling and big talk about Italian imperialism, but also in the way it insists upon attempting to fuse modern Italy with the past. It goes so far in this that it amounts to reaction, if one is to judge from the voices of such men as Croce which come to us from behind muffled doors.

The Turkish dictatorship has the advantage of working behind a constitutional screen, thus retaining a European façade, although a sham one. Although it also is called nationalist, it has in truth, apart from Turkish economics, a very anti-nationalist spirit. The Turkish dictatorship has made the next greatest effort after the Soviets to cut its people off from their past. This may not be European, but

it is decidedly modern. The campaign against tradition within the last four years has been relentless. This particular instance of the Turkish dictatorship's technique, however detrimental for the Turk in the long run, must be taken at its face value. It is one of those modern attempts to turn a people's face toward the future by shutting out the past.

Hence, in trying to find the answer to the question, "Whither Turkey?" one point is absolutely clear. Turkey's face is resolutely set toward the future. But the certainty that Turkey cannot turn back is offset by the uncertainty as to the direction in which she is moving. No doubt the future Turkish state will be a synthetic unity of ideas and processes, just as the states the Turks have formed in the past always have been. How far will the spirit of Europe, with which Turkey has been imbued for a century, dominate? How much will there be of American standardization and efficiency; and above all, what will be the influence of the new Russia, constantly working upon Turkish minds?

In its economic system, for long years to come, Turkey is bound to stand on the side of capitalism. No country in the world needs capital as urgently as Turkey does, to develop its resources and to reconstruct what has been to a very great degree destroyed. No one can realize the immediate need of development in every line without visiting the interior of Anatolia. All these are merely external and inferior functions; but until Turkey reaches the minimum material standard of civilization possible

for her, the emphasis must be laid on them by every Turkish Government. The necessary capital and expert technical assistance needed in order to realize this standard—without which all reforms will merely be so many empty printed words—can be obtained only from Europe or from America.

Apart from this necessity which ties them to the capitalist world, because of their Islamic training the Turks would be the last people to accept communism as an economic system. Christianity, regarded from a certain angle, is communist in spirit; Islam is not. Islam, in its recognition of the rights of man, emphasizes the right of property as its fundamental principle. An illuminating example in this respect can be given from the new Russia. The Soviets divided the land of the Moslem landowners around Tashkend among the Moslem Turkish peasants. The peasants more than once returned the land to the landowners, of their own accord; for this they were severely punished by the Soviet Government.

In form Turkey is bound to remain a republic. The traditional forces are so much discredited that the revival of the sultanate is an impossibility. Whether military figures, with a party behind them, can maintain dictatorial power very much longer, will depend on what is going on in the world in general and in Europe in particular.

What, after all, really matters to the Turk is what really matters to the European. Will there be a future united, though not uniform, Europe? If one

could solve the sorry riddle of European destiny, one could clearly answer the question, "Whither Turkey?"

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